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Dissertation

NATURE AND NATURALISM IN THE THOUGHT OF FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE AND JOHN DEWEY

by

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Statement of the Problem

The central problem of this dissertation is a matter of definition. As the title suggests, the main interest is in "nature" and "naturalism." The quest was prompted by the ambiguity of these terms among contemporary naturalists. The writer has chosen, therefore, two well-known American naturalists as representative of this school, in an effort to find out just what the naturalists, themselves, mean by these terms.

In order to ascertain the meaning, an investigation of several main points is required. It is, as was stated above, an attempt to arrive at a definition of "nature" and "naturalism" as used by these writers. It will also be necessary to investigate the main influences which prompted their respective philosophical systems, with special reference to their conceptions of these terms. Further, a comparison of these two thinkers must be made in order to discover their similarities and differences, if any, in an effort to arrive at some definition which would be acceptable to both, and perhaps, to other adherents of this school. Finally, some evaluation of the position, agreement and consistency of the theories of these two thinkers will be made in the form of conclusions to this study and investigation.

B. Significance of the Problem

The importance and significance of the investigation is partly implied in the preceding section. There has been far too much confusion caused in current philosophical discussions by loose terminology. Many writers, using the same terms, find themselves talking about different things. There is need for definition and freedom from "the tyranny of words." It is probable that no term has been used in more ways than the term "nature." Every good dictionary lists a dozen or more definitions of the term. This is also true of the term "naturalism."

To add to the confusion, there is no agreement upon the precise definitions of the terms. When we come to consider the philosophical naturalists themselves, we find them offering no exact definition. A good illustration of this is found in the recent naturalistic manifesto, Naturalism and the Human Spirit, a co-operative enterprise, edited by Y. H. Krikorian. In the last chapter of this book, John H. Randall Jr. attempts to sum up the various views under the title of "Epilogue: The Nature of Naturalism," from which we quote:

> Now naturalism, in the sense in which it is maintained in this volume, can be defined negatively as the refusal to take "nature" or "the natural" as a term of distinction (italics ours). As Mr. Lamprecht well points out, it is opposed to all dualisms between Nature and another realm of being--to the Greek opposition between Nature and Art, to the medieval contrast of the Natural and the Supernatural, to the empiricist antithesis of Nature and Experience, to the idealist distinction between Natural and Transcendental, to the fundamental dualism pervading modern thought between Nature and Man. For the present-day naturalists "Nature" serves rather as the all-inclusive category, corresponding to the role

> played by "Being" in Greek thought, or by "Reality" for the idealists. In this sense, as Mr. Dennes recognizes, naturalism, in becoming all-inclusive, ceases to be a distinctive "ism." It regards as "natural" whatever man encounters in whatever way--Nature, as Mr. Costello put it, is a collective name for "quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff."[1]

It will be readily seen from this, that naturalists are not greatly interested in exact definition, partly because they think it dogmatic. Naturalism, as a philosophy, is more of a common feeling of spirit among quite a group of men with diverging first principles. Yet, it seems to the writer that, if we are ever to make progress, we must have more exact definitions. To adopt such a view as expressed in this volume, is to lapse into confusion worse confounded. It tends to lead to chaos. It is the purpose of the writer to offer definitions of "nature" and "naturalism" which will remove this confusion, and which, from the philosophical point of view, ought to be more or less acceptable to all schools of thought.

C. Scope of the investigation

The bulk of this dissertation will be a consideration of the writings of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and John Dewey. In the case of Woodbridge, whose writings are somewhat limited, the task offers few difficulties. A statement about his writings will appear in the next section. When we come to John Dewey, we find ourselves at the opposite extreme. Mr. Dewey, who has been writing for the past sixty-four years, has written much in several fields of endeavor. P. A. Schilpp,

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[1] Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 357-358.

in Volume I of the Library of Living Philosophers has a 65 page bibliography of his writings.[2] Fortunately for this investigation, a considerable range of his interests may be eliminated from present consideration. Many of his essays, addresses and articles are not applicable to our subject. Examples of these are his work on such questions as the Trotsky case, the formation of a new political party in this country, techincal articles on education and various other subjects, addresses on controversial, social, political and other questions of the hour, etc.

The scope of the preliminary investigation may be narrowed down to a brief history of philosophical naturalism which will be taken up in the next chapter. This will be followed by two chapters dealing with Woodbridge's conception of "nature" and "mind." A chapter will be devoted to Dewey's naturalistic philosophy as a whole, covering the fields of logic, epistemology, metaphysics, and psychology. This will be followed by a chapter upon the application of his naturalistic philosophy to the field of values. Only by such a systematic consideration can the full implications of the naturalistic thought of these men be arrived at. Then, some evaluation of the meaning and purpose, as well as the implications of "nature" and "naturalism" as used by these men, can be made.

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2. Schilpp (ed.), PJD, 611-676: see also Thomas and Schneider, BJD, 1929.
3. In this dissertation, for the sake of consistency, Dewey's spelling will be followed.

D. Brief Biography of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge

Frederick Woodbridge was born in Windsor, Ontario, on March 26, 1867. He died on June 1, 1940. Who's Who tells us nothing about his early life, nor when he came to the United States. He received his Bachelor of Arts degree from Amherst College in 1888. He then went to Union Theological Seminary in New York, from which he graduated in 1892. From 1892 to 1894 he studied in Germany, at the University of Berlin. In 1898 he received the Master of Arts degree from Amherst College. With the passing of the years he was given a number of honorary degrees From 1895 to 1902 he was professor of philosophy at the University of Minnesota, leaving there in the latter year to teach at Columbia University. In 1904, the same year that John Dewey came to Columbia, Woodbridge was named Dean of the faculties of political science, philosophy, science and fine arts. For many years he served as an editor of the Journal of Philosophy.

Because of his administrative and editorial duties, Woodbridge did not write extensively. Much of his writings consist of essays, published mainly after his coming to Columbia. In fact, before that time he seems to have published but four short essays. Costello, in his chapter, "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge," says:

> Woodbridge was a powerful personality. Those who knew him will not soon forget the square-cut face on the square shoulders, the forthright speech, the keenness, the humor...No one can judge whether Woodbridge might have accomplished more by writing more himself, rather than by activities as administrator and editor.[4]

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[4] Krokorian (ed.), NHS, 297.

The first book published by Woodbridge was The Philosophy of Hobbes, 1903. During the next few years, 1904 to 1912, his most important essays dealt with the problem of consciousness. In 1916 a short book appeared under the title of The Purpose of History, in which he interprets history as being made up of many histories, and sees the whole process as naturalistic. It was ten years before he was to publish another book; this time it was The Realm of Mind. In 1937 a group of his friends gathered together the most important of his essays and published them in his honor, on his seventiety birthday, under the title of Nature and Mind. Then, in 1940, shortly after his death, was published his largest single work, An Essay on Nature. The essays important for our purposes, are included in the collected volume, and need not be enumerated separately.

E. Brief Biography of John Dewey[5]

John Dewey was born in Burlington, Vermont, on October 20, 1859. He is still living and still engaged in writing and developing his philosophy. His life may well be divided into five periods.

1. Childhood and Youth. 1859-1882. He completed his preliminary education in the schools at Burlington. He then entered the University of Vermont from which he received the Bachelor of Arts degree in 1879. After graduating he taught

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[5] Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 3-45.

for two years in the High School in South Oil City, Pennsylvania. During this time he read much in the field of philosophy, becoming increasingly intrigued by the subject. An early essay, "The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism," was published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1882.

2. Graduate Studies. 1882-1884. In the fall of 1882, Dewey entered Johns Hopkins University to study for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. At that time President Gilman was working on a plan to provide adequate graduate studies for American students who, up to this time, had been going to Germany. "President Gilman constantly urged upon the students the feasibility and importance of original research."[6] Because of the number of clergymen interested in, and teaching philosophy, the President suggested to Dewey that he change his major, "but was unable to turn the enthusiastically budding philosopher from his path."[7] At the University, Dewey came under the influence of such men as George S. Morris and G. Stanley Hall. In 1884 he graduated, writing a dissertation on "The Psychology of Kant."[8]

3. Hegelian Period. 1884-1894. During this period, Dewey was first Instructor, and then Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Michigan, where he remained until 1888. The next year he spent at the University of Minnesota. The following year he returned to Minnesota as

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6. Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 15.
7. Ibid., 16.
8. Schilpp, PJD, 611.

full professor of philosophy, remaining until 1894. It was during this period that he began to devolop his early philosophical theories, most of which were influenced by Hegelian philosophy. His Psychology was published in 1887, to be soon followed by Leibniz: A Critical Exposition. In the latter part of this period he turned more to moral philosophy and also began his departure from the Hegelian influence. In 1891 appeared his Outline of Ethics, and in 1893 a revision called Study of Ethics.

4. The Chicago Period. 1894-1904. In 1904 he was called to be the head of the Department of Philosophy, Psychology, and Pedagogy in the newly-formed University of Chicago. Dewey says: "One of the factors leading to its [the offer to teach there] acceptance was the inclusion of Pedagogy in the department with Philosophy and Psychology."[9] As would be expected from this, his interest was divided between the three fields, with education occupying a large part of his time, especially through the establishment of the "Dewey School" for educational experiment. He published the Psychology of Number, a cooperative work in 1894. Then came School and Society in 1900.

His philosophical bent is well illustrated in his part of the volume, Studies in Logical Theory, 1903. The empirical or experimental view of logical theory is seen coming to the fore as well as functional psychology. "Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other

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[9] Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 27.

needs we engage in other sorts of activity."[10] The great problem of logic is this: "How does the particular functional situation termed the reflective behave?"[11] The combination of functional psychology with his early Hegelianism is seen in this: "The test of validity of idea is its functional or instrumental use in effecting the transition from a relatively conflicting experience to a relatively integrated one."[12] Here, in the germ, appears his Organic Logic later to be so well developed in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1938. Dewey says that: .

> After his movement from idealism to his naturalistic and pragmatic experimentalism personal contacts had, on the whole, more influence in directing his thought than the books he read.[13]

On the influence of Angell's functional psychology he says, "This movement played a part in developing the logical theories of Dewey and in making a bridge from his logical to his moral theory."[14] As his biographer so well says, Dewey's contribution to Studies in Logical Theory marks "a final and complete break with Hegelian idealism and launches his instrumental theory of reflective thought."[15] Although written at a later date his books, How We Think, 1909, and Democracy and Education, 1913, are the fruits of his Chicago experiment.

5. The Columbia Period. 1904- . From 1904 on, Dewey has been closely connected with Columbia University as professor and professor emeritus. The first important writing

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[10] Dewey, (ed.), SLT, 2.
[11] Ibid., 18.
[12] Ibid., 75.
[13] Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 28.
[14] Ibid., 32.
[15] Ibid., 33.

of this period is Ethics, 1908, which he published in co-operation with James Tufts. In the next few years he broadened his interests to include the whole field of social philosophy, but he continued his contribution to speculative philosophy and education. In 1910, the Influence of Darwin on Philosophy appeared. Five years later came his Schools of To-Morrow in co-operation with his daughter Evelyn, and in the same year German Philosophy and Politics was published. Then came, in 1916, one of his great speculative works, Essays in Experimental Logic. In 1917 Creative Intelligence, another co-operative volume appeared.

When Dewey came to Columbia, Woodbridge was already there, accepting and teaching a "naturalistic metaphysics of the Aristotelian type."[16]

> Contact with him made Dewey aware of the possibility and value of a type of metaphysical theory which did not profess to rest upon principles not empirically verifiable.[17]

Dewey also mentions the influence of James's Pragmatism which he delivered as lectures at Columbia. The whole realistic atmosphere found in this new environment "led to a rethinking of all his philosophic ideas."[18] His thought as found in Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1920, Experience and Nature, 1925, and The Quest for Certainty, 1929, are the direct result of this new influence. It is also true that these works contain the whole essence of his speculative philosophy or naturalistic

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[16] Ibid., 36.
[17] Loc. cit.
[18] Loc. cit.

metaphysics. When _Experience and Nature_ appeared the reviewer for the _New York Tribune_ wrote, "with monumental care, detail, and completeness, Professor Dewey has in this volume revealed the metaphysical heart that beats its unvarying, alert tempo through his writings, whatever their explicit themes."[19] His psychological development is well covered in _Human Nature and Conduct_, 1922, while his social interest is expressed in "The Role of Philosophy in the History of Civilization," which he delivered at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy held at Harvard University in 1929, in his contribution to _Whither Mankind_, and _The World Tomorrow_. Three important volumes of collections of his writings have been edited and published by Joseph Ratner, _The Philosophy of John Dewey_, 1928, _Characters and Events_, 2 vols., 1929, and _Intelligence in the Modern World_, 1939. But Dewey himself, did not stop writing. In 1934 came _Art as Experience_, and _A Common Faith_. In 1935 _Liberalism and Social Action_, and in 1938, _Experience and Education_, were published. Also in 1938 appeared the volume which many believe to be the culmination of his thought: _Logic: The Theory of Inquiry_, a great work in the field of Organic Logic. Most of Dewey's works since that date have been essays and reviews, although he has published some longer works in the social field, including _Freedom and Culture_, 1939. His more recent works include Chapter I in the Krikorian volume, 1944, "Antinaturalism _in Extremis_," and "Dualism and the Split Atom," which appeared in _The New Leader_, November, 1945.

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[19] Cited on the Paper Jacket of the book published by The Open Court Pub. Co., 1925.

Both of these are a criticism of religion in general and supernaturalism in particular. Then in the spring of 1946, appeared a new volume, Problems of Men, but, with the exception of the Introduction, it consists of previously published articles. This, while by no means complete, gives a bird's-eye view of the historical development of Dewey's thought.

F. Some Influences on Frederick J. E. Woodbridge

When we consider the influences upon Woodbridge, the task is somewhat more difficult than when we think of Dewey. Dewey repeatedly acknowledges contributions to the development of his thought. Although Woodbridge says little that is specific on the subject, some important sources are evident. His first important work was the Philosophy of Hobbes. For several years his main writings were on the problem of consciousness, showing an interest in the modern psychological treatment of the mind-body problem. There is little doubt that his philosophy was influenced by behavioristic and functional psychology. He was greatly influenced by the theory of biological evolution as is seen from such articles as "Natural Teleology." Costello, in his chapter in Naturalism and the Human Spirit, well points out the influence of Spinoza upon Woodbridge.

> In print and in conversation Woodbridge was ever praising the greatness of Aristotle, and he acknowledged indebtedness to Plato, to Locke, to Santayana, to Bacon and Hobbes. But I do not find in his published writings echoes of the very substance of these authors, as I do of Spinoza.[20]

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[20] Costello, Art.(1944), 307.

Woodbridge's view of nature was undoubtedly influenced by Aristotle and Spinoza more than by any other philosophers. When he came to Columbia, Dewey said concerning Woodbridge, that he "accepted and taught naturalistic metaphysics of the Aristotelian type."[21] The relation of Woodbridge to both Aristotle and Spinoza will be taken up more fully later.

G. Some Influences on John Dewey

Dewey, as well as Woodbridge was influenced by the Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle, the former still providing his favorite philosophic reading.[22] In his essay "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," Dewey finds some grounds for pragmatism in the thought of Plato "whose highest flight of metaphysics always terminated with a social and practical turn, and not to the artificial Plato constructed by unimaginative commentators who treat him as the original university professor."[23]

Dewey, as well as other modern naturalists, link their thought with that of Aristotle. Writing in the Krikorian volume Dewey says: "philosophical naturalism has a more distinguished ancestry than is usually recognized; there are, for example, the names of Aristotle and Spinoza."[24] Aristotle, he continues, regarded the physical as the lowest substratum of nature and intellect as the highest. "Pure intellect, pure because free from contamination by any trace of the material,

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[21] Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 36.
[22] Dewey, Art.(1930), 21.
[23] Loc. cit.
[24] Dewey, Art.(1944),1.

is at the apex."[25] Both the material and the intellectual are within nature. Centuries later, Aristotle's thought was transformed by the medieval church philosophers and "the naturalistic elements in his teaching were overlaid, covered up, with supernatural beliefs."[26] In giving a dynamic interpretation to nature, modern naturalists also hold that they stand in the Aristotelian succession. The doctrine of "natural teleology" is linked with Aristotle's thesis that nature does nothing in vain.[27]

To Kant, Dewey says, Peirce, the originator of American pragmatism, owed the term "pragmatic." But Kant had a far more direct influence upon Dewey than that. The great contribution of Kant, he says, was the development of a system of belief

> which would give mechanical science, conceived after the Newtonian pattern, complete sway in all matters of fact, in all matters whatsoever where thinking has a claim to interfere; while he reserved a higher ideal realm with which man's moral and religious interests are concerned, a realm where science has no business to enter and where it could say nothing.[28]

Against this bifurcation of experience, Dewey's philosophy was to be a lifelong protest. The reason for this protest he states as follows:

> It was a great comfort to many to know they could be as scientific and as mechanistically scientific as they desired in the realm of phenomena, and yet retain intact a superior world of ideal values in which freedom, instead of mechanical necessity, reigned. But the price paid for the comfort was unduly high. Science in such a regimé becomes a technical occupation of an intellectual class; it

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[25] Loc. cit.
[26] Loc. cit.
[27] See Section on Aristotle in Chapter II; also Dewey, GPP, 20.
[28] Dewey, CAE, 65.

> is barren in morals, where fertilization by science is most needed, fruitful only in material appliances and machines used in the material sphere for mundane ends where the world is already too much with us. Morals become an affair of formulas, often sublime in themselves, but without possibility of effective translation, intellectual or practical, into the affairs of the workaday world.[29]

Kant's philosophy only postponed a facing of this question, and with it the time when the discoveries of science would be made applicable to the whole of experience.

Dewey began his philosophical career as an Hegelian idealist, and although he later rejected this position, he says, "That acquaintance with Hegel has left a permanent deposit in my thinking."[30] Dewey rejected Hegel's concept of the Absolute Mind, but retained his emphasis upon "continuity" and the "function of conflict."[31] The Hegelian emphasis upon "coherence" and "wholes" is clearly seen in Dewey's logical writings.[32]

Dewey was also influenced by several of his contemporaries, the first of which was Charles Sanders Peirce whose theory is summarized as follows:

> Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have, Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.[33]

But it was not until 1898 that the work of Peirce was brought to the attention of the philosophical world by William James.[34] James's writings, especially Principle of Psychology, were a second influence. To these two men Dewey gives much credit for his own Instrumentalism. Of James's objective psychological theory, founded upon biology he says: "It worked its way more

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[29] Ibid., 66.
[30] Dewey, Art.(1925), 21.
[31] Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 17-18.
[32] Dewey, LOG, 104-105, 13, 25, 55, 177 and others.
[33] Peirce, Art.(1878); reprinted in Muelder & Sears, DAP.
[34] James, Art.(1898); reprinted in James, CER.

and more into all my ideas and acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs."[35] In the development of his theory Dewey is closer to Peirce than to James. He conceived of thought as a function of the human organism--a function which may be used to adjust the organism to its environment. As his theory developed, Dewey became more and more behavioristic in his psychology. Indeed he himself says:

> I should also like to point out that the essays in their psychological phase are written from the standpoint of what is now termed a behavioristic psychology, though some of them antedate the use of that term as a descriptive epithet.[36]

But what seems to the writer of this dissertation of much more importance is the fact that Dewey reaffirmed this position in the Schilpp volume, 1939.[37] This behavioristic viewpoint is acknowledged also in the other article referred to above:

> The psychological tendencies which have exerted an influence on instrumentalism are of a biological rather than a physiological nature. They are closely related to the important movement whose promoter in psychology has been Doctor John Watson and to which he has given the name of Behaviourism. [sic][38]

In the process of developing his philosophy, Dewey always related it to human affairs and humanity. The purpose of philosophy is adaptation to, and control of, environment through the instrumentalities of intelligence, thought, or ideas. The chief function of philosophy is the solution of practical and social problems.

Better it is for philosophy to err in active par-

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35. Jane Dewey, op. cit., 23.
36. Dewey, Preface to, EEL, vi.
37. Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 23.
38. Dewey, Art., in Runes, TCP, 464.

> ticipation in the living struggles and issues of its own age and times than to maintain an immune monastic impeccability, without relevancy and bearing in the generating ideas of its contemporary present.[39]

> The aim of philosophy, then, is to become, as far as is humanly possible, an organ for dealing with these (social or environmental) conflicts...it is to be a catholic and far-sighted theory of the adjustment of the conflicting factors of life.[40]

Dewey insists upon the practical use and application of philosophy. It is always for a purpose. The idea of consequences, of course, permeates the whole pragmatic outlook. This concept will be dealt with more fully in Chapter V.

H. Survey of Literature in the Field

We shall now point out some of the books and articles which deal with the subject of "nature" and "naturalism." To mention all the works is of course impossible. A great work is Friedrich A. Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus, (1866), 1926, which is available in an English translation. Two excellent works in the field are James Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism, 1899, and A. J. Balfour's Foundations of Belief, 8th ed., 1901. Other good works, some of which deal only in part with this problem are, Ralph Barton Perry's Present Philosophical Tendencies, 1912; Alfred North Whitehead's The Concept of Nature, 1920; D. H. Parker's The Self and Nature, 1917; James B. Pratt's Matter and Spirit, 1922, and his Naturalism, 1939, although the latter rather confuses the issue because of a very loose definition of "naturalism."; John

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39. Dewey, in EHWJ, 79-80.
40. Dewey, CI, 5; RP, 26; IDP, 45.

Watson's Psychology From the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 1919, as well as his other works; Chester L. Morgan's Emergent Evolution, 1923; Charles Darwin's Origin of Species, 1859, The Descent of Man, 1871, and other writings; Samuel Alexander's Space, Time, and Deity, 1920; Arthur S. Eddington's Science and the Unseen World, 1929, The Philosophy of Physical Science, 1939, and others; Roy Wood Sellars' Evolutionary Naturalism, 1922, The Philosophy of Physical Realism, 1932, and numerous articles and reviews; C. A. Strong's Essays on the Natural Origin of Mind, 1930; Arthur Titius's Natur und Gott, 1926; Henry Nelson Wieman's Is There a God?, 1936, and other works; Morris R. Cohen's Reason and Nature, 1931; Corliss Lamont's Issues of Immortality, 1932, and The Illusions of Immortality, 1935; George Santayana's The Life of Reason, 5 vols., 1905-1906, The Realm of Matter, 1930, and many others; Durant Drake's Mind and its Place in Nature, 1925; Arthur O. Lovejoy's The Revolt Against Dualism, 1930, and others; Bertrand Russell's Philosophy, 1927, and other works.

Among the works which are more directly connected with Woodbridge and Dewey, we find the following. "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge," in Krikorian, ed., Naturalism and the Human Spirit, 1944; Arthur O. Lovejoy's chapter, "Pragmatism versus the Pragmatist," in Durant Drake and others, Essays in Critical Realism, where he criticizes Dewey; D. T. Howard's John Dewey's Logical Theory, 1918, in which Dewey's earlier writings are dealt with; George Santayana's article, "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," originally published in the Journal of Philosophy, 1926, and reprinted in the Schilpp Volume;

Viscount Haldane's Human Experience, 1926, is a very strong criticism of Dewey's Experience and Nature; A. Schinz's Anti-pragmatism, 1909; Sidney Hook's The Metaphysics of Pragmatism, 1927, and his John Dewey, 1937; A. W. Moore's Pragmatism and its Critics, 1910; James B. Pratt's What is Pragmatism?, 1909; Joseph Ratner's The Philosophy of John Dewey, 1928, Characters and Events, 1929, and Intelligence in the Modern World, 1939; then there is the volume edited by Paul A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey, 1939, which is by far the most systematic and complete criticism of Dewey's philosophy as a whole. Nature and Values, 1945, by Edgar S. Brightman is a recent criticism of naturalism. Besides these there are other books, as well as a continuous stream of articles on Dewey and his thought, in the philosophical journals, not to mention others, for the last five or six decades.

CHAPTER II

BRIEF SURVEY OF NATURALISM

A. Purpose

In this chapter it is our purpose to give a brief resumé of "naturalism" as a philosophical system, in order to orient ourselves in the field, and to consider the historical theories about "nature" which may have bearing upon the present study. This is not intended to be a history, but simply a pointing to some of the highlights in the use of these terms "nature" and "naturalism," not only today, for for centuries past. For an excellent history, those interested are referred to Lange's work, published in English under the title History of Materialism.

B. Definition of Terms

1. Nature. In the matter of definition, as good a place as any to begin, is with Webster. This Dictionary lists twelve different main meanings of the term, with additional subvariants to many of them. It will be unnecessary to consider all of these. One will suffice, for example. Webster's philosophical definition of "nature" is as follows:

> The totality of powers or agencies which determine the character and process of things, in general and in detail; that which is the gound of existing phenomena and determines the order of causes and effects, whether conceived as a plurality of formative agencies or as a single and uniting principle governing all reality in space and time;--often restricted to the totality of finite agencies and forces, in distinction from a creative and guiding intelligence. The conception of nature has been confused by the mingling of three chief meanings adopted with the word in English, viz., (1) crea-

> tive or vital force, (2) created being in its existential character, (3) creation, as a whole, esp., the physical universe.[1]

The great variety, even in the philosophical use of the term is quite evident from this. Further, Webster's definition can hardly be considered exhaustive. He goes on to say that the "main ambiguity is between *nature* as active or creative and *nature* as passive or created."[2]

In an article, "A Personalistic View of Human Nature,"[3] Edgar S. Brightman discusses this term "nature" at length. *Natura* is derived from the Latin *nascor* which means "to be born," or "to beget." It is equivalent to the Greek φυσις (phusis). There are at least five general historical meanings of the term with subvariants besides. (1) Nature (φυσις) for the Greeks was the whole world, viewed as an ordered process; law rather than development was basic. (2) For traditional theology, especially for scholasticism, nature is the created order as distinguished from God. (3) For the more pantheistic thinkers, nature is all-that-there-is; as in Spinoza's *deus sive natura*. Nature as begetting, so to speak, is *natura naturans*; nature as begotten, *natura naturata*. Many modern naturalists share this view vaguely, and think of nature as synonymous with reality. (4) For Kant, nature is the phenomenal order--the order of categorized appearances, the

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1. Webster, NID, 1631.
2. Loc. cit.
3. Brightman, Art.(1945), 1-2.

sense manifold organized into a world of possible experience. Neither things in themselves or the moral experiences are, on this view, any part of Nature. (5) Nature is also loosely used as the designation of what the sciences are investigating. It is no wonder that John Dewey, writing on the subject in J. M. Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, says that "Few terms used in philosophy have a wider or looser use, or involve greater ambiguity."[4] This shows clearly that all authorities agree on the extremely indefinite usage of "nature." The need for exact definition is clear.

2. Naturalism. Again we turn to the dictionaries. Webster says that "naturalism" means:

> The doctrine which expands conceptions drawn from the natural sciences into a world view, denying that anything in reality has a supernatural or more than natural significance. It is the doctrine that cause-and-effect laws are able to give an adequate account of all phenomena and any teleological conceptions of nature are invalid.[5]

Baldwin in his article on "Naturalism," in his Dictionary, lists three possible meanings:

> (1) The theory that the whole of the universe or of experience may be accounted for by a method like that of the physical sciences, and with recourse only to the current conceptions of physical and natural science; more specifically, that mental and moral processes may be reduced to the terms and categories of the natural sciences.
> (2) Synonymous with materialism.
> (3) As a view that limits itself to the normal in anything as against appeal to what transcends nature as a whole, or, as in any way, supernatural or mystical.[6]

Baldwin favors limiting the use of the term to the third sense leaving positivism and materialism to take care of the first

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[4] Dewey, Art., 139.
[5] Webster, Art., 1631.
[6] Baldwin, Art., 138.

two respectively. He goes on:

> It is a false position from the start, as the development of science shows, to limit "nature" to physical nature, and that minus animated nature. Indeed, the development in the meaning of natural to include man is so firmly established that it were better to yield up the word naturalism altogether to go with it.[7]

It will be seen from this that Baldwin wants to make man part and parcel of nature. Nature, for him, is all there is.

A very good statement of what the philosophical naturalist ought to say, appears in the article "Naturalism" in Runes's Dictionary of Philosophy. Professor Fuller, who wrote the article, says much in one sentence:

> Naturalism, challenging the cogency of the cosmological, teleological, and moral arguments, holds that the universe requires no supernatural cause and government, but is self-existent, self-explanatory, self-operating, and self-directing; that the world process is not teleological and anthropocentric, but purposeless, deterministic (except for possible tychistic events), and only incidentally productive of man; that human life, physical, mental, moral, and spiritual, is an ordinary natural event attributable in all respects to the ordinary operations of nature; and that man's ethical values, compulsions, activities, and restraints can be justified on natural grounds, without recourse to supernatural sanctions, and his highest good pursued and attained under natural conditions, without expectation of a supernatural destiny.[8]

To summarize to this point, the variety of meanings which may be applied to "nature" and "naturalism" is evident. It is well to have them clearly in mind. Nature may be:

(1) The whole world viewed as ordered process;
(2) The created order as distinguished from God;
(3) All-that-there-is;
(4) The phenomenal order;
(5) The field of scientific investigation.

The definition of "natural" and "naturalism" will depend upon

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[7] Loc. cit.
[8] Fuller, Art., in Runes, DOP, 205.

the definition of "nature" adhered to, or vice versa.

C. Naturalism in Greek Thought

1. *The Early Greeks*. The Early Greeks have often been classified as materialists because they sought for a ground of things within the material world. Thales, for example, found the ground of things in "water." Anixamander suggested "the boundless" as the ground, while Anaximenes found the ultimate ground in "air." Aristotle in his *Metaphysics* says that:

> Most of the early Greek philosophers were content to seek a material first principle as the cause of all things...but of what sort this first principle is, and how many such there are, this is the point upon which they are not agreed.[9]

But there is still considerable disagreement as to the exact meaning of "Nature" (φυσις) among the early Greeks. Paul R. Helsel in an article in *The Personalist*, "The Beginnings of Personalism in Constructive Thought," discusses the meaning of this Greek term at some length. The great question is this: "Did the Ancients imply by it (φυσις), a permanent unchanging substratum, or did they mean coming into being or growth?"[10] Was the Greek conception of "nature" static or dynamic? He points out that the Greeks did not limit the term to one meaning and so the term may well stand for a whole family of ideas such as, substratum, life, power, soul, value, or God. The restrictions were placed upon the use of the term by Aristotle three hundred years later. Thus the use of "cause"

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[9] Aristotle, MET, I, 3, 983b.
[10] Helsel, Art.(1944-45), 20.

by Aristotle in the above quotation is arbitrary. Too many have assumed that Aristotle's use of the term φύσις was the only use of the term. Hence Aristotle assumed, and others following him, that the early Greeks sought only a material cause. "Thus thinkers down to Kant began by presupposing an objective space-filling stuff. Aristotle's knowledge of the Ancients is partial and inadequate."[11] Helsel goes on to point out that if the dynamic interpretation be given to the term, that is, in terms of life and growth, there is as much ground for a personalistic interpretation as a naturalistic one.

The real founder of materialistic philosophy was Democritus who taught that "only the atoms and the void are real."[12] According to his view, reality was made up of indivisible, impenetrable, simple atoms. What they are now, they always have been, and ever shall be. Out of these atoms the different objects of experience are formed. All bodies are combinations of atoms and spaces. Objects differ, simple because the atoms differ in size, shape, weight, arrangement and position. The atoms have within themselves, the power of motion and hence no external causative agent is necessary for a physical system. The earth is one of the bodies formed or created by a particular arrangement of atoms, and out of the moist earth or slime life arose.

According to Democritus, the soul is also composed of material atoms, but the atoms of the soul are finer, rounder,

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[11] Loc. cit.
[12] Bakewell, SBAP, 60.

and quicker than any of the other atoms. Thilly says that in the theory of Democritus, "we have the crude beginnings of a physiological psychology on a materialistic basis."[13]

The extent to which Democritus carried his materialistic view is well seen in his theory of sense-perception. According to him, objects send out images of themselves which pass through space and enter and directly affect the atoms of the soul.

Writing in Baldwin's Dictionary, Dewey says that there was no clear distinction of the term "nature" before Plato.

> The early Greeks were all "naturalists" in the sense that they were basically interested in the physical world. There was with most of them no clear distinction between mind and matter. "Nature" was conceived of as living and, in so far at least, as psychical; the scheme, in a word, was Hylozoism, not materialism.[14]

2. Plato. The distinction between the physical and the metaphysical was first clearly made by Plato, thought by many to be the greatest philosopher who ever lived. After his time the tendency to use the term "nature" in a restricted sense grew rapidly. It distinguished or marked off the physical world from the metaphysical. The world of nature was the realm of becoming for Plato, as distinguished from the realm of being which he called the World of Ideas or Forms. One must recognize "the existence of absolute beauty and be able to distinguish the idea from the objects which participate in the idea..."[15] The world of phenomena was an object of probable knowledge only.

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[13] Thilly, HOP, 39.
[14] Dewey, Art.(1902), 139.
[15] Plato, Republic V, 476.

> But it was far from being identical with what we should term nature in the purely physical sense, the term σῶμα much more nearly expressing that. Moreover, in general a teleological explanation of nature was required by which it was subjected to the good and reason.[16]

The distinction between the two is well illustrated by the Allegory of the Cave in Book VII of the Republic. Nature is the whole system of moving and changing things so far as they are capable of realizing an end or purpose.

3. Aristotle.

Aristotle's concept of nature is important because both Dewey and Woodbridge, as well as other naturalists, link their systems with his thought. Nature, according to Aristotle, does nothing in vain. Nature is always achieving purposes or ends. In contrasting the results of art and nature he says: "if, therefore, artificial products are for the sake of an end, so clearly also are natural products."[17] It is for a purpose that the swallow builds a nest, the spider makes a web, and the plant grows leaves. "It is plain then that nature is a cause, a cause that operates for a purpose."[18] Aristotle rejected Plato's attempt to separate the world of Forms from the world of changing things. Instead he conceived of form and matter together as making up nature. There is no matter which does not have some form. But Aristotle, at the same time, arrives at Pure Form, the unmoved Mover, or God as the ultimate final cause of all things.[19] All the order and uniformity and system

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[16] Dewey, Art. (1902), 139.
[17] Aristotle, Physics, 199a.
[18] Ibid., 200b.
[19] Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1064ab, 1071b, 1072b.

of nature is due to the fact that it represents "the transition of the potential to completion under the teleological influence of forms, and the supreme Form, God."[20] Aristotle's view may be summarized as:

> (1) The system of moving, changing things, so far as directed to realizing an end, or the end, the absolutegood;
> (2) as the standard of reference to which all particulars of a given cause as well as failures, etc., can be measured. But it is distinguished from Art in that the efficient cause is internal not external.[21]

4. The Stoics and Epicureans. In the Epicurean philosophy the teleological factor is eliminated and "nature is simply the sum total of the mechanical impacts and arrangements of the purely quantitative elements, the atoms."[22] This view is found in its greatest expression in Lucretius's De Rerum Natura. Here the term "nature" is limited largely to the physical world. Lucretius says:

> If you will apprehend and keep in mind these things, nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods.[23]

He held to a form of physiological psychology. "...must we not admit that the mind and the soul are of a bodily nature?"[24] The mind is formed of "exceedingly minute bodies." He was much influenced by Democritus in his theory.

He, likewise, saw nature as not guided by a Purposer, "for verily not by design did the first beginnings of things station themselves each in its right place by keen intelligence, nor

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[20] Dewey, Art.(1902), 140.
[21] Loc. cit.
[22] Loc. cit.
[23] Bakewell, SBAP, 309.
[24] Ibid., 311.

did they bargain sooth to say what motions each should assume."25

By the Stoics, nature was regarded as self-moved, both efficiently and teleologically. Nature was not merely ordered and attracted to perfection by God; it was God. Man's greatest virtue is to live in accordance with nature, in fact, it is his only virtue. Man was conceived of as a cog in the great machine of nature. He must find his happiness in conformity to nature's laws and demands.

D. The Middle Ages

During the Middle Ages there were three strains of thought concerning nature, all vying for the dominant position on the philosophical scene.

1. The first line is that of orthodox scholasticism which follows Aristotle and defines nature as the essence of anything, in so far as it operates in a regular way to bring things to an appointed end. God was considered as the ultimate cause of all things.

a. Augustine. 353-430. Although Augustine preceded the period known as the "Middle Ages" by many centuries, he is included here because he stands in the orthodox tradition and because of his influence upon the Schoolmen. According to his theory, God created the world out of nothing (creatio ex nihilo). It is not an evolution of his own being as the pantheistic thinkers suggest. It is a continuous creation, ever dependent upon him. God is timeless and

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25. Ibid., 316.

with their proper goods [illegible] habitual. A [illegible] Stoic [illegible] was crystallized in self-control, self-sufficiency and self-[illegible]. Because [illegible] perfection [illegible] virtue is [illegible]. It is his only virtue. [illegible] as a [illegible] in the great machine of nature. [illegible] to material[illegible] and [illegible].

1. The Middle Ages

During the [illegible] of thought [illegible] in the philosophical sense.

1. The first line is that of [illegible] as the [illegible] of all [illegible].

2. Scholasticism. [illegible]

[illegible] Ibid., 116.

spaceless. He created time and space when he created the world. The world or nature is not eternal for it had a beginning. God was the creator of all things. His view is simply that of God the creator and "nature" the created.

b. *Thomas Aquinas*. 1225?-1274. After the period of the Dark Ages, we enter into the period of Medieval philosophy - the period of systematic development of church philosophy. According to Thilly, the fundamental aim of his system "is to demonstrate the rationality of the universe as a revelation of God."[26] Aquinas held to the same general view of God as absolute, as did Augustine, but his whole development was strongly colored by Aristotelian concepts, indeed he called Aristotle "the philosopher." Forms are, for him, necessary principles of explanation in metaphysics, but they do not alone account for the natural world. The principle of matter is also necessary. Nature is a union of form and matter. The nature of a corporeal being consists of form and matter. Matter always has some form but there are forms without matter, that is spiritual beings. God is pure form or pure actuality. But essentially, his view of nature as form and matter is the same as that of Augustine. God is creator, and all else is created. "It must be said that every being in any way existing is from God."[28] "Since God is the efficient, the exemplar and the final cause of all things, and since primary matter is from Him, it follows that the first principle of all things is one in reality."[29]

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[26] Thilly, HOP, 191.

[27] *Summa Theologica* II, 217.

[28] Ibid., 214.

[29] Ibid., 221.

Only those created beings which have both form and matter belong to the world of nature. The soul of man is not a part of nature but only the body.

2. The second was the mystical strain which continued the Platonic, and even more so, the Neoplatonic influence, but it was more pantheistic on the whole. It tended to make nature the mysterious, vital, creative energy of God.

a. Giordano Bruno. 1548-1600. One of the most interesting figures of the Middle Ages was Giordano Bruno, a monk of the Dominican order who broke with the church and was finally condemned by the Inquisition and burned at the stake. So far as we know, Bruno was the first to develop a theory of monads. All things are made up of atoms which are both mental and physical. The soul of man is an immortal monad and God is the monad of monads. The whole of nature then, is one living system - a world of monads.

> Let a thing be even as small and tiny as you will, it has within itself some portion of spiritual substance...spirit is found in all things, and there is not the least corpuscle which does not contain within itself some portion that may become living. [30]

All things, he goes on, contain within themselves a soul and have the essentials of life. God is immanent in the infinite universe. He is the active principle in it.

> The universal intellect is the most intimate, real, and essential faculty and effective part of the world-soul. This is one and the same thing which fills the whole, illumines the universe and directs nature to produce the various species as is fitting,

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[30] See Rand (ed.), MCP, 14.

> and has the same relation to the production of natural things as our intellect to the parallel production of our general ideas.[31]

The world of nature follows from him with inner necessity. God is really the world-soul permeating all things.

3. The third line was that which came through the Arabian interpretation of Aristotle. Form and purpose were wholly immanent in nature. From this strain come the distinction of nature into _Natura naturans_, equivalent to God, and _Natura naturata_, the world as materialized form.

E. Modern Philosophy

1. _General Introduction_. John Dewey says:

> Modern thought has added little change to the concept of nature. It has brought out the homogenity of nature, its identical structure and operations in all its parts. The mechanical conception of nature may be said to have become, through the writings of Descartes, Galileo, Hobbes, and Newton, completely victorious, as against Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions.[32]

But here Dewey seems to be referring to nature as the physical universe only. On this basis, the physical universe would be the whole of reality. It does not mention, for example, that Descartes would make a very marked distinction between the world of extension and the world of thought. It is true though that the conception of the world of sense experience was regarded as mechanical.

Josiah Royce summarizes the contribution of this period as follows:

> These three ideas, then, that nature is a mechanism, that human reason is competent to grasp the truth of nature, and that, since nature's truth is essentially mathematical, geometry is the model

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31. Ibid., 7.
32. Dewey, Art., in Baldwin, DPP, 140.

> science, whose precision and necessity philosophy, too, must imitate,--these are the ideas of our first period.[33]

He refers of course, to the early part of the period of modern philosophy leading up to the time of Spinoza. With this introduction, we turn to a consideration of four men who had a profound influence upon the development of naturalism, Hobbes, Spinoza, Kant, and Darwin.

2. Thomas Hobbes. 1588-1679. An interesting naturalistic view was that of Thomas Hobbes. He lived in the age of awakening of modern science and was greatly influenced by Newtonian physics. The completely mechanistic conception of nature ruled the day. He rejected theology completely, as a science in any true sense of the term, and accepted instead "the new natural science of Copernicus, Galileo, and Harvey, whom he regards as the founders of science, and fearlessly deduces the consequences of the mechanical theory in his materialistic philosophy."[34] Thilly goes on to say that for Hobbes,

> philosophy is the science of the motions and actions of natural and political bodies, and everything can be explained by motion or mechanically: the nature of man, the mental world, and the State, as well as the occurrence of physical nature.[35]

Hobbes worked out his philosophical system in three stages. First, De Corpore, where he developed a systematic doctrine of Body, showing how physical phenomena were universally explicable in terms of motion, as motion or mechanical

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33. Royce, SMP, 41.
34. Thilly, HOP, 264.
35. Ibid., 265.

action was then understood.

> All which qualities, called sensible, are in the object, that causeth them, but so many several motions of the matter, by which it presseth our organs diversely. Neither in us that are pressed, are they anything else, but divers motions; for motion produceth nothing but motion.[36]

The theory of motion was then applied (following Galileo and others) in the light of mathematical science. In the second stage, Hobbes, in his De homine, separates man from the realm of nature and shows what specific bodily motions are involved in the production of such bodily phenomena as sensation and knowledge, as well as the feelings and passions which result from the relations of man with man. Hobbes explained all functions of the human organism, both physiological and psychological, on the basis of complete mechanism. Man's every action is the result of rigid and unchangeable mechanical laws. Sense is a

> phantasm made by the reaction and endeavour outwards in the organ of sense caused by an endeavour inwards from the object, remaining more or less...[37]

Mind, he says, is motion, (or sometimes, the effects of motion), in the brain. The third stage is developed in De cive, his philosophy of the state. Here he shows how men who are naturally enemies gradually developed the better relation known to us as society. He thus united into one coherent whole, a materialistic philosophy of Body, Man and State.

3. Baruch de Spinoza. 1632-1677. For the most part we

36, Rand (ed.), MCP, 58.
37. Molesworth (ed.), EW, I, 391.

will follow Royce's account of Spinoza. One cannot help commenting on the beauty of Royce's work. Spinoza's basic axiom was that everything in the world must be explained either by its own nature, or by some higher nature. By explanation he meant the comprehension of what a thing is. To illustrate his point, Spinoza used geometry. All the diameters of a circle, for example, must be equal and that is what a circle is. Anything in the world that does not contain its own explanation must be a part of some larger nature of things which does explain it and which forces it to be just what it is. "Cause and explanation mean for Spinoza the same thing. He knows only rigid mathematical necessity."[38] Nothing comes by chance in the world, but everything must be what it is by necessity. Spinoza goes on to say that "there must be some one highest nature of things, which explains all reality."[39] The world is one, and so all things in it must be parts of one self-evident, self-producing order, one nature. The supreme nature of things Spinoza called the universal "Substance."[40]

> In it are we all, it makes us what we are; it does what nature determines; it explains itself and all of us; it isn't produced, it produces; it is uncreated, supreme, overruling, omnipresent, absolute, rational, irreversible, unchangeable, the law of laws, the nature of natures; and we--we, with all our acts, thoughts, feelings, life, relations, experiences--are just the result of it, the consequences of it, as the diameters are the results of the nature of a circle.[41]

This Substance, Spinoza calls God.[42] Thus all that happens,

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[38] Royce, SMP, 59.
[39] Ibid., 60.
[40] Spinoza, Ethics, I, Def. III.
[41] Royce, SMP, 60-61.
[42] Spinoza, ETH, Def. VI.

happens because of the one Substance or God. It is also Nature. For Nature equals God equals Substance, in Spinoza's thought. It is all that there is. "Besides God no substance can be granted or conceived."[43] Again he says, "whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived."[44]

God, Substance, or Nature has an infinite number of attributes of which we can know only two. One of these attributes is the material world, bodily substance, or extension. The other is thought. "These two worlds, Spinoza holds, are equally divine, equally full of God, equally expressions of the supreme order."[45] All material substance is subject to natural or mathematical law. The law of cause and effect is true in the world of material substance and in the psychological world.

Then, likewise, thought produces and acts on thought alone. The two worlds are parallel but do not affect each other in any way. They are completely independent of each other. "Where-ever there is a body, God, says Spinoza, has a thought corresponding to that body."[46] Our thoughts are a part of God's thought, just as our bodies are a part of the embodied substance. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.[47] The human mind is a part of Nature, just as much as the human body, for Nature, God, or Substance is all

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[43] Ethics I, Prop. XIV.
[44] Ibid., Prop. XV.
[45] Royce, SMP, 63.
[46] Ibid., 64.
[47] Ethics II, Prop. VII; Rand (ed.), MCP, 170.

that there is.

Spinoza differs from Aristotle on the point of nature achieving ends or purposes. He says "there is no need to show at length, that nature has no particular goal in view, and that final courses are mere human figments."[48] Instead he holds that everything that is, is by absolute necessity.

The influence of Spinoza's doctrine upon philosophical naturalism has been very great. Dewey says:

> With Spinoza the nature of a thing is its essence and its idea and so the supreme essence is also, *Natura*, *natura naturans* or Deus, while the world of modified existence is *Natura naturata*.[49]

4. *Immanuel Kant*. 1724-1804. It would be presumptuous, to say the least, to even attempt to give an outline of Kant's thought in a few short paragraphs. Our purpose is to mention only the main ideas of Kant concerning the phenomenal world, and that in bare outline. We begin with space and time, which Kant calls the Forms of Sensibility. In the antinomies, Kant shows that to consider space and time as real entities is unthinkable and contradictory. He concludes that they are not real. They are not properties of things in the same sense that color is a property of a thing at all. They are rather necessary conditions for our sense perceptions. We know phenomena under the forms of space and time. "Space and time appear to us to belong outside us, merely because they are conditions in us of our seeing and feeling things, forms of our sense."[50] Kant makes a great distinction between phenomena or objects of sense, and noumena or objects of thought,

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[48] Rand (ed.), MCP, 166.
[49] Dewey, Art., in Baldwin, DPP, 140.
[50] Royce, op. cit., 124-125.

the things in themselves.

The world of phenomena is the world in space and time as built up through sense-perception. Out of sensations we gradually build up the whole ordered existence known as the physical universe. In the world, the law of cause and effect is true, for Kant firmly believed in the validity of Newton's physics. Royce says:

> What he wants to be sure of is that nature, seeing or real, in show-space or in itself, has discoverable law and order in it, uniformity, causal fixity, genuine reasonableness, about it.[51]

Kant concludes in his Critique of Pure Reason that:

> In so far as the world is seen by us in our sense-forms of space and time, it is bound to appear to us as conformable to their laws. Nature, then, is forced to obey geometry, because nature, after all, is just show-nature, our own experience, and so conformable to our own fundamentally geometrical ways of viewing it...[52]

The important point for us is that Kant considers "nature" to be the world that is experienced in organized sense perception. What is not in the order of sense is not nature. Kant, thus, specifically defines this term nature for us. Nature is the object of all possible categorizable experience. By experience Kant means:

> Our sensations as ordered in space and time in accordance with such necessary principles as the law of cause and effect, which Kant calls categories.[53]

Kant excludes the world of moral experience from the realm of

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[51] Ibid., 126.
[52] Ibid., 126-127.
[53] Brightman, NAV, 36-37.

nature. It will be interesting to relate this view to that of Woodbridge and Dewey, as well as the view of Spinoza which is opposed to that of Kant in that for Spinoza, nature is all that there is.

5. Charles Darwin. 1809-1882. Probably no one theory suggested to men caused such a furor in so many circles as that of biological evolution as given to the world by Charles Darwin. While his is essentially a theory of what happens in nature, its influence upon philosophical naturalism is so great it must be considered. In his book The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, Dewey says:

> That the publication of the "Origin of Species" marked an epoch in the development of the natural sciences is well known to the layman. That the combination of the very words origin and species embodies an intellectual revolt and introduced a new intellectual temper is easily overlooked by the expert. The conceptions that had reigned in the philosophy of nature and knowledge for two thousand years, the conceptions that had become the familiar furniture of the mind, rested on the assumption of the superiority of the fixed and final; they rested upon treating change and origin as signs of defect and unreality. In laying hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency, in treating the forms that had been regarded as types of fixity and perfection as originating and passing away, the "Origin of Species" introduced a mode of thinking that in the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge, and hence the treatment of morals, politics, and religion.[54]

What Dewey says is indeed true. Since the times of the Greek philosophers, the idea of the fixed and immutable had dominated the scene. The doctrine of evolution revolutionized the thinking of the world. It destroyed forever the

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54. Dewey, IDP, 1-2.

concept of fixed and eternal forms and species. It was argued that

> If all organic adaptations are due to constant variations and those variations which are harmful and useless are eliminated in the struggle for existence, there is no call for a prior intelligent causal force to plan and preordain them.[55]

F. Naturalism in America

In the Krikorian volume, Harold A. Larrabee has a chapter on"Naturalism in America." The value of this account is partly destroyed because the author has a biased point of view. However, it does contain some valuable information. "The career of naturalism in America is the history of the slow growth of an attitude rather than of a specific philosophical doctrine."[56] What he means, I take it, is that Americans are gradually coming to see the "naturalistic" light. Then, while he admits that the philosophy of the "schools" has been, on the whole, mainly idealistic," it was not so fully in control of American thought in general and still less of American living."[57] "For our professed philosophers have endlessly refuted naturalism, while our practical philosophies have steadily confirmed it."[58] Larrabee would have us believe that every American was and is really a naturalist at heart. It is unfortunate that he carries his prejudice so far as to make statements like these:

> Theological doctrines which had all the appearance, at least, of defeatist rationalizations of earthly

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55. Ibid., 3.
56. Larrabee, Art.(1944), 319.
57. Ibid., 320.
58. Ibid., 321.

> scarcity, frustration, and despair could hardly retain their hold in a land which has turned out to be one of plenty and of hope.[59]
>
> It was thus that millions of Americans lived, as it were, naturalistically, long before a few philosophers among them began to make theoretically and systematically explicit and underlying premises of American enterprise.[60]

Larrabee would have us believe that the vast majority of people are naturalists at heart, and that only here and there does one find a theistic soul.

He goes on to consider the deistic movement, for example, as the permanent collapse of supernaturalism. Of the work of Franklin he says:

> Thus, at a time when, after the fervor of the Great Awakening, godliness was again rapidly declining, he united in the popular imagination the two main secular tendencies that were ultimately to furnish the broad foundations of American naturalism.[61]

The chief contribution of the Revolutionary Period was that of the deists whose revolt against Calvinism "undoubtedly afforded philosophical naturalism, in the form of Anglo-French sensationalism, its first brief opportunity to take root in America."[62] Then came the early medical materialists who did not offer anything that was completely permanent but yet made some contribution. It was to be another century before man "as a biological organism was to become the starting point of a convincing philosophy in the hands of a James or a Dewey."[63]

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[59] Ibid., 322.
[60] Ibid., 323.
[61] Ibid., 331.
[62] Ibid., 333-334.
[63] Ibid., 335.

> It took, however, the triple earthquake of Darwin, the panic of 1857, and the Civil War to bring the ancient structure down; and to arouse both scientists and philosophers to a belated realization that supernaturalism had overstayed its era and that a new America--urban, industrial, and secular--was on the way.[64]

After the Civil War the American Colleges began to grow and to appoint men who were not clergymen to the presidency. The effect of this was a shift to German idealism which was almost completely out of touch with "the issues raised by the laboratory sciences for revelation," but also "with those generated by the emerging social studies for entrenched plutocracy."[65]

He does point out that the greatest single influence in the history of naturalism was Darwin's Origin of Species which reached America in 1860. Then came the revolt of Realism and Pragmatism against idealism. "Just as the Civil War killed transcendentalism, so the first World War and its disillusioning aftermath precipitated the downfall of the feebler Roycean idealism which had succeeded it."[66] He says, concerning the present period, that most of the teachers of philosophy at the universities are naturalists. Naturalism has changed places with idealism.

After reading this account of American naturalism, one is inclined to conclude that American naturalism is of a comparatively recent origin and growth. In the early period, Larrabee was able to show little, if anything, of the positive and tangible nature, which is strange for one who must give

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[64] Ibid., 244.
[65] Ibid., 349.
[66] Ibid., 351.

such an important place to the existential. The real beginning of naturalism, as a philosophy, was after the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species. Naturalism as a vigorous philosophy came with the Columbia School of Realism and Naturalism. Indeed, the greatest work was done by Woodbridge and Dewey. This work has been continued through their pupils as is quite evident from contemporary naturalistic writings. Among the younger naturalists, there are few names found which were not at some time connected with this School. Among the older naturalists, not connected with Columbia, nor influenced so much by Dewey, are George Santayana, Bertrand Russell, and Roy Wood Sellars. Wieman of Chicago has been much influenced by Dewey's thought.

G. Summary

In this chapter a survey has been made of philosophical naturalism. Five possible views of nature have been suggested;

(1) The whole world viewed as ordered process. Here, the various conceptions held by the ancient Greeks may be classified.

(2) The created order as distinguished from God. This is the view of Augustine and the Schoolmen.

(3) All-that-there-is. Spinoza held this view; for him, the term "Nature" was synonymous with God.

(4) The phenomenal order. This is the view of Kant who held that nature is the world of organized and categorized sense experience.

(5) The field of scientific investigation. Hobbes, who held to a mechanistic view of all physical, psychological, and social events is best classified here.

In the rest of the chapter the influence of Darwin upon the development of modern naturalism was noted, and the history of naturalism in America discussed. Most of the work of this school has been done within comparatively recent years under the leadership of Dewey, Woodbridge, Sellars, Santayana, and a few others.

CHAPTER III

WOODBRIDGE'S CONCEPT OF NATURE

A. General Introduction

As we begin a consideration of Woodbridge's naturalistic metaphysics, it will be of interest to compare him with George Santayana and John Dewey. Costello, in his article on "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge," remarks that he can find no agreement among naturalists either old or new. "Professor Dewey and Mr. Santayana are so far apart that no one can have profited by both and still be fully able to accept either."[1] This is also evident from Santayana's article on "Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," and Dewey's reply to that article which have been referred to above in Chapter I. Woodbridge's philosophy, Costello goes on to say, is decidedly different from that of either Santayana or Dewey. Costello quotes an answer he received from Woodbridge to questions concerning the position of these two naturalists. To Santayana's thesis that mind has no causal place in the world, he replied: "When Santayana says that, he is ignoring obvious fact for the sake of theory. The existence of his own book, lying on the table there, is evidence to the contrary." Then concerning Dewey's reply to a simple question, Woodbridge says that: "Dewey defined and distinguished

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[1] 1. Costello, Art.(1944), 296.

and qualified, in such a maze of dialectic, that not only I did not get any answer, I didn't even know where my question went to. And do you know, when he gets that way, he thinks he is being empirical."[2] Such was his opinion of two quite well known fellow naturalists. We will consider Woodbridge's view under several headings.

1. Nature. In An Essay on Nature ~~he~~ says that "Nature" is used as "a name for the familiar setting of human history. In the words of Santayana, it is 'public experience'."[3]

> In recognizing it as the setting of human history, I would not exclude other histories from it--neither that of living creatures other than man nor that of the stars--for I must think of it as expansed not only into the eyes of all, but into the eyeless also, for heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them is, make up a sum which seems to leave nothing out. "Nature" is here used as a name for that sum.[4]

This is, of course, a preliminary definition. Nature is all that there is. She is one. "Personification is difficult for me to resist; I am afflicted with a sense of indecency whenever I refer to 'Nature' as 'it'."[5] But "let Nature's proper pronoun be 'it' for those who like it better and would avoid all suggestions of personality."[6]

But, whether we personify Nature or not, we must accept her as genuine. Heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them is are very real, so real that is is difficult to think of reality in competition with them, especially when that "all

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2. Loc. cit.
3. Woodbridge, EON, 3.
4. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid., 4.
6. Ibid., 5.

that in them is, is so far from having been discovered."[7]

2. The Natural. Leaving "Nature" for a moment, we turn to Woodbridge's definition of "natural." The natural is that which "is characteristic of Nature and leads us naturally to expect this or that consequence."[8] The great difficulty has been that adjectives and adverbs suggest their opposites. Natural suggests unnatural, artificial, or super-natural, and thus tends to confuse the issue. We are all working with Nature, striving to change her, and to make her adaptable to our needs. We change the "natural" into the "unnatural." "We are natural artists working with Nature and upon Nature in ways that transform the natural into the unnatural."[9] Besides,

> The behavior of Nature, although all of it must be said to be natural, often exhibits the universal and the astonishing, leading us to call these exhibitions unnatural and sometimes monstrous when they are not.[10]

The natural is what one would expect to find in Nature. Woodbridge desires to avoid by the use of the term "natural" any suggestion of "supernatural" as a realm of existence. There is but one realm of existence, the realm of Nature, and all events are natural events.

B. Epistemology

Our knowledge of Nature is obtained from Nature herself. We gain all our knowledge in the way that the chemist or the physicist gains his knowledge.

> I must do precisely what the chemist does, go to Nature, put questions to her, and accept her answers and refrain from trying to imagine what knowledge should

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[7] Loc. cit.
[8] Ibid., 6.
[9] Loc. cit.
[10] Loc. cit.

be like before any knowledge is acquired.[11]

But his theory of knowledge is not always clear. He says that knowledge is more than the immediate data of consciousness. "Knowledge is acquired, not given."[12] Further, it is acquired from Nature. He points out that if immediate knowledge were possible, one would know all at the moment of perception. All we do is set ourselves apart, just as anything else is set apart, for the purpose of study. Yet, man always remains part and parcel of Nature, no matter how he may set himself apart from her for the purpose of gaining knowledge.

> Distinguishing man is not taking him out of Nature in order to secure for him a privileged position wherein he is fitted to receive Nature as a gift from an alien benefactor.[13]
>
> Our natural status is as inseparably bound up with Nature as is that of the largest star or the smallest microbe.[14]
>
> Nature is a coherent and integrated system, an order, a cosmos, a universe which can find expression in language and, so expressed, be handed on from generation to generation improved.[15]

Thus when we see ourselves in the presence of Nature, we see ourselves in the presence of our owner. "To regard Nature as the symbol of God's glory is not at all strange or unnatural. It is very human."[16] Our knowledge of all things comes from Nature. Nature, with all her grandeur, all her majesty, all her beauty, all her power, naturally suggests a personal God,

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[11] Ibid., 11.
[12] Ibid., 12.
[13] Ibid., 13.
[14] Ibid., 14.
[15] Ibid., 15.
[16] Ibid., 17.

even to the human spirit. But it would be most unscientific to say such a God exists, since all our knowledge comes from our one source, nature.

In the foregoing, Woodbridge says that knowledge is acquired from nature, not immediately given. In another passage, he seems to say that knowledge is perception. "Knowledge is of what we perceive, and I have named that 'Nature'."[17] Again he says: "We are limited in knowledge by our ability and equipment on the one hand and Nature in which they operate on the other."[18] To this writer, his position is not quite clear. Knowledge is "of what we perceive" suggests that knowledge is perception, or given in perception, yet in the previous passages he says that it is "acquired" nor "given."

Our instruments for acquiring knowledge are our bodies. Our living bodies are in nature. To begin with, they are rather ingenious instruments, and we supplement them with others almost equally ingenious which often perform more effectively than our bodies themselves. The miracle of the present age, with all its scientific inventions for the betterment of man, is not the instrument but the human body. "The greatest instrument in the triumphs of art is the human body with its natural equipment, and the great miracle, if one wants one, is the response which nature makes when that instrument is employed."[19] "Increasing the effectiveness of our natural instrument by such supplementation is proof that there is no break between nature and

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[17] Ibid., 21.
[18] Ibid., 25.
[19] Ibid., 28.

ourselves, that intimate reciprocity prevails, and that we are interposed in Nature rather than set over against her."[20] Idealists would likewise agree that there is no break in reality (Woodbridge's Nature) but differ radically as to just what reality really is.

C. The Human Body

Our bodies, he says, are instruments by which we may know Nature. Yet, they are a part of Nature. The body is an all-important part of Nature for Woodbridge. All mental states are really physical states, that is, parts of the body. It is because we have bodies that we can come to grips with Nature as a whole. Consciousness he recognizes, but it is not a fact to be explained but a fact to be observed. We have conscious bodies. Concerning the body he says:

> We cannot, however, escape the fact that it is also what we call a conscious body and that its "consciousness"--a word that means no more than that it can and does perceive, feel, observe, and think--is illusive. Its behavior is, as we say, externally observable, but its consciousness only internally or by introspection, with the consequence that the consciousness of others is not accessible to me, nor mine to them. So far as consciousness is concerned, each of us has his own exclusively; there is no common consciousness, even if the word "consciousness" has, as Hobbes long ago pointed out, the verbal meaning of "knowing together." Nature seems to have made herself, as the common residence of us all, into exclusive personal experiences yearning for companionship...We are isolated souls, feeling nonetheless that we are not.[21]

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[20] Loc., cit.
[21] Ibid., 32.

Our bodies are instruments for co-ordination of our activities. This co-ordination does not produce Nature, but something that occurs in the natural world. A body is an instrument to be used in all of the many and varied functions that make up life, from building a fire to burying the dead. And, further, it is an instrument for "discovering that all this is done because Nature and the body are inseparably and intimately bound together, even when the body is reduced to ashes."[22] According to his position this reduction to ashes is the end of the human personality for the body is all that there is. Consciousness and life both cease with the decay of the body.

The body is not an instrument for changing the effects of its environment upon it into a visionary world.

> The student of the human body as an instrument is under no obligation to try to find in a head, in the interstices of a brain, or anywhere else--call it "in the mind" or "in consciousness" or "in intuition" or "in the immediately given" or "in us"--some semblance of an "external world" like the substance of a dream. Neither it nor its external world is composed of that sort of substance.[23]

There is only one kind of substance in Nature and that is the stuff of which she is made up, he would say. The only possible way to discover her and know her is by experiment. A passage like the following brings us to the heart of his naturalism: "If we want to know out of what sort of substance both are composed, physicists and chemists are the sort of

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[22] Ibid., 34.
[23] Ibid., 35.

knowers who give us anything like an intelligible answer."[24] He goes on to say here that different bodies produce different results. The fact that a color blind person sees differently is cited as evidence of the primacy of the body. We may use the term "sensation" if we wish, but it does not mean any such thing as "mental content." "Its use will be the recognition that the word has been restored to its natural status of indication that the mental operation of sensing has been performed."[25] We are justified in using an adjective like "mental" because it has been used so long and because it is important for the distinction of a certain kind of operation. Its use distinguishes activities such as seeing and hearing, from such activities as walking and breathing. The language of mental activity is such that "its words are names for what we do when we try to find out what we and Nature are and use knowledge as a name for the result."[26]

All of which does not lessen the importance of mind. In fact it increases it. We have not lost our souls. "We have found that the more we learn about our bodies, the more their dignity is enchanced; for we have found that through them (souls) our intimacy with Nature has no discovered parallel."[27]

> If matter, if that which is made of the dust of the gound, can think and worship, could anything by any other name do better? If the discovery of our bodies is the discovery of our ownership by Nature, what then must that owner be? We mount together.[28]

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24. Ibid., 35-36.
25. Ibid., 36.
26. Loc,cit.
27. Ibid., 36-37.
28. Ibid., 37.

D. The Visible World

Nature is the visible world. It is heaven and earth and sea and all that in them is, to use his own favorite expression. It is public experience--that which lies spread out before us.

> It is the kind of experience which is shared in such a way that in that experience the sharers are identified as sharing in it, clasping hands, as it were, with other hands identified as not one's own and belonging to other bodies similarly identified, but not the kind of experience in which the clasp of another's hand is alien pressure on one's own skin.[29]

By this he means that nature is qualitatively one. But why is there a visible world at all? One might as well ask, with Heidegger, why there is anything, rather than nothing. "Nature and Nature as preëminently the visible world does not need any justification."[30] When we ask whether a thing really exists as such and push the question to nature "we confuse the question of existence with that of justification."[31] His argument is that we must take nature--as the visible world--as she is. We must accept her and in accepting her, that very fact becomes at the same time an adequate and sufficient explanation of what she is.

> This is not pleading the cause of realism as over against idealism. It is not pleading the cause of common sense. It is pleading the cause of intellectual clarity. It is pleading the fact that with the visible world made problematic, intellectual clarity has vanished, and the reign of confusion has begun.[32]

It is hard to agree with Woodbridge that making the visible world problematic destroys intellectual clarity and produces confusion, for scientists agree that there are problems in nature. To offer some explanation or justification for

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[29] Ibid., 61.
[30] Ibid., 70.
[31] Ibid., 70-71.
[32] Ibid., 72.

Nature seems to be a legitimate problem. He goes on to say that the visible world

> is not a state of mind, but the sphere of existence both visible and invisible. The astronomer never looks at stars which it does not contain. The physicist never deals with forces or energies which do not operate in it. The chemist does not analyze substances which he finds elsewhere...When the philosopher robs it of its reality and seeks another, he adds nothing to all those enumerated enterprises. He is seeking, not knowledge, but justification. He has good reasons for that, for Nature drives him to it...But he makes a mistake when he turns the fact of the visible world into a problem of knowledge. He claims incentive for so doing, but Nature refutes him by making the visible world the justification of his claim.[33]

1. Optical Structure. Woodbridge considers next the problem of vision. Why should there be vision conditioned by optical structure? This is a fact that has never been explained. There *is* vision and it *is* conditioned by structure; these are facts we recognize without trying to give evidence for their existence. All of this simply brings confirmation that Nature herself is optically structural throughout, "that she is preëminently the visible world, the world wherein existences are present and operate, and that 'wherein' as 'space' is, not *in vacuo*, but in an integrated optical structure, the meaning being the same whether we say Nature is in space or that space is in Nature."[34] He is to qualify this statement though, as we shall see. "This optical integration is explorable, and optical science is the consequent knowledge."[35]

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[33] Ibid., 72-73.
[34] Ibid., 105-106.
[35] Ibid., 106.

2. Space. In the discussion of space he admits the inadequacy of his discussion of light and optical structure. He had gone off into the realm of the imaginative, whereas we never pass beyond the limits of this earth. Woodbridge says that we ought not to allow ourselves to be carried away by vain picturing. Nature is not in space, but space is in Nature. Space, he says, is but the shifting yet integrated interplay of the geometrical distinctions we observe. Nature includes space as such for she is all that there is.

3. Time. Past, present, and future are adjectives before they are nouns. They qualify events before they qualify time. Only after they have been allowed to qualify time are they turned into nouns, the past, the present, and the future, as if they were original divisions or divisors. In qualifying events those adjectives show a classification into kinds of events rather than a sequence of events, all of the same kind. Events are "present in" or "absent from" Nature. An event not present in Nature is either a past or future event. "Present events are; past and future ones are not."[36] A present event finds a place in the class of past events only by ceasing to be an event. Future events may be divided into sub-classes such as necessary, possible, probable, etc. We, ourselves, are a part of Nature. "While we are in Nature, we are just as much her residents as the heavenly host. Our presence is just as much an event as any other event that comes and goes."[37]

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[36] Ibid., 140.
[37] Ibid., 149.

Nature cares no more for us than she does for events such as hydrogen. She is no more anxious about what we do than she is about what it does. We are just as natural as any other of Nature's many beings. Nature consists throughout of possibilities realized and in the process of realization. We are in Nature, making her just what she is. There is no picture of her possible except the picture of Nature with us in her.

> That is why we are forever saying that Nature "does" this or that; or, fearful lest the word "Nature" should convict us of peetry, we use "matter" or "energy" or both together and say that they "do" this or that; or, again fearful of a doer, we change from the active to the passive voice of the verb and say that this and that "are done" and, in the doing, Nature or matter or energy "is transformed."[38]

Nature is the realm which nourishes us all. We are dependent upon her for all things. If Nature fails us, we are helpless.

E. Matter

Matter is that which supports the historical processes present in Nature. It is the material world, the physical world, set over against ourselves. We are companions with heaven, and earth and sea. All of this is clearly visible.

> Substance, inertia, resistance, solidity, the deadweight of the hard-to-move, the horror of sheer emptiness, always the something that is there filling the present world with its presence during every period of the calendar and at every second that the clock ticks, something as unescapable as space and time themselves, lasting and keeping its own constitution while events come and go telling the tales of history--that is what we usually name "matter."[39]

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[38] Ibid., 150.
[39] Woodbridge, EON, 181.

> So we incline to think of matter as the perpetual off-stage of all that is dramatic, whether that be present, past, or future, whether it be the march of the heavenly host of the cities and wars of men, Nature expansed unto the eyes of all.[40]

Matter is but another name for Nature itself. Or, in his words, "Nature appears now as matter clothed and it is our cognitive necessity to strip that clothing off in order to find the real skeletal structure it conceals."[41] To use different names to describe it, tells us no more about it. Actually we have very little knowledge about matter. We know that it is and that is about all. Trying to see matter with a microscope is like trying to see it with the human eye.

> Eventful Nature is also material, with the consequence that her space and time seem like emptiness filled by something that persists in spite of changes and has a native constitution or structure of its own.[42]

Materials are the blocks that make up the universe. But matter is not one of those blocks for it is what they all are; it is the structure which all things possess. Materials are transformed only with the use of other materials. There is no first material or basic matter. Such a substance is meaningless because Nature's processes are historical. They are continuously making the present world different from what it was, but they are doing it through material agencies. Work is done, but it is done by material things. All that we can discover about material things is their structure. It is the

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[40] Ibid., 181.
[41] Ibid., 182.
[42] Ibid., 184.

discovery of the laws by which materials are transformed. Matter is simply the name for material Nature, not an unknowable cause of anything.

F. History

Nature is also historical. We discover history and write it down. We talk of past events and future events as a consequence. We are inclined to see causal connection in this natural progress of history, but it is not actually there. Woodbridge develops his theory in another volume called The Purpose of History. Here he sees no over-all purpose in historical events. To quote him:

> There is discoverable in history no purpose, if we mean by purpose some future event towards which the whole creation moves and which past and present events portend; but there is purpose in history, if we mean that the past is utilized as material for the progressive realization, at least by man, of what we call spiritual ends...History is itself essentially the utilization of the past for ends, ends not necessarily foreseen; but ends to come, so that every historical thing, when we view it retrospectively, has the appearance of a result which has been selected, and to which its antecedents are exclusively appropriate. In this sense purpose is discoverable in history. But this purpose is not single. History is pluralistic and implies a pluralistic philosophy. There are many histories but no one of them exists to the prejudice of all others.[43]

This seems to be a common naturalistic position. The naturalists admit that there is purpose in a certain sense, or rather in many senses. But they refuse to admit that there is one single purpose guiding the events of history. History is pluralistic and purpose is likewise pluralistic. There

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[43] Woodbridge, POH, 4.

is no one far off event to which the whole creation moves. There is rather the independent development of many events and many histories.

> Our history (as persons) *appears* (italics ours) thus to be a utilization of material, a realization of ends, a movement with purpose in it...Such a destroying, conserving, utilizing, selective, and purposeful movement in time, history *appears to be* (italics ours) when we restrict it to the domain of human knowledge.[44]

But here the word "appears" is all important. It is not really purposive. It looks purposive from our point of view. "Time is, thus, constantly rounding out things, so to speak, or bringing them to some end or fulfilment. That is why we call its movement purposive."[45] He rejects any view which sees the world as finished and complete because:

> History would thus be a kind of temporal revelation of the absolute and we should read it as we read a book, from cover to cover, discovering page by page a story which is itself finished when we begin.[46]

But very few philosophers see history in this way. He is knocking down another man of straw.

Nor is history a matter of cause and effect.

> Whatever happens is thus conceived to be the effect of what has already happened, rather than the active conversation and working over of what has already happened. The past is made the cause and producer of the present, so that the state of the world at any moment is only the result or outcome of what it was in the preceding moment. To-day is thought to be the effect of yesterday and the cause of to-morrow, and is thus but a transition from one day to another.[47]

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[44] Ibid., 33.
[45] Ibid., 34.
[46] Ibid., 35.
[47] Ibid., 35.

On the basis of such a position as this, he believes that purpose becomes an illusion. Such a view represents the way we conceive of things but not nature's way of doing things.

Human history is history conscious of itself, for human beings are conscious beings. As he said in the Essay above, our bodies are conscious bodies. Human history is the time process at work. Such history is selective and so purposive. But purpose does not mean predestination, as he said above, but a specific line of development which the person or nation is striving to fulfill.

> Every history is a particular career in the development of which some facts, persons, and events have been more significant than others, so that the limitation of the career at any time is like an end that has been reached or a consequence to which its antecedents are peculiarly appropriate.[48]

Selection is not a device which the historian invents. It is rather imposed upon him by his purpose to preserve and promote a particular end. The essence of purpose for him then, is "the converging of means upon a specific end."[49] It is not design, intention, or foresight. "The end is to be conceived not in terms of any good ultimately reached but in terms of the career of what it is the termination."[50] But apart from beings who foresee and plan, Woodbridge sees no evidence of intention in the world.

> When we speak of nature's designs we speak figuratively, and impute to her rational and deliberate powers. But we can not clearly affirm that the rain falls in order that the garden may be watered, or that the eye was framed in order

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[48] Ibid., 43.
[49] Ibid., 47.
[50] Loc., cit.

> that we might see.[51]

All the evidence, he says, for this sort of purpose has been disproved. But such a statement is definitely questionable. When we say that nature is full of purpose, we are not thinking about a preconceived plan, but rather that nature is an historical process. It is the changing of the possible into the actual and the record of the process. Again he denies the singleness of purpose:

> When we try to reduce them all to some show of singleness we again do no more than try to tell what a temporal order is like. It is metaphysics and not history we are writing.[52]

So far as man is concerned he is just another event or incident in the universe. The universe as a whole, or nature, is the stage on which his career is played.

> Absolutely considered the history of man can not claim preëminence over the history of the stars. He is no more the darling of the universe than is the remotest nebula. It is just as intelligible and just as true to say that man exists as an illustration of stellar evolution as to say that the sun exists to divide light from darkness for the good of man. Absolutely considered the cosmos is impartial to its many histories.[53]

What he is saying is that all history is relative. One event is just as important as another.

> Undoubtedly man is a part or instance of nature, governed by nature's laws and internally involved in her processes. But he is so governed and involved not as matter without imagination, but as a being whose distinction is the historical exercise of his intelligence. Nature is not what she would be without him and that is why his history can never be remembered or understood if he is forgotten. He can not be taken out of

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[51] Ibid., 48.
[52] Ibid., 49.
[53] Ibid., 52.

> nature and nature be called upon to explain him as a part or instance of nature. Man is to be remembered and understood, but as the part or instance which he himself is, and not another. His history, consequently, can never be adequately written solely in terms of physics or chemistry, or even of biology; it must be written also in terms of aspirations.[54]

Human history, he says, is a rational enterprise.

G. Teleology

The question of purpose has already been partly discussed in connection with history. Woodbridge maintains that there is no one purpose in history. History is not moving toward one goal. But there are many histories moving toward many goals. In this latter sense alone, is purpose discoverable. But there is on one purposive cause behind all the events of history taken as a whole.

In An Essay on Nature he says that "Nature stirs in us the suspicion of plot or design, of purposes first conceived and then executed."[55] Nature is teleological in fact. Her time-scheme declares it. Our knowledge is dependent on it. Although we cannot explain them, there are very intelligible things discoverable in Nature. "Intelligibility is the discovery of an order or orders in Nature which are not only followed but which can also be expressed in formulas that in their turn can guide and practice. Teleology and intelligibility go hand in hand."[56]

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[54] Ibid., 56-57.
[55] Woodbridge, EON, 194.
[56] Ibid., 196.

Teleology is not opposed to mechanism. A machine is anything which runs in an orderly fashion. The hammer is no more a tool then the hand or the eye. "If Nature can rejoice, I must believe that she rejoices more over the machine which makes an automobile than over the automobile made."[57] Man is just a more intricate mechanism.

> One needs only to consider how levers, pulleys, etc.,... are found in Nature so variously unified in operation and working so effectively...without the aid of anything like a factory managed by a human corporation with a board of directord,...there are the stars, the seasons, ...mechanism and teleology supplementary and complementary.[58]

By teleology here he means exactly what he meant in reference to history. It is the natural movement of an event in a specific direction. It is historical progression. It is natural teleology. Indeed he has an article of that very name. It will be considered in due course. In writing natural history, such as the history of the eye, we are but writing Nature's teleology. We are artists employing Nature's own brushes in the writing of her history. Is there then an artist who has painted the whole picture of Nature? It is interesting to consider his answer. On the basis of all that he has said, there is not, but here he adds:

> An artist for the whole of Nature, without one jot or tittle left out--we may find ourselves compelled at last to believe in that with all our heart and soul and mind and strength; but that artist, we must admit, has made the whole of Nature precisely what it is. If we ask why he did so, there is but one conceivable answer in Nature's terms--that is, that teleology might

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[57] Ibid., 197.
[58] Loc. cit.

> be exemplified in fact and that it should be acknowledged and lived, with all its far-reaching consequences, by every creature. That there are creatures in Nature who make that answer is, perhaps, the most significant illustration of her teleology. Teleology does not explain why there is teleology, but it does explain the human belief that it has a significance not expressed in its existence. It does explain the religious attitude.[59]

When one reads a passage like this, one begins to wonder just what Woodbridge really did believe. In moments like this he seems to be a "naturalist" who had very little trouble believing in a personal God. In other places he holds to an unconscious teleology for there is no one purpose behing Nature but only the movement of many events to many natural ends. Here, however, he suggests one "Artist" guiding all events.

He goes on to say that we are conscious beings. We suffer, act, and think. We change the course of events by what we do. A living person does what a dead one cannot. "But I do not see how invoking life or consciousness explains the difference or adds to the situation anything which clarifies it, even if the invocation does identify the difference between life and death or between body and soul."[60] Cause and effect means simply that agents are acting in the historical process. Nature is going forward, growing older, and the very act of growing is an instance of teleology. A seed is a cause of its own growth in age because it acts characteristically in response to the characteristic action of other causal agents on it. This is the kind of causality that is discoverably in Nature.

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59. Ibid., 199-200.
60. Ibid., 201.

> The view that knowledge is mediated by anything else than our bodily organization seems to me unsound. In plainer speech, the view that it is mediated by "messages" received by us at the door of the "mind," informing us that there is a world external to them and enabling us to adapt ourselves to it seems to me to be intolerable.[61]

Our consciousness is itself an example of Nature's teleology. By it we can know Nature in terms of her actually observed processes reduced to formulas and not in terms of messages that must be decoded.

The subject of teleology is also taken up in Nature and Mind. In the essay on "Evolution," he says that the world is no more and no less matter's than it is spirit's; it is no more man's than it is the microbes, but no less.[62] But most of his work on teleology is found in the essay "Natural Teleology." He also says that Nature is a domain, not of chaotic changes, but of definite, teleological changes pointing toward particular results. But the teleology is natural. It is a datum in metaphysics but its presence has no special significance. "It becomes incredible that the uses of nature have any other explanation than in a power good enough and intelligent enough to contrive their manifold adaptions."[63] But he insists that such an admission as this does not mean any personality behind Nature. This is nothing more nor less than what is called the hypostatization of the term "Nature." In order to illustrate his point he takes the case of the spider

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61. Ibid., 205.
62. Woodbridge, NAM, 141.
63. Ibid., 115.

and the fly. The spider's web is adapted to catching a fly. Are we to say that the fly is adapted to be caught! This brings into the situation the question of the problem of surd evil which he does not consider. The point is that there is another possible explanation of the example he uses. The whole problem of evil enters into the picture.

He goes on to say that there are causes and effects in nature for the mind is able to discover them. But he insists that there is no discoverable connection between intelligence and use. Use is not limited to the field where intelligence operates. All of which is true but this does not prove that intelligence did not set in operation or operated there at some previous time.

Nature, he says, produces thinking beings as well as falling stars. It is no more surprising that men should philosophize than that bodies should fall, or that Nature should operate intelligibly rather than unintelligibly.[64] The term "Nature" for Woodbridge is practically a synonym for God. We are not, he says, able to trace the genesis of intelligible beings but that is no reason for saying that nature did not produce them. "Nature may be spoken of as a whole if one intends to include the whole."[65] This latter statement sounds very much like Spinoza, and even more like Hegel, despite Woodbridge's remoteness from Hegel.

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[64] Ibid., 121.
[65] Ibid., 121-122.

To affirm that nature is intelligent, he says, is to affirm that among the total of its specific operations intelligence is to be included. This obviously leaves intelligence loosely related to nature. His purpose in the article is to show: (1) That there is no relevant connection between the fact of teleology and the operations of chance or design. (2) That intelligence may not be regarded as the source of the distinction between means and ends, because it cannot be credited with creating the distinctions it discovers and because it is itself an instance of teleology.[66] The presence of mind or consciousness is the result of his unconscious teleology.

Teleology, he says, exists and is unexplained. There can be no final cause. "In other words to put the end of a process into the beginning of it in order to explain why the end is reached is either meaningless or absurd."[67] To do this would result in a static world. But this is not true either. It would simply mean a consciously purposive, and to a certain extent, a determined world. To say that God or a Final Cause is the cause of all things does not make a static world. To the writer it seems that without this Final Cause we have a static world. To explain teleology naturally, is difficult, for it is hard to see how purposes can originate in unconscious matter.

Then he points out that teleology is always in individid-

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[66] Ibid., 124-125.
[67] Ibid., 125.

ualized directions. It involves controlled movement. All of which only strengthens the case for a causative, intelligible universe.

Woodbridge seems to be overcome by the immensity of the universe as compared with the littleness of man. Being a part of Nature, he (man) must measure himself up against the whole, laying his little stature off as something practically negligible in the vastness of things. There is such an overwhelming magnitude in the universe and his existence is so irrelevant that he can no longer instinctively regard human civilization as the supremely important event in the history of the universe. It may be supremely important to him but to say that it is supremely important in nature appears like an untruth or an absurdity.

But this cry from the lips of a man conscious of his own littleness in the midst of an awful universe is not new, nor can it be wholly justified. The Psalmist looked up into the heavens and likewise cried, "What is man that thou art mindful of him?" It is not true that man is irrelevant to any or even to an overwhelming part of the universe. All parts, all that the universe contains, even to the tiniest particle is necessary for all the rest. This question has often been raised and just as often answered. An article on the subject appeared in a recent issue of Christian Herald. The article which is entitled "A Scientist Searches for God," is an account of an interview with Dr. Kirtley S. Mather, well-known Harvard professor and geologist. One of the questions put to this distinguished

scientist was this, Man is so infinitesimal, how can God possibly have any interest in him? To which he replied,

> All too often we think of man as we think of a fleck of foam on the crest of a wave in the middle of the Pacific Ocean--existing for a moment, then gone forever in the swirl of the boundless deep. But workers in every field of science have been discovering the great significance of little things. In physics we know how important are the extraordinarily minute components of the atom. It is simply impossible for the human mind to imagine anything smaller than the proton and the electron; yet, if a single proton and its companion electron are removed from the interior of an atom of mercury, that atom is transformed into one of gold. All the differences between gold and mercury depend upon the presence or absence of those two trivially small units of matter. In biology, the factors that determine the hereditary equipment of an animal or a plant are known as genes. A gene is so small that not even the electron microscope is powerful enough to permit its being seen, yet these units are so important that even yet we cannot fully grasp their significance. All the differences between the potential genius and the congenital moron seem to be due to the presence or absence of a few of these superlatively important little things in life. The same principle carries into the field of human relationships. Each person in a community or nation has relatively as great importance in the life of the entire group as have the individual protons, electrons, or genes in the composition of matter and the structure of animals and plants.[68]

Argument that man is insignificant in the universe is no more valid than the argument against anything else for the same reason. Size and position do not constitute evidence for or against value.

H. Woodbridge's Pantheism

1. Nature and God. In the volume of collected essays, published under the title of Nature and Mind, we find added

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[68] Lenz, Art., in Christian Herald, 20.

material on the subject. In several essays Woodbridge deals with the subject of metaphysics. In his "Confessions" he says:

> Rather than boast, however, I would make this the first step in metaphysics--the recognition that existence is primarily what it is and can neither be explained nor explained away. The most that can be done is to find out what it implies. And the great error of metaphysicians is the supposition that the implications of existence are its causes and lead us to something more fundamental than existence, or prior to it, or in itself irrelevant to it.[69]

There is joy, he says, in going to the senses--to experience--so long as one does not stay there. The senses open the door to the realm of mind, to order, to structure, to the inevitable, to freedom, to substance, to God--if God is that which our view of things compels us to seek. Woodbridge never offers any consistent argument against one's believing in God. It becomes clearer and clearer that he does not object to the use of the term God but exactly what he means by the term is the question.

Metaphysics takes, or ought to take, things as they are. It must take things in their obvious plurality. The great trouble is that metaphysicians try to reduce the plurality of experience to ultimates by a miracle or some process of evolution.

> That there are space and time, and matter and energy, and life and death, and thought--a world to know and minds to know it--it admits beyond question.[70]

In other words, metaphysics, true metaphysics, admits the facts of experience, as it finds them, but so soon as it seeks a co-

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[69] Woodbridge, NAM, 7.
[70] Ibid., 23.

herent explanation of these facts, then metaphysics is interfering where it ought not to be concerned. What he wants us to do is to admit the existence of the world of nature, all that there is, but never seek to offer an hypothesis as to why it is, or even exactly as to what it is. He takes the same attitude toward nature, as many take toward God. We can only assert that God is, not what he is. Woodbridge says that we cannot deny that Nature is, but that we can never explain what it is. Nature for him is God, for it is all that there is. We need, he believes, no more coherent explanation than to say that Nature is.

> Faced with these things, it has no interest in why they are as they are--why the body has a mind or the mind has a body. It does not try to justify the ways of God or matter.[71]

It [metaphysics] is content to take the productivity of nature as a fact without asking for a reason. But the human mind is curious, it does seek further, even though it may know that an explanation is impossible.

> What we want to know is, what is the meaning of nature, and above all, what is its ideal meaning; and the moment we raise that question, we demand an answer that includes design of some sort. We are strong to interpret nature, and to interpret it without design is an impossibility.[72]

This is of course leading up to his idea of natural teleology dealt with previously. But there are many questions that are raised in nature for which we seek an explanation. For example:

> Since truth and error, freedom and necessity, good and bad, are conceptions which we do not find in nature, but which by virtue of our intelligence, we read into nature, then the question

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[71] Woodbridge, NAM, 23.
[72] Ibid., 35.

> becomes not, can we find design in nature, and so infer a designer, but, what is the most lofty conception we can frame of beneficence in design in order adequately to explain the terribly earnest life of man in the world which he strives to explain, to enjoy, and to master?[73]

2. Nature and Man. Although he sees values as the product of man's will, not nature's own, he firmly holds to a naturalistic view of all of man's capacities.

> It would be absurd to suppose that a man thinks in a sense radically different from that in which he digests, or a flower blossoms, or that two and two are four is a sense radically different from that in which a flower has a given number of petals. Thinking, like digesting and blossoming, is an effect, a product, possibly a structure.[74]

But man, himself, can take no pride in being nature's last and supreme act. Nor was nature made especially for his conquest and domain.

> He has become a part of nature, her master only as he has first become her attentive and obedient servant. She nourishes him in her bosom, but sedulously conceals from him the amount and length of her concern; her greatest child, but questionably her favorite. As a part of nature he can claim only a natural origin and destiny; he can no longer spontaneously believe that he can survive her. Being a part he must measure himself up against the whole, laying his little stature off as something practically negligible in the vastness of things. There is such an overwhelming magnitude of universe to which his existence is entirely irrelevant that he can no longer instinctively regard human civilization as the supremely important event in the history of the universe. It may be supremely important for him, but to say that it is supremely important in nature appears like uttering an untruth or an absurdity.[75]

What Woodbridge is saying is that astronomically speaking, man

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[73] Ibid., 36.
[74] Ibid., 65-66.
[75] Ibid., 83-84.

is negligible. I am again reminded of what one theist replied to this agnostic attitude, as quoted by President Marsh at a meeting of the Boston University Philosophical Club, "Astronomically speaking man is the astronomer." It is man who has developed the science of astronomy.

3. Naturalism and Materialism. Two factors in modern life have led us to think of nature as a vast machine controlled by mechanical laws. The first is modern physical science, and her it seems that Woodbridge refers to Newtonian physics. Had he been alive today, he too would have questioned this first, for the opinion of present day scientists has been reversed in this connection, especially by the principle of indeterminacy. The second factor is the part played by machines in our industrial and social development. But the fact still remains that someone must invent the machine. The history of the science of machines is very suggestive to the student of civilization for it shows how a study of appliances has been turned into a theory of the universe. Woodbridge is not in sympathy with this mechanistic interpretation. He believes in natural teleology along with his mechanism as he has many times said. He criticizes Galileo for trying to make the world wholly after the pattern of a machine. Nature herself was responsible for his overthrow, for nature will not readily submit to this mechanical treatment. Today he feels, that the mechanical explanation of nature, including mind, is general, although the facts of mind do not fit too well the mechanical expression. But the mechanical view can hardly be considered universal, so there seems to be no reason for saying

that it is. Besides, he himself rejects behaviorism as shall be seen. But he goes on:

> Not only has man been dethroned from his exalted position as the lord of creation and made a part of nature, but he has been made a part of a machine... Nature is a mechanism and man is a part of that machine.[76]

Mechanism has been forced upon him as inevitable. We try to personify the world but we cannot because we know that it is machanical. But such a view has not been satisfactory for a mechanical world is emotionally bankrupt. What he has been talking about is the older naturalism of materialism. His view is the newer one which allows for teleology as well as mechanism.

> The newer philosophy might still be called naturalism, for it would own nature as its source; but it might equally well be called humanism, for it would realize that nature affords the proper mechanism to minister to the ambitions and hopes of humanity.[77]

The older naturalists were mistaken in their view of nature. They saw that nature was mechanical, but they did not see that the machinery of nature exists to support and maintain its product.

> We have been so afraid of the doctrine of final causes and of assigning deliberate intentions to nature, that we have forgotten that she has produced, supported, and sustained human civilization. For man is a part of nature, carried on by her forces to work the work of intelligence.[78]

Man has grown out of nature's own stuff. He is one of the great examples or instances where nature has evaluated herself. Just how, is not at all clear. But nature does not just run on and on in complete indifference to her products. It is hard

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[76] Ibid., 87.
[77] Ibid., 93.
[78] Ibid., 93.

to see how nature could be anything but indifferent on a naturalistic basis, but nevertheless he insists that she is not.

> Rather we must regard it as that which supports and maintains what we choose to call ideal products, and finds in them its significance and justification as the germ finds its reason for existence in the life it engenders. We have been half-hearted evolutionists, seeking the causes of valuation and neglecting the fact that nature is always achieving results which may justify her labors.[79]

He concludes this chapter or essay by seeing a well developed naturalistic philosophy as the foundation of enlightened educational progress. In this he is very similar to Hook who sees our social development hampered by a failure of nerve due to the prevalent theistic philosophy of the present day. This world is no more matter's world than it is the spirit's, nor is it any less. It is no more man's world than it is a microbe's. Intelligence is no more or no less a part of the world than any of the processes it is able to discover.

> That the world should have become the home of the imagination is no less cosmically important than that it should have become the home of stellar systems. If man was destined to be an instance of physics and chemistry, he was also destined to be an instance of the "life of reason."[80]

Intelligence is more than an instrument of truth. It is also an instrument for the recovery of the past. But the great question still remains unanswered. If man was destined for anything, then obviously there must have been one who destined him. This whole question will have to be considered after

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[79] Ibid., 94.
[80] Ibid., 146.

we take up Woodbridge's view of the part of nature which we call "mind."

4. Relation to Aristotle and Spinoza. On the question of natural teleology, Woodbridge follows Aristotle rather than Spinoza. Indeed Spinoza rejects the view that nature has particular goals in view in favor of nature being what it is by absolute necessity.[81] Woodbridge's natural teleology may be linked with Aristotle's thesis that nature does nothing in vain.[82] There are, however, some very close connections between Woodbridge and Spinoza. In an article on Spinoza, Woodbridge makes the following more or less general statement:

> Integrated order ane connection, substance, native, ultimate essence, existence, idea, power, and God--these are all only different expressions for that in which everything that is is and without which nothing can be nor be conceived.[83]

Spinoza's Propositions[84] which state that God is the one substance that exists would be just as acceptable to Woodbridge if "nature" or "ultimate existence" were substituted for God. The meaning of "nature" to Woodbridge is pretty well Spinoza's meaning of "God."

Then with Spinoza, Woodbridge comes to the conclusion that the substance of knowledge and the substance of Nature are the same substance. Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum. Nature is as much a universe of discourse as she is a universe of matter moving in space and time. "As a universe of discourse she is recognized as the

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[81] Supra, 35, 37.
[82] Supra, 27.
[83] Woodbridge, Art.(1932), 117.
[84] Supra, 35, 36.

ultimate ground of intelligibility, the reason why she can be addressed in many languages whose proportions communicate what she is and is not discovered to be."[85] There are no terms in the vocabulary of the intellect which are not, first, he says, terms in the vocabulary of sense. There are bodies for mind, but mind is not a body. "With its home, energy is at work; with its body, mind thinks."[86] Mind he reduces to energy. *But one must now remember that the mind has not been dethroned by this reduction to energy.*

> Nature is not *a* body with *a* mind. She is what the distinction between body and mind is. I do not mean that she perceives, thinks, remembers, imagines, and pursues happiness, but I do mean that we are not deceived when we speak of her qualities, her quantities, her places and times, her histories, her continuities, her promises and potencies, her predictable events, her teleology, her order, her linkages of pleasure and pain.[87]

Woodbridge now mentions his reasons for personifying nature. It is not to prove that she is a person. It is rather a confession of piety. Nature is neither active nor passive. She is not an agent but such an integration of agents that knowledge and happiness are linked together in her. So far as the pursuit of knowledge is concerned nature herself is not a problem. She is rather the field of knowledge, and as that field she is preëminently the familiar visible world. She is heaven and earth and sea and all that in them is. Nature is all that there is.

In his article, "The Naturalism of Frederick Woodbridge," Professor Costello offers some further criticism of his great

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[85] EON, 253.
[86] Ibid., 261.
[87] Ibid., 264.

teacher. His criticism is made because Woodbridge was not quite naturalistic enough. Woodbridge disagreed with Santayana and Dewey, the latter because he could not understand him, and the former because he denied the causal place of mind in the world.[88] He explains for us what "Nature" meant for Woodbridge:

> To Woodbridge, as to some of the other naturalistic philosopher, it carries a connotation of something very solid and real, an emotional unification of all things. Toward Nature they feel a natural piety, as toward the great Mother of us all. For myself, I do not feel that piety, whether expressed by a Marcus Aurelius or a Woodbridge. To me Nature seems rather a collective name for quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff. Nature should not, by some "pathetic fallacy," become a substitute for God...To Woodbridge the world was not alien to men, nor too solicitous either. It does not answer prayers, and we may be thankful that it does not answer other people's; but it does offer us material for building the better life.[89]

For Woodbridge then, this writer agrees, Nature is a synonym for God. Yet within the realm of Nature man is an actor, a part of the whole drama, never a spectator. To him "Man's life and Nature were all one piece."[90] It is little wonder that one thinks of Spinoza, although there is some difference on many details. Our conclusion is that Nature for Woodbridge is practically synonymous with God and that his position is close to that of Spinoza's view of God or Nature. The greatest difference between them is that Spinoza looked upon nature existing as it is by necessity, while Woodbridge held to a theory of natural teleology. Costello also offers some criticism of Woodbridge's treatment of mind. Coming from another

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[88] In Krikorian, NHS, 296.
[89] Ibid., 299.
[90] Loc. cit.

naturalist it is certainly worth quoting:

> ...We may note certain features of Woodbridge's characterization of mind. He begins by saying that the body thinks, just as the body walks; there is no such thing as mind, but only forms of behavior. *Woodbridge himself qualifies, even reverses, these statements later*...If mind is behavior, it is behavior directed toward things remote, in the past, perhaps imaginary, perhaps abstract...To say it is the brain or the "organism" that thinks, is to deceive ourselves with an explanation that would indeed by simple, if only it were true, that we have a strong wish to believe it and to disregard the complexity of the fact.[91] (Italics ours)

He likewise criticizes Woodbridge's statement that we each have different inner lives because we have different bodies. However, he agrees with Woodbridge on the naturalness of teleology.

Pratt in his *Naturalism* agrees that man is not a misfit in Nature but that he is at home in the world. He has grown out of Mother Nature as her own child. The great and important question, however, is what we mean by nature. What is Nature? He says:

> It has become increasingly clear that Mother Nature, with which he is at home and from which he sprang, is not a mere collection of atoms acting solely according to mechanical laws, but a much richer organic whole within which many more influences and processes and qualities of being are at work than are dreamed of in the mechanistic philosophy. When we have put life and mind into Nature, the concept of Nature is significantly enlarged. Between man and his Mother there is a certain family resemblance. It does, indeed, characterize him to realize that he has sprung from Nature; but this fact characterizes her as well.[92]

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[91] Ibid., 307.
[92] Pratt, NAT, 141.

I. Summary

Woodbridge's concept of nature may now be summarized. Nature is "heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them is." It is the familiar setting of human history of "public experience."[93] The "natural" is what is "characteristic of nature," for the definition of "natural" and "naturalism" depends upon the definition of nature. Nature then is the visible world and that is all-that-there-is.[94] No further explanation, he holds, is needed than the recognition of nature as existing. She has definite structure.[95] Space is the shifting yet integrated interplay of geometrical distinctions observable in nature. Time has reference to the presence or absence of events in nature. Present events are; past and future one are not.[96] Matter is another name for nature but with reference to the materials of which it is made up rather than the whole.[97]

All knowledge about nature is obtained by the method of scientific experiment. To learn what sort of substance nature is made of, it is necessary to perform experiments such as are performed by physicists and chemists and only in that way can any true knowledge of nature be obtained.[98]

Man is part and parcel of nature. He is one of nature's events, but no more important than any other of her events.[99] He is not nature's last supreme act.[100] His body is an instru-

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[93] Supra, 46.
[94] Supra, 53.
[95] Supra, 53.
[96] Supra, 55.
[97] Supra, 56-58.
[98] Supra, 47, 51-52.
[99] Supra, 55-56.
[100] Supra, 72-73.

ment by which he acquires knowledge of nature. Mental states, for nature, has but one kind of stuff.[101] Man is natural in all his capacities, both in walking and in thinking.[102] He had a natural origin and will have a natural destiny. There is no survival after death.[103] In this Woodbridge differs from Spinoza who holds that "The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but there remains of it something which is eternal."[104]

There is no one purpose discoverable in nature. History itself is the natural progression of many events to many ends.[105] Historical events do "suggest" purpose but this is appearance only.[106] The whole of nature stirs within us the suspicion of plot or design, but no such design can be found.[107] There is, however, what he calls "natural teleology" which is the unconscious realization of purposes or ends.[108] Nature is going forward, growing older, and this is an instance of teleology.[109] That nature has produced man is no more surprising than that it has also produced microbes, falling stars or hydrogen.[110] In holding to natural teleology, Woodbridge is following Aristotle.[111]

Woodbridge criticizes metaphysicians for their failure to take things as they are and for trying to reduce the plurality of experience to ultimates.[112] To recognize nature in all its

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[101] Supra, 50-51.
[102] Supra, 72.
[103] Supra, 51.
[104] Ethics V, Prop. XXIII; see Rand (ed.), MCP, 188.
[105] Supra, 58-59.
[106] Supra, 59.
[107] Supra, 62.
[108] Supra, 62, 65-66.
[109] Supra, 64.
[110] Supra, 65-66.
[111] Supra, 27.
[112] Supra, 70.

plurality, as all-that-there-is, is as far as metaphysics can go. When an explanation of nature is sought, one is driven back finally to the assertion that nature is and farther one cannot go.[113] While holding to naturalism, Woodbridge rejects the older mechanistic materialism. Mechanism is true of nature but nature is not wholly mechanistic; it is also teleological.[114] Dewey and other naturalists, as well as Woodbridge, reject the mechanistic theory that followed the rise of Newtonian physics in favor of the Aristotelian concept of nature always achieving ends.[115]

Woodbridge's concept of nature is in general the same as Spinoza's concept of God as all-that-there-is.[116] The substance of knowledge and the substance of nature are the same. But Woodbridge differs from Spinoza in that he holds to natural teleology and rejects personal immortality.[117]

J. Criticism

Some criticisms of Woodbridge's concept of nature will be offered here, but the bulk of the criticism will be reserved until the close of the following chapter.

1. In most of his writings Woodbridge is much of a näive realist. He points out many facts and then says that they need no explanation other than pointing out their existence.[118] In his An Essay on Nature there is a strong mystical element

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[113] Supra, 71.
[114] Supra, 73-75.
[115] Supra, 27.
[116] Supra, 76-78.
[117] Supra, 62f, 51.
[118] Supra, 46, 48, 50, 63-64.

throughout. He is inclined to stand in awe before "Nature" and to make "her" the object of religious devotion.[119] Such an attitude is not consistent in a philosophical and scientific investigation.

2. At times Woodbridge becomes somewhat idealistic in his statements. For example, he says, nature seems to have made herself into exclusive "personal experiences."[120] He also speaks of "conscious bodies," although he says there is no "common consciousness." While Woodbridge would deny any tendency to idealism, such passages may be called ambiguous and inconsistent with ordinary naturalism.

3. Woodbridge is rather impatient in dealing with some problems. He dismisses them without adequate examination. This is seen, for example, in his rejection of a consideration of solipsism because the discussion would be "unprofitable."[121]

4. Woodbridge states that making the visible world problematic destroys intellectual clarity.[122] To make the world a problem begins a "reign of confusion." Just what is meant by "making the visible world problematic" is not very clearly stated. If he means that nature has no problems to be explained, then he is out of step with practically all scientists. Probably what he means is that the existence of nature must be taken as a fact that needs no further explanation or justification. To try to offer any explanation as to why

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[119] Supra, 66, 70.
[120] Supra, 50-51.
[121] EON, 32-33.
[122] Supra, 53-54.

nature exists is to raise questions that cannot be answered and ought not to be raised. Such an attitude as this stalemates speculative inquiry. It is quite possible that nature can be explained in terms other than itself.

5. Woodbridge's theory of knowledge is the scientific method taken in its narrowest sense.[123] For him, truths is what can be scientifically verified in the same way a physicist or chemist verifies an hypothesis, that is, by a laboratory experiment. In this position he is not in agreement with many other philosophers, idealists and naturalists alike. Regardless of their metaphysics, many philosophers agree on the probability theory of truth.[124] Absolute certainty is impossible and all knowledge is probability.

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[123] Supra, 47-49; 51-52.

[124] See Bowne, TTK; Brightman, ITP; Dewey, LOG; Larrabee, RK, and others.

CHAPTER IV

WOODBRIDGE'S THEORY OF MIND

A. Mind as a Universe of Discourse

The subject of "mind" must begin with a tentative definition of what mind is, before considering it in all its relations, functions, and aspects. As good a place as any to begin is with Woodbridge's essay "Mind Discerned," reprinted in Nature and Mind.

1. Mind Discerned. Mind, he says, is a universe of discourse.

> The universe which we investigate is, in a very genuine sense, a universe of discourse--certainly a universe discoursed about--a sort of total object of thought, the totality of which seems to be in no wise impaired by any of the distinctions discovered or set up within it...In other words, the world of material objects and the mind which inhabits animal bodies lie, as it were, discriminated in a single universe of discourse and may be subjects of thoughtful inquiry even if such inquiry may seem never to occur except with the presence of some animal body with a mind inhabiting it.[1]

Mind is a part of the whole natural universe--the world of nature. No one has ever succeeded in separating mind from this universe as a whole. There is no universe of ideas apart from objects, nor a universe of objects apart from ideas. To use the words of Spinoza: Ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et connexio rerum.[2] But mind, it must be remembered,

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1. Woodbridge, NAM, 162.
2. Supra, 76.

is not a thing. It is first, last, and always a name for a realm of discourse. It is a term we use because of its convenience and usefulness. Woodbridge makes this very clear when he says:

> Since the universe of discourse is a universe of this kind, we might give to it with some appropriateness the name of mind. Such a name would be used in the transcendental sense, for it would be used to indicate possibilities, the possibility of knowledge, of inquiry, of discursive thinking. It could not mean that a mind was taking thought of a world. In this latter sense the name could have no specific meaning. Neither could such a mind be said to have an origin. One might reluctantly admit that the universe of discourse itself might have an origin, that it was not self-sustained and self-sufficient, but mind in the transcedental sense, could have no origin within it, since mind in that sense is but a name given to the universe's salient character. And that name would indicate the sum total and mere fact of existence as constituting the universe wherein inquiry is active and productive. Clearly this mind is also not a determinate form of being, a distinguishable part of the universe known to experience and discourse. It does not inhabit animal bodies and is not structural in psychology. Nor does it explain the universe it constitutes, for it is not a substance which supports the universe, nor a cause of which that universe is an effect. *It is a name* [italics ours] for the fact that object and idea are already married whenever their union is open to consideration. It is a protest against the divorce courts of epistemology.[3]

He goes on to say that the physicist and the psychologist have the same subject-matter, likewise the moralist and the economist. All inquiry is relevant to the one and only realm of discourse.

2. *Psychological Concept of Mind*. What then of the mind

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[3] Ibid., 166.

that inhabits animal bodies? It is a fact that the mind of psychology is mind which remembers, imagines, perceives, reasons, etc. Are there, then, two minds? Is there one mind transcendental, and another that inhabits animal bodies? Of course not, for his objection is to mind as a separate entity inhabiting a body. Such a view is untenable. Yet, Woodbridge seems to think that many (probably the idealists) do have such a view. He says:

> In other words, I can make nothing intelligible out of the attempt to start with animal bodies fully equipped in their animality and then by adding mind to them construe their thoughtful consideration of their world in terms of this addition only. The attempt has been made many times, but it has always been wrecked ultimately by our inability to exhibit what animal bodies are without any implication at all of mind...[4]

No philosopher ever held to the view he is trying to criticize, so far as can be found. He then draws a conclusion that any idealist would also make, but apparently he believes that no idealist could possibly assent to it.

> It would seem as if animal bodies become seeing, thinking, remembering, imaginative, and passionate bodies in much the same ways as they become digesting, breathing, walking, and reproductive bodies.[5]
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> We ought rather to affirm that the possibility of mind as a determinate form of being inhabiting animal bodies resides in the fact that there is mind in the transcendental sense. Such a view makes of the genesis of the mind studies in psychology something wholly natural--I know of no better word--as natural as digestion or breathing, with the death of all animal bodies thinking itself might cease, but that which made thinking

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[4] Ibid., 169-170.
[5] Ibid., 171.

> possible would not cease. The latter would remain something characteristic of the world in which animal bodies had come to be. That is, mind in the transcendental sense can have no genesis.[6]

He goes on to say that mind so considered indicates a logical structure to which living things must conform just as they conform to other structural facts. But the fact also remains that the logical structure exists because mind already exists. For,

> As by conforming to the mechanical structure of things they maintain their equilibrium, so by conforming to the logical structure of things they think in propositions, they make distinctions and so finally come to discover themselves as distinct from the world, recognize themselves as the habitations of mind, and undertake the study of psychology.[7]

But this is possible only because mind is transcendental in the universe, at least, according to Woodbridge, as eternal as the universe itself--for mind as such had no genesis. The logical structure of things as we find it, depends upon the presence of mind in the universe. Before arriving at any definite conclusions, a consideration of The Realm of Mind is necessary.

B. The Realm of Mind

In the "Preface" to his book, The Realm of Mind, Woodbridge begins by relating his observation of the conversation of two deaf-mutes on a New York bus. As he watched them this thought flashed through his mind, What if one of them should exclaim, "Matter is indestructible?" To all of this he says:

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[6] Loc. cit.
[7] Ibid., 172.

> A miracle, and yet the common miracle of all language, for language is ever matter in some shape--fingers moving in space, sounds vibrating in air, marks showing in light, synapses charging and discharging in brains--matter, matter everywhere, the one and only means of conveying its own indestructibility. We describe matter in figures of speech because the figure of speech is what matter indestructibly is.[8]

In the first sentence of the text proper, he defines mind as "not an individual agent or being which thinks, but the realm of being in which thinking occurs."[9] The thinking agent is a self and there are many selves, which is another way of saying that many minds are taking thought of the world. Yet all of this, he admits does not tell us what mind actually is. If we analyze ourselves, we do not find any mind--we find only our bodies. Our bodies are the only agents of thought that we ever discover. Just as soon as we look into the fact of mind, we are carried beyond ourselves to the object of thought. We enter into a realm of being in which thinking becomes an event. It is the realm of being to which our bodies belong, in other words, it is the space-time realm. This realm is so connected that we can discover what one event or fact implies in terms of another event or fact. We live in a realm of logical structure. "This I take to be the discovery of the essential nature of mind."[10]

What then has caused the distinction between the mental

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[8] Woodbridge, ROM, viii.
[9] Ibid., 1.
[10] Ibid., 2.

and physical worlds? This is what Whitehead calls, "the bifurcation of nature." Our activity falls into two major classes which we denote by names. To activity such as thinking, remembering, and imagining, we give the name of mental; and activity such as walking, sleeping, and digesting, we call physical. "Nor has the physical ever been successfully reduced to the mental, although some philosophers have attempted to do so, impelled by the logic of their own speculations."[11] Thus these are simply terms used to distinguish different kinds of activity of the human organism, not different objects or things. The objects took on the character of their activities and were named in terms of what they did. What is thought unless there is something thought about? What is motion, unless something is moved? There is, he says, no mind unless there is mental activity; nor no body, unless there is physical activity. "It is what the man does that divides him into body and mind."[12]

In so far as explaining these two kinds of activity, metaphysics of any kind has had little success, in fact no success. He says:

> Metaphysics, no matter how much it has exalted the mind and set it over against the body, has never succeeded in revealing by analysis a mind and a body as primary facts from which the distinction between the mental and the physical is derived.[13]

Man is never found as possessing a body and a mind, but these terms are used to explain that he walks and thinks, that is,

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[11] Ibid., 3.
[12] Ibid., 5.
[13] Ibid., 5-6.

engages in two kinds of activity. The object which thinks and walks, the man himself, is one. He is undivided. Mind and body are simply terms to express concisely things that man does. They, in themselves, explain nothing. Any special content of meaning we may give to them is the result of transfer not of discovery.

The whole of man's unitary life may, however, be examined in terms of his behavior. The world in which we live is a physical world filled with physical bodies, not spiritual bodies. It is a world in which these physical bodies interact. Why have we not been willing to take it as such? The answer is that we think. Our mental activity seems irrelevant to the world of physical things. It seems to be apart from it. The heart of the whole body-mind problem he states in one sentence. "HOW CAN THE SITUATION BE CONSTRUED SO THAT THE FACTS OF MENTAL ACTIVITY AND A PHYSICAL WORLD ARE COMPATIBLE?"

Woodbridge now devotes several pages to a view with which he disagrees. It is the view that reality is made up of two realms, mental and physical. He seems to forget that idealists object to this bifurcation, just as much as do naturalists. Since he refutes or attempts to refute this view, it is worth dwelling upon. The world is conceived of as being filled with physical objects which stimulate our sense organs. These objects cause nervous impulses which are conveyed to the brain. We are then driven to the conclusion that there is something in us which responds to the stimuli from the physical world.

Man is conceived of as having a mind and a body which are two separate things. Thus we endow our bodies with an agent which uses the body to reach the physical world, via the senses. Eventually this view refutes itself. The mind grasps the physical processes in the brain. The brain does not contain the bodies which stimulate it. The objects accomplish effects within the brain itself. The immediate objects of the mind are nervous processes in the brain. Objects stimulate the brain to action. But the immediate objects of the mind are never brain processes, although nervous processes in the brain are the immediate occasions of thought. The immediate objects are something with which the brain processes are somehow correlated. They are not the external objects for the mind is associated with the brain alone and has no contact with the external bodies.

All that is left is the content of the mind itself and this content is perceptions or ideas. What the mind thinks about is its own perceptions or ideas. These constitute a mental world of their own in which all our thought and reasonings proceed. "We are thus confronted with two worlds, a world of physical bodies from which the mind is wholly excluded and a world of perceptions and ideas from which the physical world is wholly excluded."[14] We thus lose contact with the physical world and all we have is our perceptions and ideas. Then from our own ideas we proceed to establish the existence of the physical

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[14] Ibid., 14-15.

world. An object is now not a body in the physical world but a perception in the mind. Its qualities are in the mind while its counterpart is a physical process or thing in the world outside. The physical world is no longer a world of bodies and qualities but rather a vast system of mechanical relations.

If the physical world is excluded from the mind, the problem is to find reasons for believing in its existence. How can we, from the contents of our minds, arrive at the physical world? According to this view the physical world becomes a product of the mind itself. It is a system of ideas which the mind works out or builds up in view of its own contents. Even the location of the physical world involves some kind of mental projection.

This in general is an idealistic view of the physical world. All that exists is ideas in a perceiving mind. Add to that the objective existence of the world in the infinite Mind and a good picture of Berkeley's idealism can be seen. The last sentence in the paragraph above might have been taken from Bowne. But Woodbridge has stated this view in order to criticize it. His criticism will be considered.

The physical world, he says, according to this view, requires a mind that it may be known. But the mind knows no other physical world than that which it constructs out of its own content. This, to him, is unintelligible.

> That such a piece of metaphysics should hold a respectable place in history, is due, I imagine, not to the coherency and intelligibility of the argument, but to the obvious fact that we discover the physical world by thinking, and, when

> we have discovered it, it is found to be something radically antithetical to thought. It is objective to thought and yet somehow thought's achievement. This fact, the argument with all its attendant philosophy does most emphatically disclose in spite of its vitiation by unintelligible assumptions. And these latter ought to afford abundant evidence of the unsoundness of any metaphysics of the mind which begins with the physical process involved in thinking and assumes an agent quite independent of that process to do the thinking.[15]

He learns from this digression that the physical world is discovered by thought. Our thinking constructs our knowledge of the physical world. It is the process of exploring the realm of being within which our thinking occurs in all its concreteness. The problem is to discover the extent of thought as we think about the common objects of every day life and try to understand them and their relations. We take the world as common sense finds and takes it. Perceptions and ideas are retained as names for the contents of the mind but we must understand what these terms really mean in this connection. A perception means that a thing is perceived. An idea means that we think of an object. They tell us nothing at all of the nature of the object or thing perceived. All the terms mean is that we are aware of the existence of things, never that we have discovered something about them.

> All we have really done is to affirm, for example, that whatever we think about is an idea and an idea is whatever we think about. But precisely what the whatevers are, is left wholly undetermined.[16]

We simply think about facts and events near and remote.

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[15] Ibid., 18.
[16] Ibid., 21.

What then is the realm of thinking? He says that if we follow the lead of what we think about, to the acceptance of thinking as an event in time and space, as an event, that is, in the same realm of being in which are the objects of thought. "It is the world of space and time in which we think, just as much as it is that world in which we walk."[17] Our brains and our legs are but instruments for different kinds of activity.

This view is similar to Dewey's instrumentalism. Thought is simply a function by which the human organism is able to adjust itself to its environment.

> If this is more than a fashion of speech, if the mind is, metaphysically, the domain of thought, then, in considering it, we are evidently not considering a realm of being in which thinking occurs. At any rate, thinking is so bound up with the objects of thought that we find ourselves dealing with their world in every attempt to deal with its...Since we think beyond our body's place and our life's duration, there is no intelligible divorcing of time and space from the realm of mind.[18]

Next, Woodbridge considers some possible objections to this position. It is argued that only the effects of the objects which exist in the space-time realm are in the realm of mind. To this he replies that the space-time order existed long before and will exist long after we cease to think. How, he says, could we write histories or make scientific predictions, if our thinking is cut off from the subject matter involved? But this reasoning seems to be based on the assumption that the space-time realm is the only one there is.

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[17] Ibid., 24.
[18] Loc. cit.

He goes on to deny Kant's statement that space and time belong to the mind. Mind is in no way responsible for space and time, yet at the same time mind is not bound to the realm of space and time. "Since we think, no limit is set by time and space to what we think about. Our thinking goes on in a realm where time and space are accessible."[19] This is similar to idealistic space and time transcendence. He makes no attempt to explain this but says that it is so and must be accepted as such. When we deal with the place where thinking goes on, we are never dealing with an event, but a realm of events.

Next, what do we think about? We think about the infinite variety of things in the world, which we collectively call being. But things do not exist only when we think of them, but they exist all the time. The realm of being is not dependent upon the realm of thought nor is it created by thinking minds. But if what we think about is in the mind, then the realm of mind is co-extensive with the realm of being. Further, the realm of being is in the mind.

The realm of being has a logical structure. It is unified and coherent. It is so systematized that one fact in it leads one to think of other facts and events. It is this fact of logical structure that identifies the realm of being with the realm of mind. There is no possible way of solving any problem if we maintain two separate realms in reality, those of mind and matter.

The world of mind is the world of thinking. It is a world which is immediate and concrete subject matter for our

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[19] Ibid., 29.

inquiries. It is the world about which we think. But we must not, when we think, assume that there is an agent mind that does the thinking for us. Thinking finds the fact of logical connection interwoven with whatever we think about. It is a logical world in which thinking is an event. If this world is the mind's world, then the mind is not properly a being, but a realm of being.

Mind is a collective name for the experienced objects of thought or just another name for experience itself. Mind is a term used to denote the fact that while experience is a matter of space and time, of objects, qualities, and relations, it is also a matter of implications and inferences. "The realm of experience is the realm of mind."[20] If we accept experience as it is, the realm of experience is the realm of being, the realm of mind. All are one and the same. "This is the ultimate metaphysical fact in no need of further explanation."[21]

Mind, he goes on, seems to be an implication of existence rather than existence itself. It is something demanded by considerations which seem to lead to it and to make it necessary. If we follow these considerations, we may find what creates the demand. The quest for mind originated in efforts to construe our thinking about the world in which we live.

His general position up to this point is: (1) We have found that the difference between acts of thinking is so different from acts of walking that we are accustomed to

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[20] Ibid., 40-41.
[21] Ibid., 41.

call the former mental and the latter physical. Thinkers are minds for mind is the name for a being who thinks. (2) Given ourselves as thinkers, we find nothing besides our bodies which does the thinking. The answer to the question concerning the agent of thinking is the same as the answer concerning the agent of walking--the one identical agent is the same no matter how diverse the activity--our bodily selves. We can find no other agent nor anything that has value in metaphysical analysis. For all such analysis the thinker is and remains a body. (3) Thinking is co-extensive with the subject matter. It is a bodily activity and depends upon the body for its vigor and sustaining, but it comprehends the body and very much more. It has limitations traceable to the body, but others not traceable at all. If our thinking is to be wise and correct, it is not the body which makes it so, but a genuine coherence among the things we think about.

C. Objective Mind

He next considers the logical structure of the realm of being, that is, the rationality of the universe or nature. In this realm one fact or event leads us on to other facts or events. There is a logical structure in things.

> In this sense the mind is not a being or an agent or an existence. It is rather the implications of all beings, agents and existences, revealing something basic about the realm of being itself.[22]

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[22] Ibid., 46.

Mind as such a logical structure is discoverable. The coherence of things is found out by thinking. Mind as logical structure is objective mind and now he goes on to consider that.

The psychologist is interested in mind as a specific type of human or animal behavior. This behavior exhibits itself in ways that are identifiable and which are subject to experimentation. The results of the experiment must then be verified without regard to any metaphysical interpretation which may be placed upon them. The subject matter is a specific type of behavior and never an elusive thing called consciousness or mind in any metaphysical sense. The mind of psychology, as a kind of behavior, we take for granted. What does such a type of behavior, that is, behaving thoughtfully, really mean or imply?

The implication he finds is that mind as logical structure is objective, that is, the universe is rational. It has to do with the make-up of the world in which thinking occurs. It is something we discover for being is logically constructed and constitutes in some measure a realm of intelligibility quite irrespective of our efforts to comprehend it. This is similar to Aristotle's idea of entelechy.

It is natural to think of mind as objective and logical. Men look for reasons to make the operation of things intelligible. Men naturally seek a reason deeper than themselves for the cause of things. They want to know why they are here, whereas the reason is found in their own natural history. "Men believe in a God because it seems impossible that our fate here has no significance beyond ourselves and no part in

a wider plan."[23] We think that in the nature of things there is something discoverable which will, if found, tell us the secret of all things. It seems impossible to believe that the world is without rhyme or reason in itself and devoid of significance and intelligibility, while we seek to discover in it a way of life which is intelligent and rational.

The basic categories of the world are space, time, and existence, but these alone cannot make an intelligible world. They cannot be separated from the interplay of thought.

> When thinking is not accepted as an actual participation in existence, but as something essentially supernatural--either as the subjective accompaniment of a brain or as the generator of its own categories--it is not likely that absurdity and illusion will be avoided.[24]

The subject of knowledge is considered. Knowledge is a fact of existence just as much as any other fact. Knowing a thing is not becoming the thing nor knowing its existence. He denies the metaphysical theories that knowledge is a matter of ideas. An idea is never a copy, image, or likeness of anything whatsoever. Ideas are acquired through bodily operations. They are wholly indifferent to the medium of expression. Yet knowledge is a matter of ideas without, of course, any implications from the use of the term idea. "Knowledge is a very practical problem of getting ideas, of making them clear, and of keeping them from getting in one another's way."[25] Their agreement with their object is their effectiveness in making clear what their objects are.

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[23] Ibid., 51.
[24] Ibid., 54.
[25] Ibid., 65.

But what he means by making clear is the important thing. Man's brain is an instrument in the same way a phonograph is an instrument for making ideas clear. "Both are forms of mechanisms so both may get out of order."[26] The goal of ideas is to be clear and adequate. They are made clear through some conveyer or translator.

> In short ideas are made clear by translating from one set of words into another set, from one language into another language, from one brain process into another brain process, from one bodily condition into another bodily condition, and they are never made clear in an other way.[27]

Thinking is nothing more nor less than self-communication. It has a language, though the body may suppress public modes of expression, such as the control of the muscles of the face. By language he means not words, but a way of communication. There is an internal language or way of communication. Consciousness or states of consciousness or mental processes are simply ways of expressing the instrumentation of thought. Thus the language of thought is a material language. Our knowledge of the world is gained by or through an instrument of translation. His whole position he sums up in three convictions: (1) That language, which everybody says conveys ideas, is a material exchange and as such is on a par, metaphysically, with every other material exchange and they with it. (2) That ideas, although they are conveyed by something material, are not the material which conveys them, but an effect wrought in the exchange, and so not material at all; and furthermore he says,

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26. Ibid., 65-66.
27. Ibid., 70.

(3) That ideas, because they are acquired and clarified by experience, that is by the contacts of our bodies with the rest of the world, and because they are conveyed from one person to another, are, in spite of their immateriality, not some peculiar idiosyncrasy in ourselves, but genuine discoveries and genuine constituents of the system of things, showing that that system is also a realm of being which can be investigated and rendered intelligible in discourse.[28] Objective mind is a necessary implication of the axiom, Man thinks.

D. Many Minds

Leaving this subject, consideration will be given to the meaning of "many minds." There is no relation, he says, between objective mind and the human mind. The objective mind neither thinks nor remembers. It is an abstract thing. Often personality and the authorship of the universe are attributed to it. It is like the First Mover in Aristotle's philosophy. His own position has been well stated, that objective mind is simply the logical order of things. He finds in it nothing personal, and no causation whatsoever.

The only similarity between objective mind and human minds is the use of the same term. It is the result of the activity of thought. But the objective mind is neither essential or necessary to the existence of many minds. To discuss the existence of many minds we must begin with many minds, never with objective mind. "Many minds are many men and many men

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[28] Ibid., 81-82.

are many bodies of a sort."[29] To study many minds we must begin with many bodies, for he said at the beginning all that we can find is the body.

> The interplay of a man's body with the world about it is not only a matter of giving and receiving impacts, but also a matter of perceiving, remembering, and thinking, making up an individual's perceptions, memories and thoughts.[30]

All of which is simply a relation to be stated, not a problem to be solved. Man is a mind. He is one individual, one undivided. Mind and body are not two distinct and substantial elements of his composition. When he explores his mind he explores his own world. And as he explores, it is always his body he finds, never his mind.

E. Mental Development

His treatment of the development of mind will be considered. There is much evidence of instrumentalism here, as appeared many times before. Man uses instruments. Primitive man used a club. "He wields it with his arm and it bruises his foe. It does what his body without it would have to do. It is a real instrument."[31] The same is true of ideas.

> Ideas are thus the things that keep art from being only an instrument. But they are themselves instruments as well as symbols. They are substitutes for the things they signify, so that a sentence uttered may take the impact of a blow. And so between man and nature intervene the whole symbolism and instrumentality of his ideas. They mean and they fend. They suggest and they control. They represent and they operate. They are the supreme intervention of art, at once the highest

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[29] Ibid., 91.
[30] Loc. cit.
[31] Woodbridge, NAM, 176.

> form of instrumentation and the highest form of symbolism.[32]

Man's development has been his intellectual development. His history is the history of his ideas. The way he has put between himself and nature the symbols which are his instruments. When we speak of the growth of mind we are speaking really of the growth of art. We are setting forth incidents in the life of these beings in whose reactions art is a factor and trying to follow those incidents in their manifold connections. Viewed in time, these incidents become centers from which radiate the past and future countless series of connections. These centers have no one past nor no one future. By arrangement these incidents or events become history.

F. Behavior

All actions, whether mental or physical, are forms of behavior.

> Every act, from the movement of a body in space to the movement of a thought in an inference, seems to be done by an agent in which can be found a structure, constitution, or organization without which the act is not done.[33]

Yet, while he emphasizes the importance of thought as a form of action, he most emphatically rejects behaviorism as a psychology.

> I would avoid, if possible, any suspicion of giving aid and comfort to those misguided souls who seem to identify behavior with structure...So also, while he (man) will not speak unless he has an apparatus, the pattern of his discourse is very little determined by his vocal chords and his nervous response.[34]

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[32] Ibid., 176.
[33] Ibid., 183.
[34] Ibid., 184.

> For behavior is a teleological matter and without considerations of ends reached no differences are recognizable or definable.[35]

It is hard for me, he says, to think on behavior in any other way.

> Behavior being so pre-eminently a teleological matter, the science of behavior might be called a teleological science...
>
> Yet it seems to me clear that in so far as a consideration of behavior involves a consideration of ends, we ought frankly to admit that we have entered the realm of teleology and that there the analysis of structure is not helpful...
>
> It seems to me foolish to deny that there are ends in nature, but it also seems foolish to affirm that these ends operate to determine the structure and constitution of things.[36]

In other words the structure and constitution are prior to the ends or purposes. The purposes did not produce the structure, but the structure resulted in the ends. It still remains to be seen what he means by structure that produces ends or purposes. This is taken up in his essays on "Structure" and "Natural Teleology" and in other passages already dealt with in our consideration of teleology.

He summarizes his view of mind as follows:

> Starting with the fact that what things are is not an indication of what they do, I would observe,
> (1) That behavioristic distinctions are made, not in terms of structure, but in terms of ends accomplished by behavior;
> (2) That behavior is consequently a teleological matter implying a natural teleology;
> (3) That the admission of natural teleology does not necessarily involve either the doctrine that ends operate or the doctrine that structures con-

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35. Ibid., 186.
36. Ibid., 187.

> tain resident powers by virtue of what they do:
> (4) That the relativity of ends is confirmation of teleology and not its undoing:
> (5) That natural teleology constitutes the intelligibility of nature; and
> (6) That mind may be construed as an instance of teleology rather than the cause of it.[37]

It is evident from this that he sees mind as one of the many natural teleological factors which arise out of nature's unconscious material stuff in the course of history. It, like the other factors, arose naturally for there is no ultimate cause in nature. Teleology is simply observable progress in a definite direction. At the same time the direction is that which one observes.

G. Consciousness

The subject of consciousness is, of course, prominent all through the discussion. But a more definite and unified statement of what Woodbridge means is in order. It is evident that consciousness is a bodily action. There is no mind or consciousness unless there is mental activity, nor any body unless there is physical activity. "It is what the man does that divides him into body and mind."[38] The essence of his Realm of Mind is that consciousness is a kind of activity. In his essay, "The Nature of Consciousness," he says: "Consciousness should, therefore, be defined as the same general type of existence as space, time, or species, Its nature is akin to theirs."[39] His nearness to the neorealists is seen in this quotation:

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[37] Ibid., 190.
[38] Woodbridge, ROM, 5.
[39] Woodbridge, NAM, 308.

> And just as we may have a body of knowledge built up from the fact that things are in space, so we may have a body of knowledge built up from the fact that objects are in consciousness.[40]

It is seen from this that things in space may also be objects in consciousness. Consciousness is a system of things or events--or as he said previously, an existence in space and time. "Consciousness may be defined, therefore, as a kind of continuum of objects."[41] This is akin to what has been called "panobjectivism.

Each consciousness is individual because two continuums of the same kind cannot be parts of each other. We can relate them to each other just as we relate objects to each other. This relation is always by means of our mediating bodies. He agrees with James's aim to "take consciousness out of the realm of terms and put it in the realm of relations."[42] He admits that there is a differentiation within experience, into objective and subjective, into the physical and psychological, but "I have been unable to discover that the differentiation throws light on the nature of consciousness."[43] The division of consciousness into two parts does not isolate a field where consciousness is found. His conclusions are that "things or a part of them, may be in consciousness, but they are in it as things are in space."[44] The world, before this time unknown, has not suddenly been changed into ideas, by consciousness, but the world has been connected up in a new way. He seems to mean that a new relation of events has been discovered.

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[40] Ibid., 309.
[41] Loc. cit.
[42] Ibid., 313.
[43] Loc. cit.
[44] Ibid., 314.

H. The Nature of Man

What is man as a whole? What, then, is his essential nature?

> One result of this remarkable development (in modern psychology) is that psychology seems to have lost the human soul. Perhaps it would be better and more proper to say, that the soul has been progressively transformed, until it has at last become no more than the physiological, physical, and chemical behavior of human beings. We no longer have a soul or the soul is no longer a thing we can have. It is rather what we do, our activity as a whole.[45]

There is no soul which exists as in another world or realm. There is but one realm--that of nature. The soul is the functioning and activity of man, one of nature's most active and problematic children.

> There are not two worlds, to be played off against each other, one with men and one with all sorts of other things. I find it impossible to think that the world is divided into two the moment a man perceives it or thinks about it. I cannot look upon the activity of man as an exception. Our philosophy should be wholly positive.[46]

> When I consider the results of the historical criticism of human opinions, philosophical, religious, or otherwise, and also the results of positive inquiry into natural events, I am compelled to conclude that we should not believe that man is an exception in the natural history of the world. He comes from nature and to nature he returns. He comes and goes like any other event in the world; and the world exists for his sake as little as it exists for the sake of anything else. We should not believe differently. There are many who will believe differently. But they will to believe; and the "will to believe," although it may often be a comfort, is not an attitude which is intellectually grounded...What I would affirm is this, in the face of all our discoveries, it has become intellectually impossible to believe that man is not a natural in the same sense as animals, plants, and atoms. We

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45. Ibid., 249.
46. Ibid., 250.

> may put this unbelievable thing away in the interest of hopes and fears, but we cannot think it away, when we thoughtfully and purposfully plan for our daily life.[47]

We ought not to believe that we are otherwise than we actually are--products of nature. We ought to believe that we really are just what we are. We must develop a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy in order to realize our proper place in nature. Naturalism, as a philosophy, is becoming more popular. There is no doubt about this. Since the death of Woodbridge, it has continued to grow and flourish. A platform for Naturalists has been recently stated in the volume, Naturalism and the Human Spirit, published in 1944.

Woodbridge continues:

> Few philosophers and still fewer psychologists have attained a clear knowledge of the fact that this incorporation of man into Nature is of the greatest metaphysical significance. They seem to be content with the conclusion that something thereby has happened to man. He has been changed. His relatives have been changed. He is no longer a child of God and an inheritor of the Kingdom of Heaven. His once high position in the cosmos has been abased. His relatives have become the animals, the plants, and the atoms, and this is taken to mean that the nature of man is to be found at last in the nature of the atom. There are few who can find in Heisenberg's principle of indeterminism the hope that there is yet a Promethean spark of freedom in the world, but beyond this the incorporation of man into Nature is a profound transformation of what he is, a change of his destiny and his relationships.[48]

The popular attitude today, he feels, agrees with this conclusion. Naturalism gives to man chiefly his animal rights. His intelligence is only an instrument of his animal life, to be used to find channels through which his natural im-

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[47] Ibid., 252.
[48] Ibid., 253.

pulses may freely flow. We see here again his instrumental view of intelligence. His psychology is close to the functional psychology of Angell and Dewey, which in turn is Aristotelian.

> The incoporation of man into Nature may well do something to man, but it must also do something to Nature. It is impossible that the word "Nature" can mean the same after this incorporation that it meant before. The incorporation is really revolutionary. It does not permit us to think of Nature as if it were wholly predetermined, irrespective of man's incorporation into it. What has naturalism really done to man? It has changed him from an illustration of what Nature is not, to a profound illustration of what Nature is. He reveals what Nature is fully as much as any other natural event. The nature of man and the nature of Nature go together.[49]

He asserts that a thorough-going naturalism will not separate man from Nature. It will not allow us to think of Nature as something first created or first discovered and then man added to it. Nature can be no more adequately defined without men than she can without atoms or anything else. Man is as important for the revelation of the nature of atoms as the atoms are for the revelation of the nature of man, but no more so. Nature is equally tolerant of everything in it whether it be birds, animals, plants, atoms, or men. Man explains Nature only in the sense that he discovers her, and he discovers her only as a consequence of the fact that his whole life from birth to death, from waking to thinking, is a genuine co-working with what she is. The question why and how man lives, how and why he walks and thinks, is, in principle, the same sort of question as why and how the atoms move. "This does not mean

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[49] Ibid., 254.

that the movement of atoms is the thinking of a man, or that thinking is some curious addition to motion, but that both motion and thinking are a co-working with Nature under controlling laws."[50] A thorough naturalism demands not only an emancipation from a traditional conception of man, but also an emancipation from a traditional conception of Nature. "I must believe that Nature reveals herself in man more adequately than in anything else, that in him her laws come to expression and meaning, that human life is not set over against Nature, but is Nature illuminated and inspirited."[51]

> The modern kind (of naturalism) is new only in the sense that it is not founded on the naturalisms of the past, but is a product of modern science, modern psychology, modern criticism, and the technical demands of modern life. It is a challenge to us to revolutionize our traditional thinking. The first consequence is not surprising. Man feels himself changed, he asks what he has lost and what he has gained. He does not first ask what Nature has lost and what she has gained.[52]

Man is first and last, then, part and parcel of Nature. But Nature is earth and heaven and sea and all that in them is. Nature is all that there is.

> Now what have these observations, which are for the most part obvious and naïve, to do with man and the nature of man? Much, I believe. Guided by the philosophy of naturalism we have incorporated man wholly within nature. This now means that, with respect to human life, there is propriety in nature fully as much as in any other instance. Man, from his lowest physiological functions to the highest aspirations of his thought, illustrates the propriety of Nature. The world in which he lives is controlled not only by physical and chemical laws, it is controlled also by logical, moral, and spirit-

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[50] Loc. cit.
[51] Ibid., 256.
[52] Ibid., 256.

> ual laws. When a man walks, we readily admit that Nature is appropriate to his walking, when he sees or thinks, should we say something different? Should we say something different even when he prays? He is doing what is natural. Nature is as adapted to the life of man as it is to plants, animals, and atoms.[53]

Nature must be so arranged that the spiritual life of man is not alien to her. The nature of man and the nature of Nature coincide. The world does not exist for purposes other than itsown. Nature is not a creation, but the challenge and the opportunity to create. Thus man's intellectual and spiritual nature can produce all sorts of novelty. But such is never outside of nature, for nature is all-that-there-is. His idea of nature is that of an Absolute. As pointed out, it is very similar to the Absolute of Spinoza in which God and Nature and Substance are synonymous terms.[54] Just as God contains both thought and extension for Spinoza, so Nature contains both physical and mental activity for Woodbridge. They are both phenomena which are found with earth and heaven and sea and all that in them is. The "all that in them is" is a very inclusive term for Woodbridge. Woodbridge continues his argument about the place of man in the universe in an even more unscientific manner.

> Not only has man been dethroned from his exalted position as the lord of creation and made a part of Nature, but he has been made a part of a machine.[55]

No matter how we try to personify the world, we cannot, he says, because we cannot escape the conclusion that the world is mechanical. This is inevitable.

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[53] Ibid., 257-258.
[54] Supra, 76-78.
[55] Ibid., 87.

I. Summary

In this chapter an outline has been given of Woodbridge's theory of mind. Mind is a part of the natural world. It cannot be separated from this world. It is a realm of discourse, not a separate entity, inhabiting a body.[56] In his Realm of Mind he says that mind is a bodily function wholly within the space-time realm. Mind shows that things have a logical structure. The world of mind "is the world of space and time in which we think, just as much as it is that world in which we walk."[57]

Thinking is a function of the human organism. (1) We name certain acts "physical" or "mental" for convenience. (2) Our bodily selves are the only discoverable thinking agents. (3) Thinking is co-extensive with the subject matter.[58]

To speak of "objective mind" means simply that a logical structure is discoverable in things, the universe is rational.

His view of mind may be summed up as follows: (1) Language is a means of a material exchange of ideas. (2) Ideas are not the material itself, but an "effect" of the transfer. (3) Ideas are genuine constituents of the system of things.[59]

There is no relation between objective mind and the existence of "many minds." The only similarity is the use of the term. Many minds means simply that there are many bodies in existence.[60] Mind is evidence of man's development. He

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[56] Supra, 85-86.
[57] Supra, 89; ROM, 24.
[58] Supra, 97-98.
[59] Supra, 101-102.
[60] Supra, 102-103.

is one who uses instruments. Mind is an example of man's adjustment, but all of his activities, both mental and physical, are forms of behavior.[61] Woodbridge rejects complete behavioristic psychology in favor of a functional view of mind.[62] Consciousness is likewise a function of the human organism. "Conscious should, therefore, be defined as the same general type of existence as space, time, or species."[63] It is a continuum of objects.

Man is part and parcel of Nature. He has no "soul" or mind which exists in any other realm.[64] All his activity is "natural" activity. Man is wholly a product of Nature - an emergent. The identification of man within Nature gives to him his natural animal rights. He is shown in his true perspective as no more important then any other thing with nature.[65] This identification reveals something of what nature really is. Nature is equally tolerant of everything in it, whether birds, animals, plants, atoms, or men. Man has been truly made a part of this "natural machine."

J. Criticism

1. Woodbridge says that mind in the transcendental sense has no genesis.[66] Just what he means by this is not well

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[61] Supra, 104-105.
[62] Supra, 104-105.
[63] Supra, 106; NAM, 308.
[64] Supra, 108.
[65] Supra, 108-109.
[66] Supra, 88.

explained. If mind has no genesis, then it is eternal. In that case it is not an emergent from unconscious matter by some process of biological evolution at all. Furthermore, if mind is eternal in the universe, this would be idealism, not naturalism. In any case, his position is by no means clear.

2. Woodbridge is inconsistent in his treatment of the status of ideas.[67] He insists that there is one realm of being--the space-time realm. Mind belongs to this realm. But he says that ideas are not material things, hence, cannot be in space-time, nor are they "idiosyncracies" of ourselves. Just what they are is not made clear. He then says that ideas are "objects" in their logical connection. If they are not material, how can they be? His statements here are very difficult to make out.

3. Woodbridge is troubled by the facts of behavior, especially mental behavior. Behavior, he sees as teleological.[68] This involves a consideration of ends or purposes. These ends, he says, cannot be explained on the basis of "structure." While there are "ends in nature," he will not admit the possibility of these ends as operating "to determine the structure and constitution of things.[69] To admit purpose, he says, is not to admit any directing agency. At the same time, he says, such a view "is beset with difficulties which only increase the farther it is pursued."[70] Woodbridge sees great difficulty

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[67] Supra, 101.
[68] Supra, 105.
[69] Supra, 105; NAM, 186-187.
[70] NAM, 189.

in his own view. Mind in a teleological world is natural and at home but in a non-teleological world it would be irrelevant and absurd.[71] Woodbridge is agnostic on the existence of an infinite personality here. He is inconsistent and knows it, yet he feels unable to do anything about it. He admits that the contradiction might be solved on a theistic basis, but this solution is of no value because the existence of a personal God is not scientifically verifiable.[72]

4. His view of consciousness is somewhat neorealistic.[73] Abody of knowledge results from objects in consciousness. This view has little or no psychological or philosophical standing today.

5. Costello points out that Woodbridge's theory of mind is not always consistent.[74] He says a body thinks just as a body walks. Mind is a kind of behavior. But later he qualifies and reverses his position.

6. Since Woodbridge offers several criticisms of idealism, and since his statements sometimes represent a misunderstanding of the idealistic view, it seems best to make some comparisons of the two systems. As there are several kinds of idealism, this discussion will be limited to the position taken by personal idealists. By personal idealism is meant that the whole of reality consists of minds; there is the infinite mind of God, and the world of nature is a part of his experience; there are also finite minds which exist apart from the divine

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[71] NAM, 190.
[72] Supra, 51-52.
[73] Supra, 106-107.
[74] Supra, 79.

mind, but are ultimately dependent upon it. Personalists or personal idealists would agree with Woodbridge in his insistence that reality is metaphysically one[75] but differ as to the nature of that one. The naturalist insists that reality or nature is basically unconscious matter, while the personal idealist holds that reality is basically mental and that nature is part of the experience of the divine mind, or God. Woodbridge says that "nature" is the ultimate explanation of all things. Beyond nature it is impossible to go.[76] The personal idealist says that nature is not ultimate but must be explained in terms of the eternal mind of God. Woodbridge sees mind, purposes, and values as arising from unconscious matter.[77] The personal idealist sees all these things as unexplained, including matter itself unless the infinite mind is postulated.

One of Woodbridge's arguments against the prior existence of mind is that mind itself is an emergent and hence cannot be the cause or source of this fact of emergence.[78] But here Woodbridge confuses the issue. Practically all personal idealists would agree that finite mind is an emergent and that it is not the cause of the process. The cause of the process is the eternal mind of God which was in the beginning, and the personal idealist holds that finite minds as well as matter exist only because there was the eternal mind of God in the beginning. It seems that Woodbridge is refusing to see just what the per-

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[75] Supra, 51.
[76] Supra, 53.
[77] Supra, 59f, 72-73.
[78] Supra, 67.

sonal idealist means.

Again he says that it is unintelligible to start with animal bodies and then add to them minds.[79] The implication seems to be that some idealists do this very thing. But no good psychologist whatever his metaphysical beliefs may be, would hold to such a view. Surely the mind-body problem is dealt with by all schools in a more scientific manner than this. In a long discussion of idealistic metaphysics in general, Woodbridge argues that this position divides reality into two worlds, the physical and the mental.[80] Actually, the basic position of such thinkers as Berkeley, Bowne, Brightman, and Flewelling is complete rejection of all metaphysical dualisms. In this particular discussion Woodbridge is confusing epistemological dualism with metaphysical dualism.

Another important difference between the naturalist and the personal idealist is on the problem of teleology. Woodbridge holds to a "natural teleology." He sees nature as producing ends. Purposes arise out of unconscious matter.[81] He refuses to see any one purpose or purposer guiding the events of the universe.

The personal idealist again takes the opposing view. He holds that the presence of purposes warrants the conclusion that events are being intelligently and consciously guided to some ultimate goal. The personal idealist sees an immortal

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79. Supra, 87.
80. Supra, 91-93.
81. Supra, 62-69.

future for man, while the naturalist sees physical death as the end of personality.[82] It is interesting to notice that Woodbridge toys with the idea of one artist for the whole of nature but he rejects this possible solution as being unscientific.[83]

The heart of the controversy between the personal idealist and the naturalist is this. Which is basic, God or matter? The naturalist holds that nature is a sufficient, or at least, the only logical explanation for one to accept. The personal idealist holds that the emergence of mind, the facts of teleology, the existence of values, etc., can only be satisfactorily explained if the eternal mind of God is postulated as the ground of reality.

K. Woodbridge's Contribution to Naturalism

Dewey remarks that when he came to Columbia, Woodbridge was teaching naturalistic metaphysics of the Aristotelian type.[84] The influence of Spinoza, and that of the biological evolution of Darwin, have also been noted.[85] While it is hard to separate the contributions of Woodbridge from those of others, such as the thinkers mentioned above, some points can be stated.

Nature, he holds, is an all-inclusive term. Nature includes all realms of experience, whether sense, intellectual,

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[82] Supra, 51.
[83] Supra, 63-64.
[84] Supra, 13.
[85] Supra, 35-36, 39-40.

moral, religious, or axiological.[86] Man in his every activity is an inseparable part of nature. The central problem is, of course, that of the nature of mind and its place in nature. Man, he says, has a conscious body. Mind is not something outside of nature which comes in and lives in human bodies. It is rather, a natural function of the organism.[87] Mind is always the realm of logical structure in which thinking occurs.[88] This insistence that nature is composed of one kind of substance only, is the heart of his naturalistic theory,[89] and this one substance exists in space and time, the world of physics and chemistry. Woodbridge rejects the supernatural because the existence of any such realm of being is scientifically unverifiable.

Nature as "preëminently the visible world" is all-that-there-is. No explanation or justification is possible other than the statement that nature *is*. Beyond this it is impossible to go.[90] This is the ultimate metaphysical explanation.[91] Man is *in* nature and nature would not be what it is without man. That naturalists are inclined to use "nature" in an all-inclusive sense has been pointed out by Randall in the Krikorian volume.[92] Nature may be used like "Being" in Greek thought, or like "Reality" for the idealists; or it is whatever man encounters in whatever way; or as a name for quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff. It would appear that naturalists as a whole are not

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[86] Supra, 46, 74-75.
[87] Supra, 49, 85-86.
[88] Supra, 89.
[89] Supra, 51-52, 86, and others.
[90] Supra, 53.
[91] Supra, 69-71.
[92] Supra, 2-3.

particularly interested in an exact definition of nature.

One of his most important contributions to naturalistic philosophy has been his insistence upon the oneness of nature, which he supports by appealing to the scientific method. This has a strong appeal to many who refuse to accept anything but carefully tested scientific facts.

Another important contribution of Woodbridge was his development of natural teleology.[93] The theory of biological evolution provided the machinery by which the process might be carried on.[94] Mind emerges naturally by the biological evolution of the organism. It is, consequently, no more surprising that nature has produced thinking beings than microbes or stars.[95]

In his consideration of mind as an emergent, Woodbridge agrees pretty well with the instrumental view of the functional psychologists, such as Angell and Dewey.[96] Ideas are instruments or tools by which man operates.[97] Woodbridge thus tries to combine the teleology of Aristotle, the pantheism of Spinoza, the biological evolution of Darwin, the discoveries of modern physics, and the functional psychology of Angell and Dewey in his naturalistic philosophy.[98] His attempt will be evaluated when it is compared with that of Dewey himself. Woodbridge makes it evident that even if man is unique in that he has a mind, modern discoveries show that he has far closer connections with his natural environment than have often been supposed.

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[93] Supra, 62-69.
[94] Supra, 39-40.
[95] Supra, 66.
[96] Supra, 110.
[97] Supra, 15-16; infra, 131-132.
[98] Supra, 33-36, 73-75, 110.

CHAPTER V

DEWEY'S PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Dewey's Conception of Philosophy

In his reply to critics in the Schilpp volume, Dewey expresses his gratitude to Mr. Parodi for

> his grasp of the main purpose of my philosophical writings: "To reintegrate human knowledge and activity in the general framework of reality and natural processes." For I doubt if another as brief sentence can be found to express as well the problem which has most preoccupied me.[1]

A discussion of Dewey's general conception of philosophy is certainly in order.

Mr. Ratner, in his article in this same volume takes up the question at some length. He points out that Dewey discussed this question in the first chapter of Studies in Logical Theory, 1903. There he outlined his general conception which was to be developed during the subsequent years. At that time Dewey outlined the purpose of philosophy in three areas which may be represented by concentric circles, covering three general areas of inquiry. (1) The inner circle represents logic or inquiry, the field of reflective thought; (2) The second represents the typical modes of human experience, such as the practical, ethical, religious, esthetic, and scientific; (3) The third represents the socio-cultural world or society

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[1] Dewey, Art.(1939), 597.

organized in its institutional forms.[2]

Ratner well points out that what is unique is not this system of representation but

> the idea of the interrelation of the three areas: that they are functional distinctions, discriminable divisions within one inclusive field of experience, the boundary lines being neither fixed nor impermeable, marking off, but not insulating any one from any of the rest.[3]

The second stage in the process of development is found mainly in Dewey's contributions, Creative Intelligence, 1917, and Reconstruction in Philosophy, 1920. In these Dewey, under the weight of the world situation, sees philosophy in a larger perspective. In the earlier work we read:

> Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.[4]

Philosophy is an instrument to be developed for the solving of specific and practical problems. In the latter work its chief function is "to free men's minds from bias and prejudice and to enlarge their perspectives of the world about them."[5] The chief task of future philosophy "is to clarify men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes of their own day."[6] The great social interest of Dewey shows how seriously he took this task. It will be seen that this position is not a reversal but a development of his earlier view.

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2. Ratner, Art.(1939), 49-50.
3. Ibid., 50.
4. Dewey, CI, 65.
5. Dewey, RIP, 21.
6. Ibid., 26.

The third stage in this process is found in his Experience and Nature, 1925, and this writer believes also in his Logic, 1938. In the first of these two, Dewey sees philosophy as criticism. It must be also self-analysis. He maintains that "philosophy is inherently criticism, having its distinctive position among various modes of criticism in its generality; a criticism of criticisms, as it were."[7] His Logic is important because here he is developing his instrument, "inquiry." Logic is, he says, inquiry into inquiry. He is trying to develop a more and more perfect tool for dealing with the problems of the day.

Confirmation of this general view as developed here is found in Dewey's most recent book, Problems of Men, 1946. In his "Prefatory Note" to this volume we read that certain technical essays are included

> because they present aspects of that work of self-criticism, of purging, which, as I said in the Introduction, philosophy needs to execute if it is to perform under present conditions the role that properly belongs to it.[8]

The "Introduction" which is the only new essay in this book, is a fuller discussion of this question.

As we give consideration to the various aspects of Dewey's philosophical system, it is well to bear certain things in mind. The main difficulty in making the discussion under various heads is well stated by Mr. Piatt when he points out:

There is bound to be much overlapping in these

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[7] Dewey, EAN, 398.
[8] Dewey, POM.

> essays because Dewey's philosophy is *all of one piece*: metaphysics, epistemology, logic, differ not in their ultimate subject matter but in phases or perspectives of the same subject matter. For Dewey as for Hegel, continuity is pervasive and all-embracing...Experience and nature are not separate entities conjoined or added together; experience is rather the forms which nature assumes in interactions of non-organic and organic events including human events.[9]

If Professor Piatt had just added psychology to the others, the list would be more complete. Consideration will now be given to Dewey's psychology, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics in the order named, although this order is by no means the only one which might be followed.

B. Psychology

It is very important to have a clear understanding of Dewey's conception of psychology. He wrote his doctor's dissertation on the psychology of Kant, and many, in fact most, of his early articles dealt with psychological problems. Allport remarks that "John Dewey's productive years span almost exactly the life-time of modern scientific psychology."[10] Though his psychology takes second place to his philosophy, yet, "so close is the dependence of his philosophy upon the actual conduct of living men that he finds himself frequently forced to deal with psychological principles."[11] His earliest interest was to gain a clear understanding of the term "experience"--a concept which was to occupy a central place in his later philosophical development. Experience, he felt,

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[9] Piatt, Art.(1939), 106-107.

[10] Allport, Art.(1939), 265.

[11] Loc. cit.

was more than sensational impressions. It can never be accounted for by referring it to something else. Sensation is not prior to consciousness or knowledge; it is but a consequent dependent upon experience. It is only in experience that we find the proper fusion of subject and object. Allport sees Dewey's conception of psychology as follows:

> Psychology does not deal with mere subjective states minus the object world, because both subject and object are contained within the experiential whole; they cannot be characterized separately. It is the work of psychology to determine the relations of subject and object as they arise within consciousness.[12]

It is well to mention that in his early years, Dewey was an Hegelian idealist. This fact influenced his early psychology. It is evident that this early position can be given very little weight since he later departed from it entirely. For example, in 1886 his Psychology was published. In this work he supported "the older rationalistic, soul psychology, on the one hand, and the newer sensory and reaction psychology, on the other."[13] The soul was retained to keep the unity of the mental life. But "eight years later Dewey would regard the unifying self as a useless redundancy, accounting in other terms for such unity as mind achieves; but in 1886 he was still far from this position."[14]

Under the influence of James's Principles of Psychology, Dewey soon abandoned transcendental psychology for the newer functionalism. Concerning the position taken in the Principles,

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[12] Ibid., 266.
[13] Loc. cit.
[14] Ibid., 267.

Dewey writes: "It worked its way more and more into all my ideas and acted as a ferment to transform old beliefs."[15] But Dewey, by no means, agreed with all the theories of James. He at once set about to remove some of the well-known inconsistencies in James's psychology. "So wholehearted is his conversion to the functional position that Dewey accuses James of faint-heartedness."[16] Dewey soon reached the conclusion that the individual and his actions are completely one. There are concrete attitudes, habits, desires, ideas and ignorance; "but there is no ego behind these states."[17] There is no need to postulate the ego to explain the will any more than to explain consciousness. "If the stream of thought can run itself in one case, the stream of conduct may administer itself in the other."[18] Allport remarks: "There is for Dewey no longer any self separate from musculature."[19] Attention no longer causes the sense of effort; it is the sense of effort. Dewey was henceforth to insist on the seamless character of experience. To be aware of oneself is merely a part of the total field of awareness. Dewey has become a thorough-going functional psychologist,

His next interest was to find a unifying agent for his new conception of the mental life. He was searching for "a new guarantee of consecutiveness and coherence in behavior."[20] The reflex arc concept had recently been taken over into psychology from physiology. Dewey, after due consideration, rejected this

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[15] Jane Dewey, Art.(1939), 23.
[16] Allport, Art.(1939), 268.
[17] Ibid., 268.
[18] Dewey, Art.(1894)4, 340.
[19] Allport, Art., 269.
[20] Allport, Art.(1939), 269.

concept in one of the most important psychological articles he has ever published, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." Dewey's central criticism of the reflex arc was that it makes "a patchwork of disjointed parts; a mechanical conjunction of unallied processes."[21] Dewey held that the stimuli of both the beginning and end of a situation belong to the same act. Every reaction is a circuit leading to the redistribution of stresses and tensions within the organism. Adjustment is not a matter of response to stimuli but a "re-established rapport within one's environment."[22]

Although Dewey here rejected the reflex arc concept, it was to be many years before he hit upon a satisfactory unifying agent. This he eventually found in the concept of "habit." His interpretation of the place of habit is found well stated in a passage from Human Nature and Conduct, his social psychology.

> While it is admitted that the word habit has been used in a somewhat broader sense than usual, we must protest against the tendency in psychological literature to limit its meaning to repetition. This usage is much less in accord with popular usage than is the wider way in which we have used the word. It assumes from the start the identity of habit with routine. Tendency to repeat acts is an incident of many habits but not of all. A man with a habit of giving way to anger may show his habit by a murderous attack upon someone who has offended. His act is nonetheless due to habit because it occurs only once in his life. The essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not to particular acts except as, under special conditions these express ways of behaving. Habit means special sensitiveness or accessibility to certain classes of stimuli, standing predelictions and aversions, rather than bare recurrence of specific acts. It means will.[23]

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[21] Dewey, Art.(1896)1, 358.
[22] Allport, Art.(1939), 270.
[23] Dewey, HNC, 41-42.

It is the consecutiveness and consistency among habits, achieved through a gradual process of selection, that constitutes character. This selection appears through the modifying of surrounding conditions. It becomes effective when the organism learns to co-operate with the environmental conditions in a deliberate manner. Dewey means by deliberation, "an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if it were entered upon. Deliberation and will are a matter of trial acts executed incipiently in imagination not in overt fact."[24] But Dewey himself did not consistently follow his theory of habit, and its influence has not been widespread.

1. Nature of thought. Dewey, along with many others, believes that less confusion would result if we spoke of thinking instead of thought, etc. To a consideration of his view of thinking we now turn. In his Studies in Logical Theory he says that: "Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other need we engage in other sorts of activity."[25] "Thought arises in response to its own occasion."[26] "Thinking is what some of the actual existences do."[27] First of all we see that thinking is an activity. With that neither psychologists nor philosophers have any quarrel. "Thinking is the process of instituting these mutual references,

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24. Ibid., 190.
25. Dewey, SLT, 2; see Woodbridge, supra, 95, 110.
26. Ibid., 3; Supra, 98.
27. Dewey, EEL, 31.

of building up the various scattered and independent building-stones into the coherent system of thought."[28]

But thinking is more than just activity; according to Dewey, it is physical activity.- He says:

> Thought, intelligence, is to it (his logic) just a name for the events and acts which make up the processes of analytic inspection and projected invention and testing which has been described. These events, these acts, are wholly natural; they are 'realities'; they comprise the sticks and stones, the bread and butter...of ordinary experience.[29]

Thinking, for Dewey, is an experimental operation. Using the example of one analyzing a disease and discovering a possible remedy, he says: "to try the suggested remedy and see whether the disease is helped is the act which transforms the data and the intended remedy into knowledge objects."[30] But the important thing is that the transformation is physical, "and this transformation into knowledge objects is also effected *by changing physical things by physical means*."[31] (Italics ours.) The solution of the problem, he says, is in every case a matter of finding some given physical existence as a sign of some other existence not given in the same way as in that which serves as a sign.

Dewey's conception of thought or thinking as an organic activity is prompted by the desire to make thinking an actual fact of experience. It is well to remember Dewey's conception of "experience" mentioned above. Dewey rejected the idealistic

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[28] Dewey, SLT, 76-77.
[29] Dewey, EEL, 31; supra, 90-91.
[30] Ibid., 31-32.
[31] Ibid., 32.

conception of thought because he felt, on this view, that it was something "outside" of experience which was added or brought in. He felt that "a thought which is apart from experience and not in it, which is shut up to the contemplation of its own mental states is, by its definition, non-empirical."[32] He holds that experience must be explained in terms of itself and wants to do away with all transcendental factors in explaining reality.

2. Mind as Instrumental. For Dewey, mind is instrumental. It is an instrument of adaptation--a means of adjustment. Mind is an adaptation of the organism.

> Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the changing whirl of things, stimulated into action by his needs and wants, adapting himself to conditions, making the situation over, or meeting it habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot make the necessary adjustment.[33]

"The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct useful habits."[34] There is no doubt but that the theory of evolution played an important part in his development. It suggested to him that this organ of adaptation was the product of evolutionary forces operating on the individual and on the race. Dewey says: "Not only is one form of life as a whole selected at the expense of other forms, but one mode of action

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[32] Howard, DLT, 51.
[33] Ibid., 60-61.
[34] Dewey, Art.(1900)^3, 105.

in the same individual is constantly selected at the expense of others."[35] Mind is the result of biological adaptation and selection by the organism. Thinking is then an instrument of adaptation. Dewey, writing in an introduction to Hook's *Metaphysics of Pragmatism* says this:

> He makes it clear that "instruments" denote objects having a definite existential status and office, and that "action" does not cease to be continuous with the energies of nature when it is expressed in the behavior and habits of a living organism. There is then no difficulty in making it clear that *thought*, which in science deals with the objects which have the status of instruments, *is itself a further tool* of a distinctive type, and yet like other instruments, one set to operate in a common world of existences.[36]

3. *Behaviorism*. There are many behavioristic statements to be found in Dewey's writings as well. Indeed in the "Preface" to the *Essays in Experimental Logic*, he points out that his use of the theory antedated the use of the term in psychology.[37] In the *Essays* he adds:

> Instrumentalism means a behavioristic theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing is literally something which we do; that analysis is ultimately physical and active; and meanings in their logical quality are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward facts, and that active experimentation is essential to verification. Put in another way it holds that thinking does not mean any transcendent states or acts suddenly introduced into a previously natural scene, but that the operations of knowing are (or artfully derived from) natural responses of the organism.[38]

In another connection he says that "knowledge which is not projected against the black unknown *lives in the muscles, not in consciousness*."[39] In *Experience and Nature* we read that:

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[35] Dewey, Art.(1898), 337.
[36] Hook, MOP, 4; supra, 103-104.
[37] Supra, 14.
[38] Dewey, EEL, 331-332.
[39] Dewey, HNC, 177.

> The "seat" or locus of mind--its static phase--is the qualities of organic action, as far as these qualities have been conditioned by language and its consequences.[40]
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> Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects.[41]

In another passage in the Essays we read:

> Thinking is mental, not because of a peculiar stuff which enters into it or of peculiar non-natural activities which constitute it, but because of what physical acts and appliances do; the distinctive purpose for which they are employed.[42]

Yet, in spite of this strong behavioristic trend, Dewey does not go quite all the way. For example,

> Take speech as behavioristically as you will, including the elimination of all private mental states, and it remains true that it is markedly distinguished from the signaling acts of animals. Meaning is not indeed a psychic existence; it is primarily a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects.[43]

In another passage he points out that description is inadequate which "reduces speech to vocalization or making of sounds and thinking to a silent exercise of the organs of vocalization and other structures."[44] This he feels is an oversimplified theory of mental processes. He would not agree with Watson when he says that thinking is "the silent exercise of the organs of vocalization.[45] Further, Dewey affirms the existence of consciousness as response to meaning. Intellect is "possession

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[40] Dewey, EAN, 291-292.

[41] Ibid., 479-480.

[42] Dewey, EEL, 14.

[43] Dewey, EAN, 179; supra, 104-106.

[44] Ratner, PJD, 70.

[45] Watson says "that what the psychologists have hitherto called thought is in short nothing but talking to ourselves...that muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for implicit speech."-BEH, 191-192.

of and response to meanings."[46] The mental is "aware of meanings"[47] and thinking is "response to the doubtful as such."[48] In this response to meanings human beings function at a level above the physical. The psycho-physical level will be considered later. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that Dewey is not a consistent psychologist. He is neither wholly a functionalist nor a behaviorist. But we must consider his position further.

4. Self Psychology. At times, Dewey almost becomes something of a self psychologist. At other times, he seems to deny completely, the existence of the self. This was evident from a consideration of his functional and behavioristic tendencies. Yet, when he comes to write his Ethics, he seems to forget this belittling of the self. We read:

> The self should be wise or prudent, looking to an inclusive satisfaction and hence subordinating the satisfaction of an immediately urgent single appetite; it should be faithful in acknowledgment of the claims involved in its relations with others; it whould be solicituous, thoughtful, in the award of praise and blame, use of approbation and disapprobation, and, finally, should be conscientious and have the active will to discover new values and to revise former notions.[49]

Men are not only conscious but can become "aware of awareness."[50] There is, on the basis of this, a self which knows itself as itself. In his A Common Faith he says that the integration of

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[46] Dewey, EAN, 272.
[47] Ibid., 258.
[48] Dewey, QFC, 224.
[49] Dewey, ETH, 315.
[50] Ratner (ed.), PJD, 85.

the self is a mark of genuine religious experience.[51] Lovejoy points out that one of the most important premises of his thought is the idea of man as an agent and a "reflective agent, in a physical and social environment."[52] The intelligence he is talking about is creative intelligence.

> The pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the function of mind is to project new and more complex ends--to free experience from routine and caprice. Not the use of thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the mechanism of the body or in that of the existent state of society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberalize action is the pragmatic lesson.[53]

What he is really doing is using the term "self" in this ethical and religious content, but he does not mean by it what is meant by self psychologists.

5. Relation of mind and body. This relationship is not dualistic for Dewey rejects all dualisms. "The idea that matter and mind are two sides or 'aspects' of the same things, like the convex and the concave in a curve, is literally unthinkable."[54] He rejects also any theory of epiphenomenalism, that thought and action do not and cannot work together. It is contrary to his whole basic premise that knowing is a kind of action. He rejects what he calls "the so-called automaton or epiphenomenal theory of consciousness" which makes perception "an idle and superficial attachment to a mechanical play of energies."[55] On the contrary mind and body are "different levels "of increasing complexity and intimacy of interaction among all natural events.[57]

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51. Dewey, CF, 17.
52. Lovejoy, Art. in ECR, 77.
53. Dewey, CI, 63.
54. Dewey, EAN, 74; supra 50-52.
55. Ibid., 315.
56. Ibid., 74.
57. Ibid., 261.

Dewey takes a genetic approach to the problem. It cannot be settled by taking a cross-section of the body-mind unity. Rather this unity must be treated as a process of growth. Dewey outlines four stages in the process of development. (1) The psycho-physical organism, which represents simply the organization of energies upon lines of need-demand-satisfaction.[58] (2) The level of sensitivity, discriminatory response--this is the animal level as compared with the plant level of the first.[59] (3) The level of feeling, marked by response to distant stimuli as characteristic of the higher animals.[60] (4) Mind, whose distinguishing characteristics are communication, language, and response to meanings.[61]

Consciousness is present on all levels but at the level of psycho-physical organisms it is only "the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences," while at the level of mind, it is the totality of "actualized apprehensions of meanings."[62] Consciousness is those meanings of which one is aware at the moment while mind is "the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life."[63] Mind is an achievement of the psycho-physical organism. Mind represents the highest level of action of natural events. But though mind and body represent different levels of interaction, mind is bound to body, having an essential connection with it. Every mind that we know

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[58] Ibid., 253-254.
[59] Ibid., 256.
[60] Ibid., 256-257.
[61] Ibid., 258.
[62] Ibid., 303.
[63] Loc. cit.

empirically is connected with some body.[64] It will be evident from this discussion that Dewey does not actually hold to the existence of a conscious self in spite of the many seeming references to the contrary found in Experience and Nature, as well as elsewhere. Mind, he says, in the Preface to the revised edition of this book is "a genuine character of natural events when these attain the stage of widest and most complex interaction with one another."[65] But this is not as behavioristic as it at first seems for some of the distinguishing marks of this "character of natural events" are consciousness,[66] unity,[67] awareness and manipulation of meanings,[68] space and time transcendence,[69] and striving for known ends.[70] According to Dewey, while man is part and parcel of nature, a natural event, at the same time, he is a conscious, thinking, feeling, and willing being. On the whole it will have to be said that Dewey does not maintain nor develop a consistent psychological theory.

Dewey rejects any thought of survival of the mind or self. Man is not a being of infinite worth.[71] "Individuals will always be the center and the consummation of experience."[72] The only society worth serving is one "constituted of individuals of significant qualities."[73]

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64. Ibid., 277.
65. EAN, Rev., vi.
66. EAN, 298.
67. Dewey, ETH, 336; CF, 33.
68. Dewey, EAN, 298, 388.
69. Ibid., 256-257.
70. Dewey, ETH, 317.
71. Dewey, ION, 74-75; 154; supra, 51.
72. Dewey, Art.(1930), 181.
73. Dewey, DEE, 142; RIP, 186.

C. Logic

It is obviously impossible to consider all the aspects of Dewey's logical theory, so this section will be limited to a consideration of the naturalistic element in it, and an examination of his criterion of truth.

There can be little doubt that Dewey was and still is greatly interested in the development of a "new" logic--a new instrument for the discovery of truth. Dewey's earliest logical-- writings were concerned mainly with a criticism of accepted theories of logic. This attitude is seen in his Studies in Logical Theory and Essays in Experimental Logic. One of the chief causes for his dissatisfaction was his firm belief that the older theories separated science from morals. He wanted an instrument which would be applicable to the whole of existence. He was searching for an instrument which would discover truth by discovering the "conditions of controlled inquiry." In his own words:

> The construction of a logic, that is, a method of effective inquiry, which would apply without abrupt breach of continuity to the fields designated by both these words (which) is at once our needed theoretical solvent and the supply of our greatest practical want.[74]

There can be no doubt that throughout his whole lifetime Dewey has been working on this problem of reconstructing logical theory. This is evident from all his logical writings which culminated in Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, 1938.

It is well to note at the beginning the importance of the

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[74] Adams and Montague (ed.), CAP, II, 23.

term "experimental" in his theory. Dewey's new logical theory was to be an experimental or empirical logic. The following shows that he believed that

> Experimental logic would solve the controversy, now for centuries old, between reason and sense experience, by making both concepts and facts elements in and instruments of intelligently controlled action.[75]

Dewey was searching for a logic which would be clearly applicable to the whole of experience.

It is well to remember also, as Piatt points out, that, for Dewey, empirical logic is naturalistic logic, for "experience and nature are not separate entities conjoined or added together,"[76] but they are synonymous terms. Piatt goes on to say:

> Much of the difficulty in understanding Dewey would be obviated if more attention were paid to his naturalism and less to his empiricism. Instrumental and experimental logic is naturalistic, not a logic of a separate world of thought but a logic of natural events which are functioning on a meaning level.[77]

In his reply to critics in this same volume, Dewey concurs with this writer's judgment concerning his position. "I fully agree with the proviso that my idea of experience and hence of empirical method is naturalistic."[78]

1. Dewey's concept of Thought or Inquiry. Because Dewey is a thoroughgoing naturalist, it follows that "thinking" is a natural event. Indeed, his logical theory begins with the assumption that reflective thinking is an activity which can be identified in the same way as the interplay of physical and

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[75] Seligman and Johnson (ed.), Enc. Soc. Sc., IX, 603.
[76] Donald Piatt, Art.(1939), 107.
[77] Loc. cit.
[78] Dewey, Art.(1939), 529.

chemical forces. Furthermore, he assumes that thinking is an activity which occurs only when some felt difficulty in a situation calls it forth as an instrument for the resolution of that difficulty. This is evident from what he says in many different places. "Thinking is a kind of activity which we perform at specific need, just as at other need, we engage in other sorts of activity."[79] "Thought arises in response to its own occasion."[80] "Thinking is what some of the actual existences do."[81] "Many definitions of mind and thinking have been given. I know of but one that goes to the heart of the matter:--*response to the doubtful as such*."[82] It is clear then, that, for Dewey, thinking is a biological tool of adjustment which the human organism calls into use in problematic situations. Thinking, according to this view, is never spontaneous. It is also evident that the term "thinking" is synonymous with "inquiry" as used in his *Logic*. Here, he speaks of the "indeterminate situation" which evokes inquiry. "Thus it is of the very nature of the indeterminate situation which evokes inquiry to be questionable."[83] Inquiry is the result of a situation which is "uncertain, unsettled, disturbed."[84] Inquiry is the process by which the problematic or indeterminate situation is changed into one which is no longer problematic, or, at least, less problematic than

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79. Dewey, SLT, 2.
80. Ibid., 3.
81. Dewey, EEL, 31.
82. Dewey, QFC, 224.
83. Dewey, LOG, 105.
84. Loc. cit.; supra, 97-98.

before. Inquiry, he defines as:

> the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole.[85]

From all of this, it is evident that thinking and inquiry mean the same thing. His Logic as an investigation of "controlled inquiry" is an investigation of his naturalistic view of "thinking" as an instrument evoked by the organism in an indeterminate, doubtful, or problematic situation. The extent to which he carries his naturalistic view can be seen by his apparent rejection of any value whatsoever in "mental" states. Dewey says:

> Consequently, situations that are disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind. The attempt to settle them by such manipulations involves what psychiatrists call "withdrawal from reality." Such an attempt is pathological as far as it goes, and when it goes far it is the source of some form of actual insanity. The habit of disposing of the doubtful as if it belonged only to us rather than to the existential situation in which we are caught and implicated is an inheritance from subjectivistic psychology. The biological antecedent conditions of an unsettled situation are involved in that state of imbalance in organic-environmental interactions which has already been described. Restoration of integration can be effected, in one case as in the other, only by operations which actually modify existing conditions, not by merely "mental" processes.[86]

In this rather strong and name-calling language, Dewey rejects the value of mental states in solving problems. Rather, situations are to be settled by "existential operations" which

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[85] Dewey, LOG, 104-105.
[86] Ibid., 106.

may be taken to mean the representation of one "thing" by another "thing." To say it in another way, unsettled or troubled natural events are organized, settled, or become no longer troublesome by means of operations instituted and carried through by other natural events, the most important of which is thinking or inquiry. This seems to be what Dewey is saying.

There is no doubt then, that Dewey's view of "inquiry" is simply the natural development of his earlier view of "thinking." As he said so many years before writing his logical masterpiece,

> No one doubts that thought, at least reflective as distinct from what is sometimes called constitutive thought, is derivative and secondary. It comes after something and out of something, and for the sake of something. No one doubts that the thinking of everyday practical life and of science is of this reflective type.[87]
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> If we ask in what sense we are to understand thought as a derived procedure, we are plunging ourselves into the very heart of the logical problem: the relation of thought to empirical antecedents and its consequents, truth, and the relation of truth to reality.[88]

Piatt well points out that

> Dewey is empiricist and naturalist in recognizing the derivative rôle of thought, the dependence of thought upon a non-logical subject matter. [But] he is a reationalist par excellence in recognizing the paramount rôle of intelligence in the conduct of life.[89]

The obvious relationship between thinking and inquiry is also evident from the Essays where Dewey clearly defines his theory and purpose. Setting out from the conviction that knowledge implies judgment the essays try to show: (1) that such terms as

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87. Dewey, SLT, 1: EEL, 75.
88. Dewey, SLT, 3.
89. Piatt, Art.(1939), 109.

'thinking,' reflection,' judgment' denote inquiries or the result of inquiry, and (2) that inquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating place in the development of an experience.[90] We must bear in mind also, Dewey's broad definition of "experience" which is not consciousness but all natural events. Dewey does not make the distinction between "situations-experienced" and "situations-believed-in" as is made by an idealist such as Edgar S. Brightman. Brightman holds that experience is consciousness. All knowledge is the result of situations-believed-in, which are coherent interpretations of all the facts of experience. For Dewey, consciousness, while not wholly ignored, "is only a very small and shifting portion of experience."[91] Consciousness is the focus of attention while experience is the whole periphery which is broad enough to include all else, that is, Nature. A very interesting suggestion concerning Dewey's view of thinking as instrumental appears in Howard's treatment of Dewey's logic, written several years ago. It is certainly valuable in this connection and we quote:

> Dewey's instrumentalism rests upon a very special psychological interpretation which puts action first and thought second. Unable to discover an overt connection between fact and thought, he delves underground for it, and finds it in the activities of the nervous organism. This discovery, he believes, solves once and for all the ancient riddle of the relation of thought to reality.[92]

Mind, this critic rightly goes on, is for Dewey an adaptation

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[90] Dewey, EEL, 1.
[91] Ibid., 6; supra, 106-107.
[92] Howard, DLT, 36.

of the organism. Consciousness is interpreted on the basis of an evolutionary and naturalistic metaphysics.

> Man is viewed as an organism, placed amid the changing whirl of things, stimulated into action by his needs and wants, adapting himself to conditions, making the situation over, or meeting it habitually where he can and suffering the consequences where he cannot make the necessary adjustment.[93]

The purpose of reflection is to enable man to adapt himself to his environment. Logic, then, is a theory about the function of mind, thinking, or inquiry, as it functions in this process of continuous adjustment. "The business of mind is to have, and to continually reconstruct useful habits."[94] What of the self? Does all this account for the facts? Some of us would disagree but Dewey insists that "the notion which I would suggest as substitute is that of the self as always concrete specific activity."[95]

2. Conception of Logic. When we come to a more general consideration of his great work in logical theory, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, we are brought face to face with Dewey's belief in the absolute necessity of a new logic. In concluding his chapter on "The Needed Reform of Logic," Dewey sums up the situation in this fashion,

> The subject-matter and methods of modern science have no such direct affinity with those of common sense as existed when classic science and logic were formulated...The demand for reform of logic is the demand for a unified theory of inquiry through which the authentic pattern of experimental and operational inquiry of science shall become available for regulation of

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[93] Ibid., 60-61.
[94] Dewey, Art.(1900), 105-124.
[95] Dewey, Art.(1893), 653.

> the habitual methods by which inquiries in the field of common sense are carried on; by which conclusions are reached and beliefs are formed and tested.[96]

Having shown the need for a new logic, it is well for us to consider just what he thought this new logic ought to be, even more, must be. Dewey outlines carefully what he believes a proper logical theory must be and do.

a. *Logic is a progressive discipline*. It rests upon an analysis of the best methods of inquiry that exist at a given time. "The idea that logic is capable of final formulation is an *eidolon* of the theater."[97]

b. *The subject matter of logic is determined operationally*. The methods of inquiry are operations performed or to be performed. Logical forms are the conditions the inquiry, *qua* inquiry, has to meet.

c. *Logical forms are postulational*. By this he means that the forms are neither final, arbitrary, nor *a priori*. They are not "given and imposed from without."[98] This point will be developed later.

d. *Logic is a naturalistic theory*. By which he means that "there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations."[99] All the operations of logical inquiry, he says, are observable. "Conceptions derived from a mystical faculty of *intuition* or anything that is so occult as not to be open to public inspection and

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[96] Dewey, LOG, 97-98.
[97] Ibid., 14.
[98] Ibid., 17.
[99] Ibid., 19.

verification (such as the purely psychical for example) are excluded."[100] If we take this statement at its face value, it is a clear denial of the existence of consciousness, for such a thing, if it exists, and there are some who believe that it does, is certainly not open to public inspection. Dewey does not define what he means by public inspection, but surely it must be taken to mean visible to all who care to investigate in a more or less scientific fashion. This statement is not in keeping with others in his writings concerning the existence of consciousness.

e. Logic is a social discipline. "Inquiry is a mode of activity that is socially conditioned and that has cultural consequences."[101] It is, he adds, "cultural naturalism"[102]

f. Logic is autonomous. "Logic as inquiry into inquiry is, if you please, a circular process; it does not depend upon anything extraneous to inquiry."[103] He does not believe that logic is in any way dependent upon metaphysical or epistemological assumptions or presuppositions.

With this brief consideration of the nature of logic for Dewey, let us turn to his conception on the realm in which logical theory operates, namely, the existential matrix of inquiry, biological and cultural.

3. The Matrix of Inquiry. Dewey's naturalism is further developed in his view of the matrix in which all thinking or inquiry takes place. Simply, it is the realm of natural events,

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[100] Loc. cit.
[101] Loc. cit.
[102] Ibid., 20.
[103] Loc. cit.

for that is the only realm there is. Why do the pragmatists root thinking of inquiry so completely within nature? Professor Piatt furnishes a possible answer when he says:

> Unless our minds are already in some ways in touch with reality, unless one connection in some assignable fashion is broken relative to other connections that remain intact, this question is meaningless. Unless thought is a function of an active thinker and unless his thinking is rooted in other activities that on occasion demand thinking and provide a consummating terminal for thinking, thought is a complete mystery--unthinkable even as a mystery.[104]

Dewey, he says, begins with the world of common sense, for, apart from this world there can be no inquiry.

> The assertion of the existential basis of inquiry is an assertion that epistemological subjectivism and solipsism are masquerades, imposters, fabrications of thought which is forgetful of its origin and function. The origin consists in natural events which are organisms in interaction with other natural events.[105]

Dewey opens his discussion of the existential matrix by assuming that "logic is naturalistic."[106] Without any consideration whatsoever, he dismisses the "pseudo-problem" of mind and matter.

> The fact that inquiry involves the use of biological factors is usually supposed to pose a special metaphysical or epistemological problem, that of the mind-body relation...When, however, biological functions are recognized to be indispensable constituents of inquiry, logic does not need to get enmeshed in the intricacies of different theories regarding the relations of mind and body.[107]

Dewey's position is typical of the naturalistic school. It is to accept the fact of the presence of mind, yet, make no attempt

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[104] Piatt, Art.(1939), 112; supra, 76-77.
[105] Ibid., 113.
[106] Dewey, LOG, 23.
[107] Loc. cit.

to offer an explanation of this fact. There is another point which he mentions here which is extremely important. It will come out again and again. It is the principle of continuity. It is upon this idea of continuity within nature that the naturalistic theory is primarily based. Nature of experience is one continuous whole. Here Dewey says that:

> The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower (less complex) and the higher (more complex) activities and forms.[108]

In this connection Piatt well points out that

> Dewey's logical theory is an elaboration of the thesis that the only way to secure continuity is to recognize it when you see it and hence to start with it as an indefeasible fact of ordinary experience.[109]

This factor will be further considered as his position is developed. By this principle there is excluded from the scene or existential matrix "a totally new outside force as a cause of changes that occur."[110] All causation (whatever that may be) is to be found within nature. But this view tells us little because of his vague view of nature.

Dewey takes up at great length the question of organic behavior. Such behavior is very important for his theory for it has "direction and cumulative force."[111] By means of this natural change and development the organism finds new and more satisfactory ways of functioning. "This modification constitutes what is termed habit."[112] Habits are extremely important for the naturalist for they "are the basis of organic

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[108] Dewey, LOG, 23.
[109] Piatt, Art.(1939), 112.
[110] Dewey, LOG, 24.
[111] Ibid., 31.
[112] Loc. cit.

learning."[113] Such modification "is equivalent to giving some definite direction of future actions."[114] The conclusion of his belief in the all importance of hibitual development of organic behavior is evident because "in the human organism, organic retention (or habit patterns) give rise to recollection."[115] Dewey thus comes out for a definite behavioristic view of the development of mind. Past troubles in logical theories have arisen because it was assumed that thinking processes were "mentalistic." Such a view makes a great and impassable gulf between reflective thinking and logic. "But the recognition of the natural continuity of inquiry with organic behavior--the fact that it is a developed mode of such behavior--destroys the assumption."[116] Dewey wants none of this "bifurcation" of nature which has caused so much trouble and raised these "pseudo-problems." "Personally, as has just been said, I doubt the existence of anything 'mental' in the doctrinal sense alleged."[117] He concludes this chapter by asserting that the thoroughgoing naturalist is committed by the logic of his position "to belief in continuity of development, with its corrollary of community of factors in the respective patterns of logical and biological forms and procedures."[118]

After this consideration of the biological matrix, Dewey takes up the cultural matrix of inquiry. The human organism

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[113] Loc. cit.
[114] Ibid., 32.
[115] Ibid., 34; supra, 104-105.
[116] Dewey, LOG, 36.
[117] Loc. cit.
[118] Ibid., 41.

functions in a cultural as well as a biological environment. And

> Any theory that rests upon a naturalistic postulate must face the problem of the extraordinary differences that mark off the activities and achievements of human beings from those of other biological forms.[119]

Such difference (false of course) have led to the idea that man is completely separated from the other animals by properties which have come from a non-natural source. One of the most important reasons for such a position is the fact that man uses a tool called "language." Dewey takes the position that language is a natural tool which man has developed. He does not seem to see that it is quite possible that man developed language because he was different in the first place. But Dewey maintains that it is a mistake to suppose that language is "simply a means of expressing or communicating 'thoughts'--a means of conveying ideas or meanings that are complete in themselves apart from communal operational force."[120] Dewey sums up his position with this statement,

> We are thus brought back to the original problem; namely, transformation of animal activities into intelligent behavior having the properties which, when formulated, are logical in nature.[121]

> The habit of reasoning once instituted is capable of indefinite development on its own account.[122]

All of which may be true, but this in no way explains how the habit of reasoning was instituted in the first place. Dewey does not attempt to explain how the above tranformation took place.

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[119] Ibid., 43.
[120] Dewey, LOG, 48.
[121] Ibid., 56.
[122] Ibid., 57.

4. Logical Forms. Dewey holds to the natural development of all logical forms. There are no *a priori* postulates. His is a completely empirical logic.

> The theory [his], in summary form, is that all logical forms (with their characteristic properties) arise within the operations of inquiry and are concerned with control of inquiry so that it may yield warranted assertions.[123]

The whole problem of logic is reduced to this position. It is the problem "whether inquiry can develop in its own ongoing course the logical standards and forms to which *further* inquiry shall submit."[124] He believes that logic can. The extent to which he is willing to go is seen in his consideration of the laws of contradiction, identity, and excluded middle. According to one view, these laws represent ultimate invariant properties of objects "to which inquiry must conform."[125] But Dewey maintains a completely opposing view,

> According to the view here expressed, they represent conditions which have been ascertained during the conduct of continued inquiry to be involved in its own successful pursuit...the second position [his] implies, as has already been stated, that the principles are generated in the very process of control of continued inquiry, while, according to the other view, they are *a priori* principles fixed antecedently to inquiry and conditioning it *ab extra*.[126]

Logical forms as postulates "are not given and imposed from without."[127] The basic or fundamental thesis of the whole volume is that "logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is subjected to controlled inquiry."[128] "The forms

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[123] Ibid., 3-4.
[124] Ibid., 5.
[125] Ibid., 11.
[126] Dewey, LOG, 11-12.
[127] Ibid., 17.
[128] Ibid., 101.

in question are not fixed and eternal."[129] Concerning the form of "substantiality" he says that it is a form that accrues to original existence when the latter operates in a specified functional way as a consequence of operations of inquiry."[130] When he comes to a consideration of "causation" he adds that "the evidence is conclusive that the category of causation accrues to existential subject-matter as a logical form when and because determinate problems about such subject-matter are present."[131]

In discussing the relation of matter and form, Dewey agrees that there is no "formless-matter" nor "matterless-form" for, if form is wholly apart from matter, it could never be applied to it. "For the issue is precisely whether such forms can be applied to matter. If they cannot, applied logic is a meaningless term."[132] At this point his logic is close to that of Aristotle. But he wrongly says that formal logicians hold to a theory of "pure forms" for "it is precisely on this fundamental matter of conditions of application that the formalistic theory breaks down."[133] No formal logician, nor possibly any other, ever held to such a view as he attacks. Dewey maintains that all logical forms arise in the process of inquiry and may be used to aid in further inquiry, in which process further forms may be developed. He tries to be consistently naturalistic.

The whole relation of subject-matter and form Dewey sees through the principle of continuity. "The problem that then

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[129] Ibid., 102.
[130] Ibid., 129.
[131] Ibid., 459.
[132] Ibid., 375.
[133] Ibid., 375.

arises with reference to the relation of subject-matter to form seems to me insoluble except on the ground of the continuity of inquiry."[134] "The interpretation here advanced is that the kind of situation involved is such as, in the continuum of inquiry, to warrant a probability solution."[135]

5. Criterion of Truth. The ultimate purpose of logic is to achieve reliable knowledge or truth. For Dewey, the outcome of inquiry is "warranted assertions."[136] The settled outcome of inquiry ought to be a unified whole which is another way of saying warranted assertibility. Throughout his whole volume Dewey talks constantly about "coherent wholes"[137] and similar terms. No one doubts that such is his evident goal. But there is a problem of exactly what he means by the method by which such "wholes" are reached. He talks constantly of the "experimental" or "scientific" method. But this method may be taken to mean either of two things. It may be the strict method of the scientific laboratory, such as is used in physical and chemical experiments.[138] Or it may be interpreted in a broader sense comparable to the method of coherence of idealists such as Edgar S. Brightman, "except for its pluralism."[139]

There can be little doubt that Dewey uses the scientific method in this second sense. Dewey does assert that all knowledge is probable. Certainty is a delusion. The "scientific method" "is adequate satisfaction of logical conditions imposed

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[134] Dewey, LOG, 469.
[135] Ibid., 472.
[136] Dewey, LOG, 4, 9, 104, etc.
[137] Ibid., 13, 25, 68, 130, etc.
[138] Ibid., 439.
[139] This qualification was made by E. S. Brightman in a comment; for a definition of coherence, see Brightman, NAV, 106-107.

by control of inquiry."[140] Then he speaks of "science in its narrower sense."[141] If there is science in a "narrower" sense obviously there is science in a "wider" sense. Furthermore, "dogmatic restriction of science to generalizations compels denial of scientific traits and value to every form of practice."[142] It is evident that the scientific method can then be interpreted in the broad sense of application of intelligence to value propositions and problems. This interpretation is supported by Larrabee in his Reliable Knowledge.[143] In other of his writings we find Dewey mentioning the scientific method. He asserts that "there is but one method for asserting fact and truth--that conveyed by the word 'scientific' in its most general and generous sense."[144] Doctrines to be convincing to the modern man must be "brought to agree with the deliverances of science."[145] Scientific procedure in "actual knowing is superior to all other procedures."[146] Some experimental act is necessary for knowledge. "Scientific method is the only method that has proved a 'fruitful' method of thinking."[147] His emphasis upon this method is of primary importance.

We turn now to his explanation of this method as found in many of his writings. It is the method in which:

> Observation is determined by experimental conditions depending upon the use of certain guiding conceptions...reflection is directed and checked at every

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[140] Ibid., 433.
[141] Ibid., 439.
[142] Loc. cit.
[143] See, 473, 498, 504, etc.
[144] Dewey, CF, 33.
[145] EAN, 137.
[146] QFC, 85f.
[147] CAE, II, 774.

> point by the use of experimental data, and by the necessity of finding such a form for itself as will enable it to serve in a deduction leading to the evolution of new meanings and ultimately to experimental inquiry which brings to light new facts.[148]

It is the method of "making hypotheses which are then tried out in actual experimental change of physical conditions."[149] It is evident from this that Dewey also conceives of the "scientific method" in the narrower of the two senses mentioned above. This is even more clearly seen in the following:

> Moreover, in experiment, everything takes place aboveboard, in the open. Every step is overt and capable of being observed...The entire process by which the conclusion is reached that such and such a judgment of an object is valid is overt. It can be repeated step by step by any one...A public and manifest series of definite operations, all capable of public notice and report, distinguishes scientific knowing from the knowing carried on by inner "mental" processes accessible only to introspection, or inferred by dialectic from assumed premises.[150]

Concerning the "instrumental" theory of knowing, he says that it is not a theory about personal disposition and satisfaction in knowing, "but about the proper objects of science, what is 'proper' being defined in terms of physics.[151]

At this point it is interesting to consider the interpretation given to Dewey's scientific method by two of his well-known followers. First of all let us look to John H. Randall Jr. who interprets the method in its broader sense. To quote him:

> For despite all his analysis of the procedure of the natural sciences, *Dewey's experimentalism is not primarily based on the methods of the laboratory.* (Italics ours). It is at once the experimentalism

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148. Dewey, EEL, 89-90.
149. Dewey, EAN, 155.
150. Dewey, QFC, 289.
151. Dewey, EAN, 151.

> of practical common sense, and the coming to self-awareness of the best and most critical techniques and concepts of the social sciences. In the broadest sense, it is the experimentalism of the anthropologist, of the student of human institutions and cultures...It is a method of inquiry, of criticizing traditional beliefs and instituting newer and better warranted ones.[152]

But Joseph Ratner is inclined to look upon this method in the narrower sense, as is seen from his "Introduction to John Dewey's Philosophy."[153] He says:

> Control of philosophic arguments about the world by experience of the world is what Dewey fundamentally means by empiricism in philosophy, by scientific or experimental method.[154]
>
> Now Dewey's basic position, his basic argument about philosophic method, is that theory in philosophy is no more privileged than theory in science.[155]
>
> The only genuine passport, the only passport commanding entrance into Being, Reality, Nature or whatever else you care to call it, by capital letter or small, is the passport that is filled out, signed, countersigned, stamped and sealed by public experience.[156]
>
> That the method of experimentation is the very essence of the method of modern science is the flesh and blood (not the bone) over which Dewey's whole philosophy contends.[157]

It is not surprising that confusion results over exactly what Dewey means by the experimental or scientific method.

It seems evident to this writer that Dewey uses "scientific method" in two different senses. It is, first of all, the experimental method of the physical sciences. But in the matter

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152. Randall, Art.(1939), 82.
153. Ratner, in IMW, 3-241.
154. Ibid., 3.
155. Ibid., 4.
156. Ibid., 5.
157. Ibid., 58; many others might also be quoted.

of social inquiry, in testing and verification, he constantly uses the method of coherence, using scientific in the "wider" sense referred to above. Dewey says that "the end of science is putting the facts into coherent form"[158] Its goal is a "coherent and self-luminous system of meaning."[159] Coherence is also an ethical criterion.[160] The whole office of philosophy as the ultimate arbiter of the sciences is to subject "values, criticisms and critical methods to a criticism as comprehensive and consistent as possible."[161] It is also evident that, by the adoption of the criterion of coherence as ultimate, Dewey is criticizing his own narrower use of the scientific or experimental method. It seems that he is far more likely to restrict his method when he is trying to show the impossibility of the existence of the supernatural. This seems evident from The Quest for Certainty and his more recent article in the New Leader on "Dualism and the Split Atom."[162] In the latter he especially urges us to forget the "supernatural" which has caused a "split in the very nature of things" and urges us to "carry forward the application of our best scientific procedures" which is the only way to get ourselves out of the present dilemma. Here his use of "scientific" seems to be restricted to the narrower sense.

While we may not agree with everything that Dewey says, it would be most unfair to say his logic has little or no value.

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[158] Dewey, LCS, 115.
[159] Dewey, EEL, 90.
[160] Dewey, ETH, 201.
[161] Dewey, EAN, 404.
[162] Dewey, Art.(Nov. 1945); supra, 47-48, 51-52.

Moreover, it would not be true. He has succeeded in developing the first satisfactory organic logic. As one critic remarks,

> The only fault to be found with Dewey's exposition of operational logic is that he has done his task so thoroughly and so effectively as to seem to thrust all other forms of logic into the discard--where, however, they refuse to stay.[153]

While this is somewhat an overstatement, nevertheless, we must admit that Dewey has produced a great piece of work. It remains for those who disagree with him to develop a better system of logical theory. There is great need for a similar logic developed from the idealistic point of view.

D. Epistemology

In his well known essay, "Pragmatism *versus* the Pragmatist,"[164] Mr. Lovejoy has made a devastating attack upon the inconsistencies in Dewey's theory of knowledge. Using many quotations from Dewey's writings, Lovejoy points out both epistemological monistic and dualistic elements in his theory. It would be possible to follow this plan, but in so doing, all value of trying to discover what is Dewey's theory would be lost. It is sufficient to call attention to this cogent criticism. Lovejoy makes one statement in this essay which, in the opinion of this writer, contains more truth than Professor Lovejoy himself seems to have realized. To quote him:

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[163] Buckham, Art.(1944), 356.

[164] See Drake and others, ECR.

> We seem once more--the pragmatist is constantly giving us these exciting moments--to be on the point of finding in pragmatism a tertium quid, a new insight which will enable us to escape from both horns of the traditional dilemma.[165]

Whether or not he hoped to escape the "traditional dilemma," it is evident that Dewey was developing a new theory of knowledge. Consequently, his theory ought not to be too severely criticized along traditional lines, lest its value be wholly overlooked. His theory of knowledge follows consistently his functional view of thinking or inquiry. Dewey's epistemology stands or falls with his whole system of which it is an integral part. It would seem that if the validity of his theory of mind can be established, the truth of his epistemology will naturally follow.

1. Knowledge and action. Dewey's basic thesis is that knowing is a kind of doing. The sub-title of his The Quest for Certainty is "A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action." In this book he says "that the experimental procedure is one that installs doing as the heart of knowing."(Italics ours.)[166] "Our main attempt will be to show how the actual procedures of knowledge, interpreted after the pattern formed by experimental inquiry, cancel the isolation of knowledge from overt action."[167] To give a passage where Dewey clearly states the thesis upon which he is working:

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[165] Lovejoy, Art.(1920), 57.
[166] Dewey, QFC, 36; supra, 85-86.
[167] Ibid., 48.

> The sum and substance of the present argument is that if we frame our conception of knowledge on the experimental model, we find that it is a way of operating upon and with the things of ordinary experience so that we can frame our ideas of them in terms of their interactions with one another, instead of in terms of the qualities they directly present, and that thereby our control of them, our ability to change them and direct their changes as we desire, is indefinitely increased. *Knowing is itself a mode of practical action and is the way of interaction by which other natural* interactions become subject to direction. (Italics ours.)[168]

Knowing is a form of doing and further he adds "*We define mind* (italics ours) and its organs in terms of this doing and its results, just as we define or frame ideas of stars, acids, and digestive tissues in terms of *their* behavior."[169] From all this it is evident that Dewey's theory of knowledge hinges upon his definition of thinking of inquiry. As Mr. Parodi puts it:

> He wanted to see intelligence, though asserting its primacy in human endeavour, only the instrument of action, the sole effective means of universal reconstruction in a civilization which he, in spite of all the denials of today, considers as essentially human, natural and democratic...[170]

Knowing, according to Dewey, is something which happens to a thing in the natural course of its career. Knowing is the representation of a thing (natural event) by another thing (natural event). He objects to what he calls a characteristic assumption of most epistemologies:

> that the organ or instrument of knowledge is not a natural object, but some ready-made state of mind or consciousness, something purely 'subjective,' a peculiar kind of existence which lives, moves, and has its being is a realm different from things to be known.[171]

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168. Dewey, QFC, 106-107.
169. Ibid., 229.
170. Parodi, Art.(1939), 230.
171. Dewey, IDP, 98.

In passages such as these Dewey is not arguing against a dualistic epistemology, as some, including Lovejoy, have supposed, but he is arguing against the metaphysical bifurcation of nature and that is all. Dewey is simply saying, as any idealist would say, that there is but one realm (one order or kind) of being or existence. For Dewey that realm is the world of natural events and mind is just one of these events. Knowing, for Dewey, is a series of organizing acts of the organism. It is the adjustment of the organism through controlled action in an effort to restore the equilibrium which has been upset by a doubtful or problematic situation.

This problem has been discussed in the preceding section dealing with Dewey's logical theory. His theory may be stated as follows: An organism finds itself in a troubled or doubtful situation. Thinking or inquiry occurs in an effort to find a solution to the immediate or pressing problem. In other words, the organism pursues a controlled or directed course of action, bringing into play acquired habits, etc., resulting from past experience. When the situation is no longer troubled a solution is reached and inquiry ends. That which brought about the termination of the doubtful situation is knowledge. It is, to use his terminology, warranted assertibility. The whole purpose of inquiry is to settle troubled situations and bring the organism as a whole into a state of unity or coherence. The very process by which this is done is the process of knowing, or reaching warranted assertibility.

Mere perception is never knowledge for Dewey but "where there is knowledge another relation is added, that of one thing

meaning or signifying another."[172] There is no "immediate knowledge" such as "apprehension" by "a seizing or grasping, intellectually, without questioning."[173] Such knowledge is never immediate but it only appears so because the knower is forgetting past experience. Actually, "it is a product mediated through certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit, and it presupposes prior experience and mediated conclusions drawn from them"[174] Dewey affirms the necessity of mediation in order to produce warranted assertions.[175]

2. Warranted Assertibility. Knowledge, for Dewey, consists of "warranted assertions."[176] A warranted assertion is reached when inquiry has been satisfactorily terminated.[177] It does not mean absolute certainty but rather probability. Probability is "the mark of every proposition effected by inference from the set of matter-of-fact propositions..."[178] "The interpretation here advanced is that the kind of situation involved is such as, in the continuum of inquiry, to warrant a probability proposition."[179] In this latter case Dewey is discussing scientific subject matter. A warranted assertion is then the most likely or coherent conclusion possible on the basis of the empirical evidence offered. It is never certainty.

3. Verification. For Dewey, verification consists in following out a plan of action. It is the process leading to

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[172] Dewey, EEL, 246.
[173] Dewey, LOG, 143.
[174] Loc. cit.
[175] See LOG, 139f, 159f, and others.
[176] Dewey, LOG, 4, 9, and others.
[177] Ibid., 104-105, 117, and others.
[178] Ibid., 319.
[179] Ibid., 472.

warranted assertibility. Dewey gives the example of a person lost in the woods. This is a troubled or doubtful situation.[180] The problem is to find one's way home. What is needed is a practical plan for action which will eventually lead to success. In this case he points out that the plan for action or idea

> is not some little psychical entity or piece of consciousness-stuff, but is the interpretation of the locally present environment in reference to its absent portion, that part to which it is referred as another part so as to give a view of a whole.[181]

The individual must act. He must do something in this indeterminate situation. He follows a plan for action and as a result eventually comes to familiar surroundings. The situation is now no longer doubtful for the problem has been solved. The plan for action has been verified by consequences. It was not verified until the plan was shown to be valid and the way out of the troubled situation had been found. As Dewey says:

> The scientifically important thing in the logic of scientific inquiry is that it was treated simply as an hypothesis to be employed in directing operations of observation, an idea to be tested of "proved" by the consequences of these operations.[182]

No clearer statement of Dewey's theory of verification can be found than that of Parodi who sums it up as follows:

> Truth is not verified by just any kind of satisfaction, but only by that satisfaction which is born of the fact that a working hypothesis or an experimental method applies to the facts which it concerns and affords a better ordering of them. No misconception concerning the instrumental logic of pragmatism has been more persistent than the belief that one would want to make of thought merely a

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[180] Ratner, (ed.), IMW, 941-943.
[181] Ibid., 943.
[182] Dewey, LOG, 430; supra, 50-51, 80.

> means for a practical end,--"practical" being taken in the sense of certain material utilities, like drinking and eating. But what Dewey affirms lies in that rule of logic which refers each thought, every reflective consideration "to consequences for final meaning and test."[183]

Dewey's idea of verification is that of consequences pure and simple. If the desired result can be or has been attained, then the plan of action was valid. The result shows that it was a warranted assertion. Had the plan failed the opposite would be true and one would have to formulate a new plan for action and try once again.

4. The Indeterminate Situation. The doubtful or indeterminate situation is the one preceding the institution of inquiry. It will help considerably in understanding Dewey's position if an understanding of exactly what he means by this is at hand. Mr. Dewey was critized by Russell on the following passage in his Logic concerning the troubled situation.

> Situations that are disturbed and troubled, confused or obscure, cannot be straightened out, cleared up and put in order, by manipulation of our personal states of mind.[185]

The point under consideration is whether a "doubtful situation" is possible without a "doubter." Dewey replied in an article as follows:

> When the term "doubtful situation" is taken in the meaning it possesses in the context of my general theory of experience, I do mean to say that it can exist without a personal doubter...[186]

It is hard to see how a "situation" can be doubtful about any-

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[183] Parodi, Art.(1939), 233-234; his closing quotation is from EEL, 330.
[184] Russell, ITM, 407.
[185] Dewey, LOG, 106.
[186] Dewey, Art.(1941), 183.

thing, yet this seems to be his position. The doubtful belongs not to us, he says, but to the situation.

E. Metaphysics

1. Definition of Metaphysics. In dealing with metaphysics it is well to bear in mind that Dewey's whole system must be taken into account. His psychology, logic, and epistemology are all an integral part of his philosophical framework which might also be spoken of as "metaphysics."

In his Experience and Nature, Dewey defines metaphysics as:

> A statement of the generic traits manifested by existences of all kinds without regard to their differentiation into physical and mental.[187]

In an article written two years later (1927), he elaborated this definition into the following:

> This is the extent and method of my metaphysics. The large and constant features of human sufferings, enjoyments, trials, failures, and successes, together with the institutions of art, science, technology, politics, religion which mark them, and communicate genuine features of the world which man lives in.[188]

The method of obtaining metaphysical knowledge is, of course, the experimental method of which he says in the former of these two sources:

> Experience as method warns us to give impartial attention to all of these diversifications. (Political, religious, etc.) Non-empirical method sets out with

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[187] Dewey, EAN, 412.
[188] Dewey, Art.(1927), 19.

> the assumption that some one of these groupings of things is privileged.[189]

In his reply to his critics in the Schilpp volume, he says that the problem of metaphysics is not one of the relation of the physical or external to the mental or internal. It is rather the problem of the relation of immediate qualities (consciousness or Brightman's situations-experienced) to objects of science (situations-believed-in). The latter function as the existential causal conditions of the former. He insists that all qualities, even the tertiary ones and, *a fortiori*, those of color, are *doings of natural conditions*. If continuity is a natural category, the problem of how specific transitions occur in the case of qualities is the same sort of problem that is found in any case of temporal sequence where the latter stage is qualitatively unlike the earlier one. That qualitative transitions occur is something characteristic of nature. It is something *to be accepted* and not necessarily *to be explained*. His view is, he says, "realistically naïve."[190] The quality occurs exactly, in principle, as any natural event, say a thunderstorm. There is no passage from the physical to the mental, for the external to something felt or of the nature of a psychical consciousness, but *from objects with one set of qualities to objects with other qualities*. (Italics ours.) When a quality is called a "sensation" it has been placed in a specially selected connection, that of being related to an organism or self. One may not know whether the quality belongs to

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[189] Dewey, EAN, 15.

[190] Dewey, Art.(1939), 599; supra, 70-72.

any particular object of the environment. The occurrence of qualities is a purely natural event. The final reference of qualities to intra-organic events is itself a reference to one kind of object in the natural world. All things may be explained, in so far as any explanation is possible or required, on specifiable natural conditions. The great problem to be explained by other views is "given a separate existential realm of consciousness or of the mental, how to get out of it over into a world that is 'external' to it?"[191] In nature there is room for contingency and novelty. However, the first appearance of qualities is unpredictable. The relation between qualitative things and scientific objects is marked by contingencies, because nature is not a closed box of tight necessities. An element of chance pervades all nature. The pragmatic answer to this problem is set forth by Hook in the following terms:

> From the point of view of scientific pragmatism the fact that we do not accept a deduction as a valid consequence unless it is ultimately verified by an examination of the nature of things, proves that if the agreement between thought and things, mind and extension, idea and ideatum be regarded as an article of scientific faith, it is, if scientific inquiry is to be possible at all, a necessary article of faith. And a necessary article of faith is but a different expression for a matter of utter necessity.[192]

2. Need for Metaphysics. That the pragmatist sees clearly necessity for having a well-developed system is well recognized by Professor Hook who may be considered an authoritative in-

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[191] Loc. cit.
[192] Hook, MOP, 82-83.

terpreter of Dewey, since the latter places his unqualified approval upon the work of the former in this field. Dewey says that "he (Hook) makes it clear that 'instruments' denote objects having a definite existential status and office, and that 'action' does not cease to be continuous with the energies of nature when it is expressed in the behavior and habits of a living organism.."[193] Hook says:

> Unless pragmatism is to experience the same fact which has befallen the positivism of Comte and the phenomenalism of Mach--philosophies proudly and avowedly anti-metaphysical--it must analyze the implications of what it means to have a method and examine the generic traits of existence which make that method a fruitful one in revealing them.[194]

Pragmatism together with evolutionary naturalism and positivism revolves around the conception of man as homo faber which sums up his activities as (1) a sign-making animal, (2) an instrument-using animal, (3) and a "brainy" animal.[195] Pragmatism will stress ways and means, methods and instrumentalities. Pragmatism must reject all radical forms of nominalistic doctrine for it is committed to the belief in

> the objective existence and physical efficiency of habits, tendencies, and universals, and that sense impressions must be interpreted as checks and signs of what things are said and taken to be not as revelations of what they intrinsically are.[196]

Pragmatism begins with human thinking and what it means. It rejects the view of the epiphenomenalist who makes thinking analogous to physical reflection. Likewise, the pragmatist

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193. In Hook, MOP, 4.
194. Hook, MOP, 6.
195. Hook, MOP, 7.
196. Ibid., 8.

rejects the view of those, meaning the idealists, who look upon the mind as a "witches cauldron." Pragmatism is a mediate view, for thought is to be viewed as an instrument. Metaphysics must deal first with the instrument and then with the subject matter or that which is instrumentalized. The only way to approach the nature of things is through the things which are thought, never through the act of thinking.

The problem of the pragmatist becomes clear from all this. He must show that pragmatism is more than epistemology. If the pragmatist does not go further, he must suffer the fate of Comte and Mach. The instrument must also be the basis of an adequate metaphysics. It must provide a sufficient explanation of "all that there is," otherwise it is doomed to failure at the start.

It is well to understand what the pragmatist means by solving a problem. Hook says:

> Paradoxical as it may sound, the pragmatist maintains that a genuine and scientific way of answering questions in philosophy consists in discovering reasons why it is irrelevant to ask them.[197]

From geometry and time he draws illustrations to show what is meant by a meaningless question. He concludes that "it is not a question of truth but of convenience."[198] Dewey likewise says:

> questions concerning the relation of mind and body in the knowledge act, of the construction of the world of physics from sense data, etc., are all rendered unintelligible in their current expression as soon as the fundamental assumption shared by all parties to the discussion is challenged.[199]

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197. Hook, MOP, 11.
198. Ibid., 13.
199. Dewey, EEL, 406.

rejects the view of James, rejecting the idealism. The idea that the mind is a "fiction cessation." Pragmatism is a [illegible] view, for language is to be viewed as an instrument. Pragmatism must deal first with the instrument and then with the subject matter or that which is instrumentalized. The only way to determine the nature of things is through the beings which are through, or through the act of thinking.

The problem of the pragmatist becomes clear when it is seen. He must show that pragmatism is more than subjectivism. If the pragmatist does not go further, he must suffer the fate of Locke and Kant. The instrument must also be the basis of an adequate metaphysics. It must provide a definite explanation of "all that there is," otherwise it is doomed to failure at the start.

It is well to understand what the pragmatist means by solving a problem. Hook says:

> Translated as it may sound, the pragmatist maintains that a genuine and scientific way of answering questions in philosophy consists in discovering the reasons why it is important to ask them.107

From geometry and then to theory of instruction he must show what is meant by a metaphysical question. In concluding that "it is not a question of truth but of convenience."108 Henry [illegible] says:

> questions concerning the relation of mind and body in the knowledge act, of the objectivity of the world of outside cognizable data, etc., are all rendered unintelligible by their answers if inquiring, as soon as an fundamental assumption made by the parties to the discussion is challenged.109

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107. Hook, MPC, 11.
108. Ibid., 14.
109. Henry, EPL, 186.

When a problem is held to be artificial or false it is only the result of a prior metaphysical structure. Whether such a structure is logical or metaphysical is only a verbal matter.[200] Here Mr. Hook would seem to make no distinction between metaphysics and epistemology, contrary to the statement he has already made.

He goes on to say on the same page (1) that the search for structure, or thinking is itself a functional operation, (2) the true character of any structure can only be found by social agreement, (3) and hence, that the structure of the world is not complete. This passage is all-important for the pragmatist as well as for an understanding of pragmatism. Further he says that "in its ultimate foundations logic becomes metaphysics."[201] Historically, logical systems have not only shown metaphysical leanings, but have been openly erected upon metaphysical foundations.

> The metaphysical implications of the pragmatic-realist logic of leading principles is an open universe in which there is an element of radical indetermination, in which physical constants are limits of variation and physical laws summations and prognostications of physical flux...Logic can never be a closed system so long as science is not.[202]

In Experience and Nature Dewey defines "experience" as the field, the sun and clouds and rain, seed and harvest, and the man who labors, plans, suffers, and enjoys.[203] Experience is inclusive of both situations-experiences (consciousness) and situations-believed-in. On the basis of this broad def-

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[200] Hook, MOP, 14-15.
[201] Ibid., 93.
[202] Loc. cit.
[203] Dewey, EAN, 28.

inition the empirical philosopher sees thinking as "a continuous process of temporal re-organization within one and the same world of experienced things."[204] As he has said in many places before, reflection is a natural event, for thinking occurs in the same way as happenings of the planets, as thunder-storms, etc. Much of the present difficulty is caused by language. The use of "mind" instead of "mental," and "mentally," that is, the general use of nouns instead of adjectives and adverbs has caused endless confusion. The result has been the idea that "mind" is a "thing" instead of an activity of the organism. Language has helped greatly in this bifurcation of nature, against which his philosophy is a protest.

> It would be difficult to find a fact more significant of the traits of nature, more instructive for a naturalistic metaphysics of existence, than this cleavage of the things of human experience into actual but hard objects, and enjoyed but imagined objects. One might think that philosophers in their search for some datum that possesses properties that put it beyond doubt, might have directed their attention to this direct phase of experience, in which objects are not a matter of sensations, ideas, beliefs or knowledge, but are something had and enjoyed.[205]

His whole system of metaphysics is a protest against splitting reality in two "with no community and no bridge from one to the other."[206] Mind is a product of emergent evolution in the natural history of the organism. It is the result of social intercourse for "if we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to and with outselves."[207] That "state

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[204] Loc. cit.
[205] Dewey, EAN, 83-84.
[206] Ibid., 169.
[207] Ibid., 170.

of things in which qualitatively different feelings are not just had but are significant of objective differences IS MIND."[208] (Italics and emphasis ours.) There is a world of inner experience but man's great mistake has been the failure to see that this world is dependent upon an extension of language. Language, like money, is a symbol. But before money became a symbol, it was a physical thing, so also with language. Language "is not a mere agency for economizing energy in the interaction of human beings. It is a release and amplification of energies that enter into it, conferring upon them the added quality of meaning..."[209] But Dewey's conception of just what the mental is or how it operates does not seem to be at all clear even to himself for,

> *It is difficult to state the exact physiological mechanism which is involved. But about the fact there is no doubt.* It constitutes the intelligibility of acts and things. Possession of the capacity to engage in such activity *is intelligence*.[210] (Italics ours).

It tells very little about the nature of things to say that "intelligence and meaning are *natural consequences* of the *peculiar* form which interaction *sometimes assumes* in the case of human beings."[211] (Italics ours). Mind is, he says, an instrumentality which the organism has developed. It is well to remember that for Dewey, mind is not consciousness. He contrasts the two as follows:

> While on the psycho-physical level, consciousness denotes the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences, or "feelings," it denotes, upon the plane of mind, actualized apprehensions of

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208. Ibid., 258.
209. Ibid., 174.
210. Ibid., 179-180.
211. Dewey, EAN, 180.

> meanings, that is, ideas. There is thus an obvious difference between mind and consciousness; meaning and an idea. Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas. The greater part of mind is only implicit in any conscious act or state; the field of mind--of operative meanings--is enormously wider than that of consciousness. Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive. Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant background and foreground; perceptive consciousness is process, a series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying intensities. Consciousness is, as it were, the occasional interception of messages continually transmitted, as a mechanical receiving device selects a few of the vibrations with which the air is filled and renders them audible.[212]

For a fuller understanding of the meaning of the "instrument," Hook's treatment will be considered.

3. Metaphysics of the Instrument. Using Blake's print which shows "The Ancient of Days" circumscribing the boundaries of the earth, Hook says that besides "frenzied fancy" this picture also illustrates a profound metaphysical principle.

> For it may be given to a primal divinity to create subject matter with the very instruments which can only be intelligibly used or applied within that subject matter and which logically presupposes it.[213]

But man for his part must content himself with using instruments whose limits are tentatively assumed.

The instrument functions as a sign and has three distinct and fundamental references. (a) It is an instrument in reference

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[212] Dewey, EAN, 303-304; supra, 85f.
[213] Hook, MOP, 17.

to some thought or intuition responsible for its construction and existence as a tool, (b) it is an instrument for some aggregate of entities or domain of relations in which it is to be applied, (c) it is an instrument in respect and because of its form, arrangement or structure.[214] It is in other words a thing to be used. It has no more significance other than that one uses the best instrument available for the work at hand. The purpose of the instrument is to perform properly its function.

> It a tool is a transformative agency it can neither beget nor devour the existence it modifies; and if mind is instrumental and efficient in a world scarred with stria of shifting things and events, it cannot have created that world.[215]

These relations, he goes on, show that nature instrumentalized is nature grown or brought to self-consciousness.

He now comes to the relation of the theory of the instrument to metaphysics:

> If metaphysics then be regarded as an account of the generic traits of nature, if the categories which are the basic terms and elements of all scientific explanation and therefore themselves defy explanation, call rather for metaphysical analysis and description, then a 'theory of the instrument', whether the instrument be regarded as a scientific contrivance or a fundamental category, in not only relevant but highly essential to an understanding of the world we live in.[216]

We do not find things locked fast in a complete and closed system...proof positive that the cosmic dish is spiced with chance.

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[214] Ibid., 18.
[215] Ibid., 17-18; supra, 67, 106.
[216] Ibid., 19.

For Hook, as for Dewey, then it is evident that there can be no such thing as metaphysics as an explanation of reality. The only reality existing is nature itself, and by nature he means the world of empirical science. There is no plan nor purpose in nature for the world exists by chance and in his own words:

> Even if all application is risk and life itself a gamble, the existence of mechanical agencies proves that the cards of the universe are not stacked against us, that the game is on for a genuine stake and that there are some exciting hands to be played out before everything becomes extinct in a common doom.[217]

But it seems that Hook's argument for the mechanical agencies being proof that we have a fifty-fifty chance is wishful thinking and contrary to his conclusion. If the cards of the universe are not stacked against us, then all will not end in a common doom.

By an instrument he means what Dewey means: "a thing used as an agency for some concluding event."[218] It reveals both the surface of things and the principles of organization or logical articulation with which the stuff of experience is thickly veined.

As we have intimated the function of the instrument is to achieve ends impossible without its use, as an airplane is a means for flying. The instrument tells us something about the subject matter in which it is applied and in which it functions. There is an instrument which is best for each subject matter. There is no difficulty in telling the best use for the instrument, nor the best instrument to use for the particular subject matter. Evidently this is a matter of

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[217] Ibid., 24.
[218] Dewey, EAN, 128.

common sense or intuition for:

> Each material has its own idiom determining alike the generic character of what it can be made to represent as well as the kind of instruments which can be used upon it, is so evident in fine and industrial art that we miss its import.[219]

We are perhaps unfair when we use the terms, "common sense" or "intuition" above. He says it is empirical so we leave it at that, for:

> The point was to show that even in the world of ordinary social intercourse, particular instruments are taken not only as signs of instrumental function but as clues to subject matter as well.[220]

Further he says that an instrument is a monument to a felt lack in existence.

> It imports therefore an attempt to stabilize and fasten for future purposes the probable direction and intent of natural forces and define for physical reference the reliable substantive aspects of natural events.[221]

Subject matter may have an order of its own independent of all else, god, man, or demiurge, but when instruments are applied to that subject matter it becomes significant. The subject matter has been instrumentalized. This is important when we consider thought as an instrument.

The instrument never gives life or career to matter but it gives matter an opportunity to attain the organized life and activity of a career. The career is then never finished so long as potentialities remain dormant. It is the purpose

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[219] Hook, MOP, 21.
[220] Ibid., 22.
[221] Ibid., 22.

of the instrument to make available and liberalize the careers of other things.

The instrument has also a faith. This faith extends to the belief that besides effecting changes in the subject matter for which the instrument was made, "instruments may be successively applied to new subject matters and new problems whose kinship with the old have been unsuspected or overlooked."[222]

The instrument presupposes a certain differentiation in both structure and function and this has metaphysical consequences. "It emphasizes the facts of immanent teleology and leads to a reaffirmation of the naturalistic doctrine of Aristotle purified of its ethical expression."[223] As well as natural selection of the thing, there is also human selection, for human selection is not natural with respect to the thing selected.

> Instrumentation can be most effective only when the continuities of natural growth as well as our interpretation of them reach certain stopping places or resting places in the light of which, not by the power of which, the direction of the movement seems purposeful, i.e., capable of developing into what it does develop.[224]

The value qualities of judgments cannot be derived from the preferred objects.

The instrument shows forth its own history of continuity. The eye, ear, etc., are instruments for seeing, hearing, etc.

> Without any break or sudden leap, thought or inference steps in as an instrument in piercing stray hints together, manipulating things, mentally reconstructing the situation in order to discover what is spatially beyond and temporally

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[222] Hook, MOP, 25.
[223] Ibid., 26; supra, 27.
[224] Ibid., 27.

> remote. Therefore what is true of all instruments is true of thought as an instrument.[225]

His purpose is to make thought no more and no less than the knife which is best for cutting leather or the hammer for driving nails. Thought is an instrument for working over subject matter. The subject matter acted upon by thought does not result in "idea" but new subject matter which is the result of the "thought-instrumentalization."

He summarizes by saying:

> That instrumentalities can never become transmuted into irrecoverable certainties, for their effective application depends upon definite objective environmental traits as well as upon the passing needs and purposes of those who live and react in that environment.[226]

The instrument is also self-critical, always correcting and adapting itself to the subject matter. If an instrument could speak it would insist "that all scientific and metaphysical explanation is an exhaustive description of a natural fact..."[227] Instruments are not ends in themselves but are the effects of prior changes and intentions as well as the means to further changes which in their turn are instruments also.

Professor Hook sums up the position of Dewey on instruments in the following words:

> All of those things which appear in the garb of shining immediacy, whether it be precious stones or metals, the sensations of traditional empiricism, or the sense data which have become the

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225. Hook, MOP, 28.
226. Ibid., 30.
227. Ibid., 30-31.

> counters and money of contemporary philosophic exchange, are, as Professor Dewey has on so many occasions shown, end-terms analyzed out for definite scientific purposes by means of physical or analytical instruments from impure, unrefined and loosely delimited segments of experience.[228]

Hook now turns to the subject of communication. Words, he says, are instruments used to render other instruments more effective. He concludes his consideration of the instrument by saying:

> Every instrumental operation, whether it be scientific or artistic, industrial or personal, implies an order to which it owes its existence and an order in virtue of which its ends are realized.[229]

The instrument enables us by the utilization of nature to create new ends by the mechanics of transformation. With all this behind him, Mr. Hook turns to the relation between, or rather the similarity of thought to any other instrument. (1) The instrument is used to eliminate certain difficulties and to transform possibilities into actualities. Thinking likewise takes place in indeterminate situations to fix belief by effecting a relative stability in subject matter. (2) The instrument does not make over existence but is mediate in nature and operation. So also thinking is essentially mediate acting upon the immediately given, not known. (3) The construction and application of the instrument implies an anterior knowledge of laws and processes other than those it is to discover. So the presence of effective thought presupposes a whole body of prior knowledge which is used to clarify the presentations of sense and convert them into knowledge terms.

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[228] Hook, MOP, 33.
[229] Ibid., 38.

(4) There is continuity and coherence among the parts of a machine. Coherence is necessary for thought's satisfactory completion. (5) There is an organic unity in the instrument which gives impetus and direction to growth and improvement. The living moment of thought results from its mediate character. (6) Both instruments and thoughts represent the social character of experience. With the former the reference to action is open and unquestioned; with the latter it is indirect and removed. (7) Instruments may be taken from their context and made to set up aesthetic goods. So also thinking may be separated from vital problems and become an immediate instrument of enjoyment.

He concludes that thought cannot be epiphenomenal but that (1) *it is of the same generic order as the object to which it is applied*, (2) it implies an incomplete system of relationships among things, (3) it must forego all claims to finality and accept its status as an instrument striving for greater effectiveness.

The three generic references of thinking as instrumental he summarizes thus: (1) thinking is an instrument in reference to some non-cognitive experience, (2) with respect to and because of its mode of functional activity, (3) whose exercise is conditioned by certain structural organizations in nature. We use good thinking because it is more fruitful. Hook speaks as if "good thinking" were a "thing;" for him it is a natural

event. We cannot take our standards of either logic or ethics out of this world of matter, mind, and motion.

In the Schilpp volume, Mr. Murphy has this to offer on Dewey's system:

> There is nevertheless a skeleton in the closet of this admirably planned metaphysics, which has seriously compromised its good repute and thus given aid and comfort to its speculative rivals. It consists in an unhappy discrepancy between experience as it ought to be if its place in the natural world is to be made intelligible, and experience as it must be if Dewey's epistemology is correct. In the former, "experience" is the essential link between man and the world which long antedates his appearance in it. In the latter, "experience" is the terminus of all knowing, in the sense that all our cognitive claims refer ultimately to what experience will show itself to be in a 'resolved' situation and to nothing else. If this latter account is true, all statements about a natural environment outside of these immediate experiences become on analysis simply means of facilitating cognitive transitions to such enjoyed immediacies and the world which should have provided the background for our experience, and the measure of its metaphysical significance, "collapses into immediacy," and Mr. Dewey's naturalism reduces, as Mr. Santayana has said, to a "philosophy of the foreground."[230]

4. Concept of Nature. As early as 1905, Dewey called himself a "natural realist."[231] In 1907 in a letter to James he contrasts his "naturalistic pragmatism" with the "humanistic" type.[232] In his discussions with Santayana, he called his philosophy "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism."[233] In EAN, Rev. he upholds this view.

Negatively his doctrine is the rejection of anything "supernatural." He rejects any idea of the supernatural as world. [illegible]

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[230] Murphy, Art.(1939)^1, 221.
[231] Dewey, Art.(1905)^1, 324-327.
[232] Perry, TCWJ, II, 528.
[233] Dewey, Art.(1927)^3, 57.

[illegible] of matter, mind, and spirit.

In the [illegible] Dewey's system:

> There is nevertheless a weakness in the theory of this minutely planned anti-dualism, which was [illegible] [220]

2. Concept of Universe. As early as 1882, Dewey called himself a "natural realist."[221] In 1887 in a letter he [illegible] his "naturalistic suggestions" [illegible][222] In his correspondence with [illegible] he calls his philosophy "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism."[223] In this [illegible] view.

Positively his doctrine is the [illegible] "experiencialism" [illegible]

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220. Dewey, [illegible]
221. Dewey, [illegible]
222. Dewey, [illegible]
223. Dewey, [illegible]

an "encumbrance" in his A Common Faith.[234] In most of his major writings for the past thirty years, he has opposed the supernatural which is the realm of "striving, transciency, and frustration."[235] It is the world of the imagination.

He, likewise, rejects the older mechanistic materialism.

> Historically speaking, materialism and mechanistic metaphysics--as distinct from mechanistic science--designate the doctrine that matter is the efficient cause of life and mind, and that "cause" occupies a position superior in reality to that of "effect." Both parts of this statement are contrary to fact. As far as the conception of causation is to be introduced at all, not matter but the natural events having matter as a character, "cause" life and mind.[236]

Matter is not a metaphysical cause but a character of natural events. The "dead matter moved under the impulse of insensate forces is now discredited" and the principle of indeterminacy of modern physics was "the final step of its dislodgement."[237] Nature is not a mechanism in that older coneeption of the term, but "something problematic, undecided, still going on and as yet unfinished and indeterminate."[238] Nature is amenable to intelligent human control.[239] The supernatural is defined as "that which lies beyond experience."[240] It will be seen that the definition of "supernatural" depends upon the prior definition of "experience," and Dewey defines experience as

> The entire organic agent-patient in all its interaction with the environment natural and social...Experiencing is just certain modes of interaction, or correlation of natural objects among which the organism happens, so to say,

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[234] Dewey, CF, 6.
[235] Dewey, EAN, 55; CF, 48.
[236] Ibid., 262.
[237] Dewey, QFC, 98, 110, 204.
[238] Dewey, EAN, 348-349.
[239] Dewey, QFC, 106.
[240] Dewey, Art.(1930), 177.

> to be one. It follows with equal force that experience means primarily not knowledge, but ways of doing and suffering.[241]

Consciousness, he holds, is but a small portion of experience. Experience includes all the physical features of the environment extending in space and time as well as all the habits and interests of the organism.[242] On the basis of this the "supernatural" is much like a "transcendent" object in the philosophy of Kant. It is beyond all possible experience and if it exists, must be unknowable. The supernatural lies beyond all possibility of interaction with the organism.

a. Nature, then, for Dewey is a totality which includes (1) the physical, (2) the psycho-physical, and (3) the mental.[243] It is the sum total of all events. It is a single system subject to the same causal laws. It includes physical nature and also man, as well as mathematical and logical objects and values.[244] Its boundaries are co-terminous with what can be experimentally verified.[245]

b. Nature is a temporal process. It is a "history which is a succession of histories."[246] The natural is what occurs. "Every existence is an event."[247] The world is in the process of tranformation.[248] The permanent is merely those things which undergo change more slowly than others.[249]

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[241]. Dewey, CI, 36-37.
[242]. Dewey, EEL, 6-7; supra, 143.
[243]. Dewey, EAN, 261.
[244]. Dewey, QFC, 195.
[245]. Ibid., 197.
[246]. Dewey, EAN, 100.
[247]. Ibid., 71.
[248]. Dewey, EPP, 56-57.
[249]. Dewey, EAN, 71.

c. Nature is continuous. There is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and physical operations.[250] "The primary postulate of a naturalistic theory of logic is continuity of the lower and the higher activities and forms."[251] Experience has temporal continuity.[252]

The continuity of nature is basic in his thought. "The intelligent activity of man is not something brought to bear upon nature from without; it is nature realizing its own probabilities in behalf of a fuller and richer issue of events."[253] A naturalistic metaphysics is bound to consider reflection as itself a natural event occurring within nature "because of traits of the latter."[254] Nature, on the basis of this principle is a system.

d. Nature contains real novelties. Nature is indeterminate, if it were not so, perception, knowledge, and experiment would be impossible.[255] There are emergents in nature such as life, association, communication, participation and mind. Mind is a real novelty--[256] a functional character of natural events at the state of widest and most complex interaction.[257]

5. Definition of Nature. It will be seen from this study that "nature" is an all-inclusive term for both Woodbridge and Dewey. Both are influenced by the Aristotelian view of nature

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[250] Dewey, LOG, 19; supra, 46f.
[251] Ibid., 23.
[252] Ibid., 245.
[253] Dewey, QFC, 214-215.
[254] Dewey, EAN, 68; supra, 48.
[255] Ibid., 348-349; supra, 27, 62f.
[256] Dewey, EAN, 272-273; CI, 66.
[257] Dewey, EAN, vi, 75.

achieving ends.[258] Woodbridge has a fairly well developed theory of natural teleology.[259] Dewey views nature in much the same way, as always producing novelties.[260] The dynamic view of nature pervades modern naturalism. Both these thinkers reject the older rigid mechanistic view of nature.[261] For Woodbridge, nature may be considered a synonym for God, as in the thought of Spinoza. For Dewey, nature is likewise an all-inclusive term, but it is not synonymous with God, since he does reserve and use that term as an impersonal object of religious devotion. The exact way in which he defines "God" will be taken up in the next chapter. It is evident from this discussion that these two naturalists mean different things by "nature." They in turn differ from other naturalists, as was shown above.[262] Obviously all of these cannot be accepted as satisfactory. It is evident from this that no definition of nature has as yet been found which is acceptable to all naturalists. They do, however, agree on the denial of the existence of a personal God.

Probably the most satisfactory definition would be the one suggested by Kant. Nature, for him, is the universe as organized in sense experience. This is a possible definition also, according to Webster's Dictionary, where nature is defined narrowly as "the totality of physical reality, exclusive of minds and the mental." Were this the accepted definition, then all values, morals, all mental states, would be outside the realm of nature.

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[258] Supra, 27.
[259] Supra, 62f.
[260] Supra, 184.
[261] Supra, 73, 182-183.
[262] Supra, 2-3; Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 357-358.

But these naturalists would reject this definition because they root everything in nature.

Woodbridge comes close to this definition when he says that nature is "pre-eminently the visible world."[263] But "pre-eminently" does not mean completely and he goes on to include all mental events in nature as well. Were this definition adopted, much confusion would no doubt be avoided. However, since naturalists do not seem to feel the need for agreement on what the term "nature" should include, there is little prospect of an exact definition in the near future.

F. Summary

According to Dewey, the general purpose of philosophy is "to reintegrate human knowledge and activity in the general framework of reality and natural processes."[264] Philosophy is the great logic of experience. It is criticism of criticisms. It is the development of an instrument to cope with all the problems of men.

Dewey was interested in psychology before he turned to the field of philosophy. In his early life he supported the older soul psychology, but rejected this view under the influence of James and Angell, turning to a functional, or even behavioristic type.

Thinking, according to Dewey, is a kind of activity the organism performs at specific need. Thinking arises in a doubtful situation. The function of mind is to build and develop

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[263] Woodbridge, EON, 60; supra, 46.
[264] Supra, 122.

useful habits. Dewey has no clearly developed psychology but shifts about among (a) functionalism (b) behaviorism, and (c) self-psychology.[265]

Mind is, for Dewey, a natural event. He defines four levels in the process of its development: (1) The Psycho-physical organism, (2) the level of sensitivity, (3) the level of feeling, and (4) mind.[266] Mind emerges in the process of evolution.

Dewey's logic is the result of his theory of reflective thought. It is the development of an instrument to be used in "controlled inquiry." His logic is called "experimental." It it logic not of a separate world of thought but a logic of "natural events."[267] In his Logic, Dewey uses the term "inquiry" which is to be taken as synonymous with "thought." This work is his development of the instrument by which the organism controls the indeterminate or doubtful situation in which it finds itself. He outlines what he considers logic and develops his theory on the assumption that inquiry operates within the one existential matrix.[268] The principle of continuity is basic. All logical forms are developed within the very processes of inquiry itself. They accrue to subject matter.

The purpose of inquiry is to reach "warranted assertions" which, for Dewey, is truth. The "scientific method" which he uses may be interpreted in two ways: (1) The laboratory method of the physicist or chemist, or (2) the method of reaching

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[265] Supra, 125-135.
[266] Supra, 136.
[267] Supra, 138-139.
[268] Supra, 146-150.

"coherent wholes" by the "adequate satisfaction of logical conditions imposed by controlled inquiry," or "probability" knowledge.[269]

Dewey's epistemology is based upon his theory of inquiry. Knowing, he says, is a kind of doing: "A mode of practical action."[270] Verification is a matter of consequences. Only when the desired conclusion has been reached and the problem solved is a plan of action shown to have been warranted.[271] Knowing begins with a troubled situation and culminates when the situation is no longer doubtful.

Metaphysics, for Dewey, may be taken as an account of the characteristics of existences all of which he calls "natural events."[272] He explains all objects of experience as "natural." Sidney Hook in his The Metaphysics of Pragmatism develops and systematizes this field to a large extent. His work may be summed up as "the metaphysics of the instrument" or "instrumentalism."

Dewey defines his system as "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism."[273] He rejects both the "supernatural" and "mechanistic materialism." Nature can be changed, worked over, by intelligent human control. The natural is what is "experienced," while the "supernatural" is beyond possible experience, and hence unknowable. Nature may be

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[269] Supra, 152-153.
[270] Supra, 158-161; Dewey, QFC, 106-107.
[271] Supra, 162-163.
[272] Supra, 165-167.
[273] Supra, 181-182.

summed up as: (a) a totality which includes the (1) physical, (2) psycho-physical, and (3) mental; (b) the complete temporal process; (c) continuity, and (d) the home of novelties or emergents.[274]

G. Criticism

There are several criticisms which may be offered of Dewey's system.

1. The all-inclusiveness of nature.[275] Nature is defined as the realm which includes all events. Hence, nature is in a definite sense, all-that-there-is. It is the physical, psycho-physical, and mental, which does not define any one of them properly.

2. Dewey's psychology is somewhat confused. He conceives of mind in three different ways, (a) as a function of the organism or a tool for organic adjustment, (b) as the behavior of the organism, for knowledge "lives in the muscles, not in consciousness,"[276] (c) as a self. In his Ethics he constantly speaks of the "self," as well as in other places.[277] It cannot be said then that Dewey had a consistent psychological theory.

3. Dewey mentions some characteristics of mind which are hardly in keeping with functional and behavioristic psychology. Consciousness is not mind, but it functions at all levels of experience. It is hard to see how mind as behavioristic or

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[274] Supra, 183-184.
[275] Supra, 182-184.
[276] Dewey, HNC, 177; supra 127, 132.
[277] Supra, 134; Dewey, ETH, 315; CF, 17; Ratner (ed.)PJD, 85.

even functional can be conscious, united, aware, capable of manipulating meanings, transcendent over both space and time, and able to strive for ends. Mind is conscious, thinking, willing, and feeling, all of which suggests strongly the self-psychology.[278]

4. Allport points out that, for Dewey, there is no ego behind the actions of the individual. There exists no self "separate from musculature."[279] Dewey himself says that knowledge "lives in the muscles not in consciousness."[280] The only unifying agent he recognizes is musculature. Just how the muscles can unify the organism is rather hard to understand. Thinking, remembering, anticipating, willing, in fact, all that seems necessary to a self, are conscious actions, not musculature. The self seems to live in the activity of self-consciousness rather than in muscular activity.

5. Dewey insists that reflective thought arises only in response to the doubtful or in a troubled situation. This seems to be contrary to fact. Thinking occurs spontaneously as many have demonstrated. Furthermore this view is contrary to what Dewey says in the previous point. What he says is far more than can be said on a functional view of thinking.[281]

6. Mind-body problem. The best one can say for his solution of the mind-body problem is that it is verbal. To say that there is no distinction between them but that all is one realm does

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[278] Supra, 137.
[279] Supra, 127.
[280] Supra, 132.
[281] Supra, 129-134.

not describe the facts. This is simply stretching the term "nature" until it covers both mental, physical, and psycho-physical events. It simply assumes that they all fall with this category of nature, as they must, if nature is defined as inclusive of all events. But such definition, in no way explains the presence of either or both, nor their relation with the totality of nature.

Hocking offers some important and interesting differences between mental events and physical events:[282] (1) Mental events observe themselves; bodily events do not; (2) Bodily events are in space; mental events are not; (3) Bodily events are in the present only; mental events are extended in time to the past and the future; (4) Bodily events are facts; mental events are facts with meanings. Dewey says that both kinds of events are found within nature. This does nothing about their basic differences. Dewey is guilty of the same fallacey with which he has often charged the supernaturalists--the fallacy of hypostatization. He has said that they have made certain aspects of experience into realities, Forms and Essences. Classification, he says, has nothing to do with existence.[283] But Dewey is himself trying to account for mind by classifying it as a natural event.

7. Dewey says that logic is able to develop its own logical forms. He rejects the eternal validity of the laws of contradiction, identity, and excluded middle, holding that they too "represent conditions which have been ascertained during the

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[282] Hocking, TOP, 98-100.
[283] Dewey, QFC, 35.

conduct of inquiry."[284] This seems to be a rejection of the rationality of the universe.

8. In his Logic and elsewhere too, Dewey never clearly describes the function of mental states. At times he gives the "mental" no status at all.[285]

9. Dewey's experimental or scientific method of inquiry is not clearly defined. It may be taken either in a narrow or a broad sense. In the latter it is comparable to the coherence criterion of E. S. Brightman; in the former, it is similar to the method of the scientific laboratory.[286]

10. Dewey's conception of knowing as a kind of doing is based upon his logical theory. Since his theory of inquiry is weak, his epistemology can be questioned at the same time.

11. Dewey says that inquiry or thinking is the response of the organism to a doubtful situation. Reflective thinking, he holds, is never spontaneous.[287] There is no occasion to think until some obstacle needs to be overcome and thinking arises to serve the need of the situation. Paul E. Johnson gives a cogent criticism of this position.

> But reason does not oversleep so long as that. Daydreaming uses imaginative reason in autistic thinking. Subconscious motives work with clever reasons to gain their desires. Reason is not a separate faculty, standing aloof as a *deus ex machina* until called to meet a crisis. Some degree of reasoning is present in all conscious experience that relates fleeting impressions into meaning. There is no sharp line of demarcation between experience and reason, for reason is the coherent sense of experience.[288]

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[284] Supra, 151-152.
[285] Supra, 141.
[286] Supra, 153-158.
[287] Supra, 139-140.
[288] Johnson, POR, 172.

12. Dewey's definition of experience is broad and confusing. For him, "experience" includes anything that may affect an organism at any time.[289]

13. Dewey admits difficulty in stating the exact physiological mechanism "involved in thinking." He is definitely vague at this point.[290]

14. The naturalistic philosophy is pessimistic about the future of humanity. Eventually all will become extinct in a "common doom."[291] Human endeavor is sufficient, naturalists say, to solve all problems that arise, yet they hold to the ultimate doom of humanity. There is no hope for the future. At the same time they criticize theists who see infinite worth in man, and believe in the supernatural as a hope and guarantee of the future.

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[289] Supra, 143, 170-171.
[290] Supra, 172.
[291] Supra, 175.

CHAPTER VI

APPLICATION TO THE FIELD OF VALUES

A. General Theory of Value

The problem of values is the possibility of formulating scientific propositions about the direction of human conduct. The whole problem was prompted by the elimination of value-conceptions from nonhuman phenomena. For centuries, he says, nature was supposed to be what it is "because of the presence within it of ends."[1] This is clearly the Aristotelian view of nature.[2] But from about the seventeenth century teleology was gradually eliminated from natural science and the problem of values became a separate problem. From then on, he says, the problem of valuation was associated with the sciences of human activities and human relations. Values were located in the "mental" or "psychical" field as opposed to the "physical."[3] It is this "bifurcation" of experience that has caused the modern problem of values. Dewey holds that on the basis of his naturalistic philosophy, the problem of values more or less disappears. For example, one need not debate the question of the objectivity of values because nature is the matrix "within which our ideal aspirations are born and bred."[4] All values arise with experience, remembering, that,

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1. Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 2.
2. Supra, 27.
3. Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 3.
4. Dewey, CF, 85.

for Dewey, experience is more than consciousness, and includes anything that may affect an organism at any time.

> Let desires, skills, purposes, beliefs be what they will, what happens is the product of the interacting intervention of physical conditions like soil, sea, mountains, climate, tools and machines, in all their vast variety, with the human factor.[5]

The true worth of the goods presented by experience is not immediately given.[6] Likings and desires conflict and discrimination between them is necessary. There is a basic distinction between "desired" and "desirable" for,

> To say that something is enjoyed is to make a statement about a fact, something already in existence; it is not to judge the value of that fact...But to call an object a value is to assert that it satisfies or fulfils certain conditions.[7]

1. Logic and Values. The function of thinking or inquiry in value-experience is "the formulation of a judgment of value in which particular satisfactions are placed as integral parts of conduct as a consistent harmonious whole."[8] The great difficulty in the development of past theories of values was the failure to use the scientific method of inquiry.

> Pre-scientific ideas and beliefs in morals and politics are, moreover, so deeply ingrained in tradition and habits and institutions, that the impact of scientific method is feared as something profoundly hostile to mankind's dearest and deepest interests and values.[9]

Many philosophies of the past have maintained and still do main-

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[5] Dewey, LOG, 492.
[6] Dewey, See ETH, 318-319.
[7] Dewey, QFC, 260; see also 261 and others.
[8] Dewey, ETH, 228.
[9] Dewey, LOG, 77.

tain that the domain of values is "wholly apart from any possibility of application of scientific methods."[10] Dewey takes, of course, the opposing point of view. He insists that the only possible way to develop an adequate theory of values is by the application of his experimental method of inquiry as developed in his *Logic*. "It is not urged that attainment of a unified logic, a theory of inquiry, will resolve the split in our beliefs and procedures. *But it is affirmed that it will not be resolved without it.*"[11](Italics ours.) The importance of a proper theory of values is found in the fact that value judgments enter into all final judgments. "There is no inquiry that does not involve judgments of practice."[12] The failure to apply scientific inquiry to the field of social inquiry is due to the "practical difficulties in the way of experimental method in the case of social phenomena as compared with physical investigations."[13]

> Nevertheless, every measure of policy put into operation is, *logically*, and *should* be actually, of the nature of *an experiment*. For (1) it represents the adoption of one out of a number of alternative conceptions as possible plans of action, and (2) its execution is followed by consequences which, while not as capable of definite or exclusive differentiation as in the case of physical experimentation, are none the less observable within limits, so they may serve as tests of the validity of the conception acted upon.[14]

2. *Criterion of Value*. The general criterion of value is

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[10] Dewey, LOG, 77-78.
[11] Ibid., 79.
[12] Ibid., 174.
[13] Ibid., 508.
[14] Ibid., 508-509.

"the whole situation in which the desire takes effect."[15] But there is also an appeal to consequences for the pragmatic element is never forgotten by Dewey. "The moral quality of any impulse or active tendency can be told only by observing the sort of consequences to which it leads in actual practice."[16] In every case of valuation there is involved observation of "actual materials" and an estimate of their "potential force" in the production of a "particular result."[17]

3. Organization of Values. Values, according to Dewey, cannot be arranged into any system or hierarchy. We cannot draw up a catalogue and say that

> such and such goods are intrinsically and always ideal, and such and such other ones inherently base because material. There are circumstances under which enjoyment of a value called spiritual because it is associated with religion is mere indulgence; when its good, in other words, becomes one of mere sensuous emotion. There are occasions when attention to the material environment constitutes the ideal good because that is the act which thoroughgoing inquiry would approve.[18]

Inquiry cannot determine true goods, once for all and so develop any such table of values, arranged in unchangeable order from higher to lower. Values have to be rearranged in terms of the conditions of the concrete situation in which they arise. Dewey makes no distinction between instrumental and intrinsic good. There are several reasons for this position.

a. Means-consequences is a "single undivided situation."[19]

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15. Dewey, ETH, 385.
16. Ibid., 250-251.
17. Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 23.
18. Dewey, ETH, 230.
19. Dewey, EAN, 397.

Means and consequences bear an organic relation to each other.[20] Every value is both an end and a means.

> The doctrine of fixed ends not only diverts attention from examination of consequences and the intelligent creation of purpose, but, since means and ends are two ways of regarding the same actuality, it also renders men careless in their inspection of existing conditions.[21]

Ends are "terminals of deliberation, and so turning-points _in_ activity."[22] Objects have a two-fold character; they have a "direct individual and unique nature" as well as "relations or continuities."[23] They may be both enjoyed in the present and potential means of later experiences. The great trouble with theories that make a sharp distinction between ends and means is "the failure to make an empirical investigation of the actual conditions under which desires and interests arise and function, and in which end-objects, ends-in-view, acquire their actual contents."[24]

b. _Ideals and economic ends_. The regarding of economic ends as _merely_ instrumental has resulted in "the obnoxious materialism and brutality of our economic life."[25] Such values must be recognized as intrinsic also. Only then is life worth while. Dewey develops this point in _The Quest for Certainty_.[26]

4. _Value and Desire_. The cause of desire is always a lack in the existing situation. Valuation takes place only when there is something the matter, only when there is some

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[20] Ibid., 367-368.
[21] Dewey, HNC, 232-233.
[22] Ibid., 223.
[23] Dewey, QFC, 236-237.
[24] Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 33.
[25] Dewey, RIP, 171.
[26] See QFC, 280-281.

trouble to be done away with, or some need to be made good. Desire comes only when there is "some conflict of tensions to be resolved by means of changing existing conditions."[27] There is always present a factor of inquiry whenever there is valuation.

The difficulty or problem of present value theory is that mentalistic psychology has led to the reduction of values to feelings. Values have been treated "as merely mental states."[28] "When they are so taken (and only then), ends, needs, and satisfactions are affected in a way that distorts the whole theory of valuation."[29] Dewey's protest is against taking values as mere feelings, and forgetting their existential status. "An end, aim, or purpose as a mental state is independent of the biological and physical means by which it can be realized."[30] But in this statement, Dewey has omitted entirely the word "merely" which seems so necessary and which he himself uses above. The want or desire should not be treated as a mere state of mind, instead of something lacking in the situation. Thus the needful is what is existentially necessary if an end-in-view (or ideal) is to be brought into actual existence. The ideal is always a possibility of existence for Dewey. The ideal cannot be found by examination of a state of mind but only by examination of the actual conditions of the particular situation. Satisfying a desire means meeting the conditions of the needful

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[27] Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 34.
[28] Ibid., 36.
[29] Loc. cit.
[30] Loc. cit.

or troubled situation.

5. Value and Existence. Ideals are "continuous with natural events."[31] They are the possibilities of natural events. "The relation between objects as known and objects with respect to value is that between the actual and the possible."[32] The actual is made of given conditions; the possible stands for ends or consequences which may be brought into existence by the actual. The possible is thus the ideal with respect to any given situation. "If we agree to leave out the eulogistic savor of 'ideal' and define it in contrast with actual, the possibility denoted by an idea is the ideal phase of the existent."[33] But what has happened in actual experience has been the hypostatization of the "ideal."

> This hypostization [sic] has affected the three most generalized forms of appreciation and produced the concepts of the Good, the True and the Beautiful as ontological absolutes.[34]

According to Dewey, the basis for this is simply the "appreciation of concrete consummatory ends."[35] The ideal is, for him, the possible, not any absolute ontological existence. There is no absolute end-in-view or goal. "As long as actual events were supposed to be judged by comparison with some absolute end-value as a standard or norm, no sure progreee was made."[36] The only way to discover norms is by analytic observation of existing conditions. The results of experimenta-

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[31] Dewey, EEL, 336-337.
[32] Dewey, QFC, 299.
[33] Ibid., 300.
[34] Dewey, LOG, 177.
[35] Loc. cit.
[36] Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 48.

tion "form the content of the specific end-in-view, not some abstract standard or ideal."[37]

6. Objectivity of Values. Dewey is opposed to the objectivity of values in the sense of their being already in a realm of Being as is pointed out in the above section. His rejection of the "supernatural" is directed against such a conception. "Nature has intelligible order as its possession in the degree in which we by our own overt operations realize potentialities contained in it."[38] But Dewey has a "kind" of objectivity.

a. Values are more than personal likings. Values must have the objectivity of cognitive beliefs.[39]

b. Social objectivity. Values are socially objective. The projection and realization of ideals is a process extending through generations of continuous effort.

> The things in civilization we must prize are not ourselves. They exist by grace of the doings and sufferings of the continuous human community in which we are a link.[40]

The responsibility of the present is the conservation and expansion of such values for their transmission to future generations. Values are objective also in that they have a definite influence upon human conduct.[41]

c. Natural objectivity. Values are objective in the sense that they are natural. They are rooted in natural con-

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[37] Loc. cit.
[38] Dewey, QFC, 215.
[39] Dewey, EAN, 424-425.
[40] Dewey, CF, 87.
[41] Ibid., 48.

ditions. They are made "out of the hard stuff of the world of physical and social experience."[42] Man's labors on behalf of the ideal are "the doing of the universe" because man is a part of it.[43] Dewey sums up his theory in this way: that (1) the problem of valuation in general as well as in particular cases concerns things that sustain to one another the relation of means-ends; that (2) ends are determinable only on the ground of the means that are involved in bringing them about; and that (3) desires and interests must themselves be evaluated as means in their interaction with external or environing conditions. Ends-in-view, as distinct from ends as accomplished results, themselves function as directive means, or plans. There is, he concludes, no final theory of valuation. The theory must grow and be improved by continuous and critical methods of investigation. When all this is done,

> The break will disappear, the gap be filled, and science be manifest as an operating unity in fact and not merely in idea when the conclusions of impersonal nonhumanistic science are employed in guiding the course of distinctively human behavior, that namely, which is influenced by emotion and desire in the framing of means and ends; for desire, having end-in-view, and hence involving valuations, is the characteristic that marks off human from non human behavior. On the other side, the science that is put to distinctively human use is that in which warranted ideas about the nonhuman world are integrated with emotion as human traits. In this integration not only is science itself a value but it is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations in all aspects of human and social life.[44]

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42. Ibid., 49.
43. Dewey, EAN, 420.
44. Dewey, Art.(1939)^1, 66.

B. Religious Values

1. The Religious Object. The subject of religious values warrants special and more extensive consideration, especially because of the importance of the nature of the religious object. The ideal had been defined as a "possibility of existence" realized through the use of natural means by man who is a part of nature.[45] The objective of faith for Dewey is the active relationship between the ideal and the actual. This union is his "God."

> We are in the presence neither of ideals completely embodied in existence nor yet of ideals that are utopias. For there are forces in nature and society that generate and support ideals. They are further unified by the action that gives them coherence and solidity. It is this active relation between ideal and actual to which I would give the name "God."[46]

There are goods in nature but they need to be developed. The only way this can be done is by "a clear and intense conception of a union of ideal ends with actual conditions..."[47] It is this conception--that the actual may become the ideal--that arouses man and spurs him on. It is the function of such a working union of the ideal and actual which is "identical with the force that has in fact been attached to the conception of God in all the religions that have a spiritual content..."[48] God is not a particular Being but the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desires and actions.[49] This is not the unity to be found in one Being but "the unity of loyalty and effort

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[45] Dewey, CF, 43.
[46] Ibid., 50-51.
[47] Loc. cit.
[48] Ibid., 52.
[49] Ibid., 42.

evoked by the fact that many ends are one in the power of their ideal..."[50] The meaning of the term is selective. It "selects those factors in existence that generate and support our ideal of good as an end to be striven for."[51]

There are times, however, when the object of religious devotion becomes practically the whole of nature. Dewey speaks of the "Universe" as such an object.[52] "The ideal means, as we have seen, a sense of these encompassing continuities with their infinite reach."[53] "A work of art elicits and accentuates this quality of being a whole and of belonging to the larger, all inclusive, whole which is the universe in which we live."[54] The suggestion that the religious object is either a part or the whole of nature is found elsewhere as well.[55] Whatever else the religious object may be, for Dewey, it is not a person. The question whether Dewey is a theist was debated a few years ago in The Christian Century. Dewey entered the debate and said that he was not a theist. Since Dewey himself objects to being classified as one who believes in the personality of God, this would seem to settle the controversy.[56]

2. Salvation. The doctrine of salvation is a pessimistic view of human nature which stultifies human effort.[57] The division of mankind into saved and sinners makes a breach in any possible human brotherhood.[58] Dependence upon the supernatural

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[50] Ibid., 43; see also 33, 50, and others.
[51] Ibid., 53.
[52] Ibid., 19.
[53] Dewey, HNC, 330.
[54] Dewey, AAE, 195.
[55] See Dewey, EAN, 420-421.
[56] Aubrey and Wieman, Art.(1934), 1550-1553.
[57] Dewey, RIP, 115-116; HNC, 295.
[58] Dewey, CF, 33-34.

for salvation represents an attempt to escape from existence.[59] True salvation must come through science which, by its methods of testing beliefs, gives men the intellectual and emotional peace which they once found in religion of the supernatural type,[60] as well as by devotion to ideal ends which result in society.[61]

3. Problem of Evil. This, for Dewey, is an unnecessary problem. It arose because apologists "identified the existence of ideal goods with that of a Person supposed to originate and support them."[62] Give up belief in God and there is no problem of evil. It is not a theological or a metaphysical question but "the practical problem of reducting, alleviating, and as far as may be, removing, the evils of life."[63] The optimistic view of things--that this is the best possible world--is an obstacle to the removing of evil, for it tends to make men satisfied with things as they are. But just how man is to remove an evil, such as an earthquake or a disease germ, neither of which he is responsible for, Dewey does not make clear. He neglects the problem of surd evil.

4. Immortality. Dewey takes an agnostic attitude toward this problem. In a Symposium on the question of personal immortality he says:

> I have no beliefs on the subject of personal immortality. It seems to be a subject, being one of continued existence, for science rather than philosophy, or a matter of physical evidence. If it can be proved, it would have to be along the lines of

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[59] Dewey, QFC, 46-47, 275.
[60] Dewey, CAE, II, 456.
[61] Dewey, CF, 17.
[62] Dewey, CF, 45.
[63] Dewey, RIP, 177.

> the psychical researchers, and so far I have not been impressed with their results.[64]

5. The Supernatural. A discussion of Dewey's rejection of the "supernatural" in general will be of importance, for he not only rejects a personal God, but the supernatural in any form or sense. The supernatural rests upon certain assumptions which are not valid in the light of modern techniques. The assumption that knowledge has to do with "antecedent reality" by which he means "prior to and independent of the operations of knowing."[65] The supernatural is reality given "prior to experimental verification and redisposition."[66] It is held to be "in sufficient existence before the act of knowing," instead of being "the outcome of directed experimental operations."[67] Thus he says God or the supernatural is first set up and then "proved." Supernatural objects are not consequent to verification but antecedent. To Dewey this is a false line of reasoning.

Another argument is that cases of knowledge must correspond with the antecedent objects. "The objects of knowledge form the standards or measures of the reality of all other objects of experience."[68] Supernaturalism then appeals to the correspondence criterion of truth.[69] Scientific method shows the falsity of these assumptions. Truth for science does not end

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[64] Dewey, Art.(1928)^3, Sec. IX, 1.
[65] Dewey, QFC, 196.
[66] Ibid., 258.
[67] Ibid., 171.
[68] Ibid., 21.
[69] Ibid., 109-110.

in antecedent reality; for science the true is the verified. Verification and truth are two names for the same thing."[70] Knowledge is always the consequences of experimental operations, for Dewey. Nothing is true until it is verified.[71] Things are simply data or problems before verification is started; they become objects as a result of the process.[72] The main characteristics of scientific knowing as opposed to those used by the supernaturalistic types of philosophy are as follows:

a. All experimentation involves overt doing, the meaning of definite changes in the environment or in our relation to it.

b. Experiment is not random activity but is directed by ideas which have to meet the conditions set by the need of the problem inducing the active inquiry.

c. The outcome of the directed activity is the construction of a new experimental situation in which objects are differently related to one another, and such that *the consequences* of directed operations form the objects that have the property of being known.[73]

For science, ideas are not that which must correspond to antecedent reality or with themselves. They are hypotheses for verification. The final value of ideas is not determined "by their internal elaboration and consistency, but by the consequences they effect in existence as that is perceptibly experienced."[74] Scientific men accept the consequences of their experimental

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70. Dewey, IDP, 138.
71. Ibid., 143; QFC, 196.
72. Dewey, QFC, 137.
73. Ibid., 86-87.
74. Ibid., 165.

operations as constituting the known object rather than feeling under obligation to prove them by "identification with what was said to be antecedently known."[75] Conceptions are instrumentalities which direct operations of experimental observations, but "the knowledge-property resides in conclusions."[76] "The criterion of knowledge lies in the method used to secure consequences and not in metaphysical conceptions of the nature of the real."[77] This objection to the supernatural which is really an epistemological one may be summed up as follows: the premises upon which belief in the existence of the supernatural rests are not in harmony with those of science. Religion is out of step because "the final arbiter of all questions of fact, existence, and intellectual assent" is the method of experimental inquiry.[78] Supernatural religion cannot meet this challenge and it would be better to drop it entirely.

It is also an abstraction and rests on the fallacy of hypostatization of "selective emphasis."[79] We find ourselves in a world that is uncertain, unpredictable, uncontrollable, and hazardous.[80] Man prefers the permanent to the changing so he elevates the eternal to the rank of primary reality.[81] Such is the development of so-called Forms and Essences which so profoundly influenced for centuries the course of science and theology. What are these Essences, he asks but the objects of familiar life divinized by the idealizing imagination? Man does

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[75] Ibid., 185.
[76] Ibid., 192.
[77] Ibid., 221.
[78] Dewey, CF, 31.
[79] Dewey, EAN, Rev., 29.
[80] Ibid., 42.
[81] Ibid., 27.

just this to meet the demands of desire.[82] Dewey finds nature a satisfactory concept for the inclusion of the ideal and the real, universals and particulars, the one and the many, the changing and the permanent.

Dewey also objects to the supernatural on the ground that it had obstructed progress. The intolerance of the Church has ever been a detrimental factor.[83] Not until men gave up their ideas of the supernatural and began to experiment were the great acheivements of science made. Dewey continues to make strong criticisms of supernatural and institutional religions. This is seen in his recent articles "Antinaturalism *in Extremis*" in the volume edited by Krikorian, 1944, and "Dualism and the Split Atom," in the *New Leader*, 1945.[84] In the latter article, speaking of the role of religion in life, Dewey makes some strong criticism. Religion, he says, is causing a split in the very nature of things. The way out of our present difficulties is not to return to religious authoritarianism "the dogmas and institutions which embody and perpetuate the divisions from which we suffer" but it is "to carry forward the application of our best scientific procedures and results so that they will operate within, not just outside of or against, the moral values and concerns of humanity."[85] Religion, that is, supernatural religion (he means), stands in the way of the application of intelligence to social relations.[86] It stands in the way of an

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[82] Dewey, RIP, 105-106; CF, 73.
[83] Dewey, QFC, 102.
[84] Dewey, Art.(1945).
[85] Ibid., 4.
[86] See CF, 78.

effective realization of the sweep and depth of the implications of natural human relations.[87] It offers no solution for present problems for belief in the supernatural "does not change the existential situation in the least."[88] Conflict and error still empirically exist.[89] Science alone offers a way out of the problems that besiege us.[90] Belief in the supernatural is really a waste of time.[91] Dependence upon the supernatural also leads to stagnation, for it is the surrender of human endeavor.[92] "While saints are engaged in introspection, burly sinners run the world."[93] The only way out is to return to the belief that the environment is something to be changed.[94]

Furthermore, the supernatural is an encumbrance to religion. The feeling of dependence upon God can be found just as well in nature.[95] Faith may be had in intelligence itself without reference to supernatural powers.[96] The supernatural has been a blight upon the religious spirit, and its tie with religion and religious values must be dissolved. Such is Dewey's conception of the supernatural and God. His naturalistic theory begins with the rejection of a personal God.

C. Summary

In this chapter the application of Dewey's naturalism in

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87. Ibid., 80.
88. Dewey, QFC, 35.
89. Dewey, EAN, Rev., 54.
90. Dewey, RIP, 111-112; QFC, 264-265.
91. Dewey, Art.(1930), 177.
92. Dewey, CF, 46; RIP, 50.
93. Dewey, RIP, 196.
94. Ibid., 115-116.
95. Dewey, CF, 25-26.
96. Ibid., 6, 26.

the field of values was discussed, with special emphasis upon his conception of the nature of the religious object. It is well to bear in mind his great purpose, to reintegrate all human knowledge and activity into the framework of natural processes.[97] The modern problem of values, he holds, is the result of the bifurcation of experience.[98] The older concept of nature as producing ends was forgotten, teleology was eliminated from natural science, and values became a separate problem associated with human activities and relations.[99] Dewey holds that all values arise from nature within which our ideals arise.[100] Values are to be determined wholly by the application of his method of experimental or scientific inquiry to the field of moral experience.[101] It is false to believe that values stand apart from the application of the scientific method of inquiry as developed in his Logic.[102]

The general criterion of value is the whole situation, but with special emphasis upon the sort of consequences produced.[103] The true criterion of values is consequences which produce a "coherent whole" as outlined in his Logic.[104] Values cannot be organized into any permanent system but must always be taken in relation to the concrete situation.[105] He makes no distinc-

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[97] Supra, 122.
[98] Supra, 14, 194.
[99] Supra, 27, 194.
[100] Supra, 194-195.
[101] Supra, 195-196.
[102] Supra, 138.
[103] Supra, 197.
[104] Supra, 138f, 197.
[105] Supra, 197.

tion between instrumental and intrinsic goods. Every value is both an end and a means, for they are both part of the single individual situation.[106] Further, it is wrong to distinguish between ideals and economic ends.[107]

Values arise in a situation in which there is a lack. They cannot be reduced to feelings or treated as merely mental states, for they have an existential status.[108] The value or ideal is a possibility of existence for Dewey. The ideal is the possible in an actual existing situation. Thus an ideal or value is a possibility of a natural event.[109] In experience, however, the ideal has been hypostatized into eternal Essences such as the True, the Beautiful and the Good.[110] For Dewey, the ideal is never any such absolute ontological existence, but always the possible in a concrete situation. Dewey thus rejects the objectivity of values in the sense of their existing in some realm other than nature. But they are objective in the sense of being more than personal likings, and of being social and natural ideals.[111] He looks for the time when truer values will be produced by the full application of the scientific method to the whole of experience.[112]

According to Dewey, "God," or the religious object, is the relation between the "ideal" and the "actual." He stresses the

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[106] Supra, 197-198.
[107] Supra, 198.
[108] Supra, 199.
[109] Supra, 199-200.
[110] Supra, 200.
[111] Supra, 201.
[112] Supra, 202.

active relationship because it is the conception that the actual may become the ideal which urges man on. This driving force is God.[113] God is also the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to action. God is in a sense, a totality which at times is the whole of nature.[114] Dewey rejects completely the concept of a personal God.[115] He rejects the "supernatural" in any sense because (1) it is reached by unscientific methods of knowing, (2) it leads to abstraction, and (3) it is impractical and leads to the stalemate of human endeavor.[116]

D. Criticism

1. The modern problems of values has arisen, Dewey says, because of the division of experience into the two world of science and morals. Teleology was divorced from nature and limited to human activities and relations.[117] This is wrong, for values arise out of nature, man himself being one of its natural products. Unconscious matter or some collection of unconscious natural events is the source of all values. The truth of this view stands or falls upon the naturalistic assumption that nature is the ultimate metaphysical explanation.[118]

2. Nature is a whole which includes man and values. Man is characterized by this natural whole of which he is a part.

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[113] Supra, 203.
[114] Supra, 204.
[115] Supra, 204.
[116] Supra, 206-209.
[117] Supra, 194.
[118] See discussion supra, 116-119.

Hartshorne points out that this can work both ways. "If man is natural, then nature is manlike."[119] The doctrine that nature is a whole, inclusive of man and his ideals, is idealistic as well as naturalistic in its implications. Reality (or nature) is qualitatively one for the idealist, but the one is mental. As Pratt also points out, when man is included in nature, it becomes increasingly more evident that nature is not a mere collection of atoms..."but a much richer organic whole...When we have put life and mind into Nature the concept of Nature is significantly enlarged..."[120]

3. Dewey emphasizes "continuity" as an all important principle in his thought.[121] All forms are bound together by this principle, physical objects, man, values, and mental objects are one. In this, Dewey is guilty of the fallacy of hypostatization. "Continuity" does not order nature into a coherent whole but is simply a term used to express the fact that continuity exists. "Continuity" so used becomes one of the eternal "Essences" which he rejects, and calls a habit of the supernaturalists.[122]

Pratt has this to say about emergent evolutionists:

> What they present us with is merely a theoretical history, a chronological list of the order in which things have appeared. Their history and their list are probably correct, but if they stop with them they have thrown no light on the extraordinary things that they have described.[123]

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[119] Hartshorne, BH, 40.
[120] Supra, 79.
[121] Supra, 148.
[122] Supra, 200-201.
[123] Pratt, PR, 363.

4. Dewey offers the concept of "nature" as an explanation of change and identity, the one and the many, etc. Nature is the ultimate ground of all. Borden Parker Bowne has offered cogent criticism of such a view in his *Metaphysics* and demonstrated that the only real basis for unity in the universe must be found in the unity of intelligence or a personal world-ground. Dewey ignores such criticisms or dismisses them without proper consideration. Woodbridge does this also.[124]

5. Dewey sees existence and values both rooted in nature. An excellent criticism of this view has been offered recently in E. S. Brightman's *Nature and Values*. Brightman shows that "nature" and "values" must both be grounded in the personality of God. He gives the following main reasons for the superiority of personal idealism:[125] (1) It is more empirical than naturalism. Naturalism neglects the fact that experience is personal consciousness. (2) It is more inclusive than naturalism, for it regards personality and value as essential clues to reality. (3) It is more social than naturalism. For naturalism, society is a manifestation of a nonsocial reality; for personalism, reality is social throughout. It is the experience of persons. (4) It is equally scientific with naturalism. It might be added here that the method of coherence of E. S. Brightman is quite similar to the scientific method of Dewey when the latter is taken in the broader sense--the sense in which he usually uses it--as a means of reaching coherent wholes.[126] (5) It is

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[124] Supra, 67, 87, 116-119.
[125] Brightman, NAV, 115-123.
[126] Supra, 154-157.

based on faith in the unity of nature and spirit. To sum up, it is a higher synthesis than naturalism because it is more inclusive, more coherent, more synoptic, and more objective than naturalism.

6. Dewey's method of discovery is based on two assumptions which have not been shown to be true. He assumes that his "scientific method" is the only one for arriving at truth, and hence, the existence of the supernatural cannot be established. He also assumes that man, by this method, is capable of indefinite progress, and that all his needs can be satisfied by "natural" powers. Such assumptions have not been satisfactorily demonstrated.

7. Dewey makes a strong attack upon organized religion or the church in his articles "Antinaturalism *in Extremis*" and "Dualism and the Split Atom." Supernatural religious beliefs, he says, are causing a split in the very nature of things. They are obstructing the true course of progress, the application of scientific method to the problem of values.[127] While it is quite true that the church had its faults in the past and still has many in the present, it does not seem fair to say that supernaturalism is the whole cause of the world's ills. Moreover, it is not true. Supernatural religions, especially Christianity, usually stand for the highest of ideals, and seek the better values in life. Dewey seems to be unaware of, or else he ignores, the most important teachings of religions such as Judaism and Christianity.

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[127] Supra, 195-196, 209-210.

E. Dewey's Contribution to Naturalism

Dewey has pointed out the main influences on the development of his naturalism. He follows Aristotle in interpreting nature dynamically.[128] He is close to Spinoza in interpreting nature in the all-inclusive sense.[129] He adopted the theory of biological evolution as an explanation of the process of natural teleology,[130] as is seen in his Influence of Darwin on Philosophy.

Probably no one thinker has so well developed and rounded out his position as John Dewey. The first great step is seen in his rejection of soul psychology for functionalism.[131] The muscular activity of the organism synthesized by habits becomes the only necessary unifying agent for Dewey. His theory is developed in such works as Studies in Logical Theory, Essays in Experimental Logic, and How We Think. Dewey developed his logical theory based upon his functional or instrumental view of thinking. Besides the works mentioned above, there is also his most systematic treatment of the subject, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. He outlined his epistemology, based still upon his postulate as to the nature of thought, in such works as Logic, and The Quest for Certainty, as well as in numerous essays and articles. His whole naturalistic metaphysics is set forth in Reconstruction in Philosophy, and especially in Experience and Nature.

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[128] Supra, 13-14, 27.
[129] Supra, 13, 34-36.
[130] Supra, 39-40, 148, 183-184.
[131] Supra, 125-137.

In addition to thoroughly developing his theory, Dewey has also applied it to the problems of men. Human Nature and Conduct is his social psychology. Liberalism and Social Action, Freedom and Culture, and Problems of Men are devoted to social philosophy. His Ethics covers the field of morals; Art as Experience applies his theory to esthetics; A Common Faith takes up the problem of religious values. Dewey has not only developed a metaphysical theory, but he has tried to show that it also has practical application.

Dewey, as well as Woodbridge, has combined the discoveries of modern physical science, the functional psychology, teleology, and biological evolution in his effort to formulate a naturalistic philosophy.[132] There seems to be little doubt that he has done this better than Woodbridge. Furthermore, Dewey has developed and used a more adequate method, freed, as it usually is, from the experimental laboratory. Dewey has also applied his system well in the field of values--a field which Woodbridge rather neglected. On the whole, it can be said that Dewey has developed a more scientific philosophical system than Woodbridge. But, like every system, Dewey's philosophy is based upon an assumption, and the truth of the system depends to a large extent on the truth of the assumption. Until the assumption that thinking is purely an instrument of organic adjustment, invoked by the organism in a troubled situation, and until the objections offered by other thinkers are adequately answered, his view must remain one of the solutions offered for the mind-body problem.

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[132] Supra, 121.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A. Summary

This dissertation has been an investigation of "nature" and "naturalism" in the thought of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and John Dewey who were chosen as more or less representative of naturalistic philosophy. The main emphasis has been an attempt to discover the meaning of these terms as used by these two naturalists. The study may be summarized under the following general headings: (1) Main influences upon the philosophers under consideration; including a brief historical survey of naturalism; (2) The respective systems of these two philosophers; (3) A comparison of their respective views; (4) General conclusions of this study.

It was noted that confusion has been caused by inadequate definition of terms especially in the field of philosophy. "Nature" is used in many different ways by the philosophers, not to mention its use in other connections. There is no unity even among naturalists themselves as to what "nature" means. In a recent manifesto of some of the naturalists this was freely admitted. Naturalism is described as more of a "spirit" or temperament, rather than a well-developed school standing upon the same general first principles.[1] To say that "nature"

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[1] Supra 2-3, 120-121; Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 357-358.

is a name for "quite a mess of miscellaneous stuff" helps very little.

A brief biography of each of the men under consideration was given. Woodbridge studied in Amherst College, Union Theological Seminary, and the University of Berlin. He taught for a time in the University of Minnesota and then in Columbia University where he became Dean of the Graduate School in 1904. Most of his literary work was done while he was at Columbia.[2] John Dewey was born in Vermont in 1859. He studied in the University of Vermont and Johns Hopkins University. He taught in the Universities of Michigan and Minnesota for a few years, then in the University of Chicago, and finally in Columbia. His literary career has extended over the past sixty-four years. These men represent in literary production, two extremes; Woodbridge's writings being rather limited, while Dewey has probably published more than any other American philosopher.[3]

The most important influences upon these men were mentioned. Probably Woodbridge owed most to Aristotle, Hobbes, and Spinoza.[4] Dewey was influenced by the Greek philosophers and especially Aristotle. This is evident in the dynamic view of nature in much of modern naturalism.[5] Dewey's relation to Kant was namely that of a protest against his division of experience into two worlds, that of mechanical science, or the phenomenal order, and that of moral and intellectual experience or the noumenal

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[2] Supra, 5-6.
[3] Supra, 6-12.
[4] Supra, 12-13.
[5] Supra, 13-14.

order.[6] Dewey began his philosophical career as an Hegelian idealist. Hegel, he says, left a permanent deposit in his thinking. The influence of Hegel is especially evident in Dewey's emphasis upon continuity, coherence, and wholes.[7] From Charles Sanders Peirce, Dewey mainly derived his pragmatism, while his psychological theory was developed under the influence of Angell and James.[8]

The literature in the field was then surveyed.[9]

In the second chapter the historical background of naturalism was taken up. Some possible definitions of "nature" were also considered. Webster's Dictionary lists many, of which the philosophical one was emphasized. It was pointed out that confusion has resulted from the use of this philosophical definition in at least three different ways: (1) Creative or vital force; (2) Created being in its existential character; (3) Creation, as a whole, especially the physical universe. To this may be added the confusion resulting from the many other possible definitions, not to mention their sub-variants. Edgar S. Brightman in an article, lists five possible definitions of the term: (1) Nature, for the Greeks, was the whole world viewed as ordered process; (2) the created order as distinguished from God as used by the Schoolmen; (3) all-that-there-is, as in Spinoza's deus sive natura; (4) the phenomenal order, or organ-

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[6] Supra, 14.
[7] Supra, 15.
[8] Supra, 15-16.
[9] Supra, 17-19.

ized and categorized sense experience as suggested by Kant; (5) as the world the sciences are investigating.[10] James M. Baldwin in an article in his Dictionary notes the same general confusion in the use of "naturalism." It is evident that the definition of "natural" and "naturalism" will depend upon the particular view of "nature" adhered to.[11]

The survey of naturalism from the early Greeks to the present day shows various uses and definitions of nature. No clearly defined view was found among most of the early Greeks, with the exception of Democritus who had a fairly well-developed materialistic philosophy. Plato looked upon nature as the world of changing things as is distinguished from the world of Forms. The idea of nature as the world of changing things persisted in Aristotle, but with the added concept that nature is always realizing ends or purposes.[12] The Epicureans eliminated all purpose from nature and regarded it as a mechanistic system of atoms, while the Stoics looked upon nature as self-moved both efficiently and teleologically. Nature was really God for the Stoics.[13]

The orthodoz Church philosophers, Augustine and Aquinas, regarded nature as the created order, distinguished from God who created all things ex nihilo.[14] Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), a monk who broke with the Church, taught that nature was made

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10. Supra, 21-22.
11. Supra, 22-24.
12. Supra, 27-28.
13. Supra, 28-29.
14. Supra, 29-31.

up of living atoms or monads, each one of them being an independent center of life but together organized in the system called nature.[15]

In the Modern period, at least three views are very important. Hobbes developed a completely mechanistic view of nature, applying his theory to matter, man and society. All movement whether physical, psychological or social, is controlled by mechanical laws of cause and effect.[16] Spinoza, the pantheist, developed a theory of nature or God as all that there is. Nature and God are synonymous terms for him.[17] Everything that is is by absolute necessity. Kant thought of nature as the universe of organized and categorized sense experience. Only objects of sense belong to the world of nature. What is not in sense is not in nature according to this view.[18]

The influence of Darwin's theory of biological evolution upon the development of naturalism was mentioned. Most modern naturalists see nature as achieving ends through the processes of biological evolution.[19]

The history of naturalism in America shows that most of the work of this school had been comparatively recent, mainly under the influence of Woodbridge, Dewey, Santayana, Sellars and a few others.[20]

We will first consider Woodbridge's view under several headings:

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[15] Supra, 31-32.
[16] Supra, 33-34.
[17] Supra, 34-37.
[18] Supra, 37-39.
[19] Supra, 13-14, 27, 39-40; infra, 62-69, 181-184.
[20] Supra, 40-43.

1. Nature. Woodbridge defines nature as "the familiar setting of human history," or "public experience." Nature is a sum that seems to leave nothing out. She is heaven and earth, and sea, and all that in them is.[21] The "natural" is what is characteristic of nature. Nature, as all-that-there-is, is clearly the physical universe existing in space and time. All that the word "mental" does is to distinguish certain actions from certain others which we are accustomed to call "physical." Actually there is no difference, qualitatively, between the two. Nature is structural, organized and scientific knowledge of her is possible.[22] Space is really in nature for it is the observable interplay of geometrical distinctions. Time has reference to the presence or absence of events in nature. Present events are in nature; past and future events are those absent from nature.[23] Matter is the stuff of which nature is made up. It is nature as the material world set over against ourselves, but not different from ourselves.[24] Nature is historical. She is continually changing, in process, a history of histories.[25] Nature is then the all-inclusive realm of being. Just as God (or nature) included both thought and extension for Spinoza, so nature includes both the mental and the physical for Woodbridge. What Woodbridge has done is broaden out the term "nature" to include all events. This is simply saying that nature

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[21] Supra, 46.
[22] Supra, 53-54.
[23] Supra, 55.
[24] Supra, 56-58.
[25] Supra, 58-62.

is "everything," and this neither explains the nature of "nature," nor says anything at all about the "everything." Verbal usage of a term does not add to knowledge.

2. Epistemology. All our knowledge of nature is obtained by scientific experiment, by going to nature as a physicist or chemist goes, experimenting, and then accepting the results.[26] All knowledge of nature must be scientifically verifiable. While Woodbridge recognizes that to think of God or the infinite is not at all strange, but human, yet, to say that God existed would be most unscientific. Such a thought cannot be verified.[27]

The medium through which knowledge is gained is our bodies. They are "conscious" bodies and nature responds to our efforts to obtain knowledge. All mental states are really physical states--functions of the body. The only kind of "stuff" in nature is the substance of which she is made up, and just what sort of substance that is "physicists and chemists are the sort of knowers who give us anything like an intelligible answer."[28] The substance of knowing is also the substance of nature. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.[29]

3. Man. Man as a whole, body and mind, is part and parcel of nature. He is no exceptional event either, but of the same kind as animals, plants, and atoms. He is first and last, a product of nature and he ought not to believe himself to be

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[26] Supra, 47-48, 51-52.
[27] Supra, 48-49.
[28] Supra, 51-52; Woodbridge, EON, 35-36.
[29] Supra, 76.

anything more.[30] He is wholly natural for thinking is no different from walking. He is not "Nature's last supreme act."[31] He is her child but he will not survive her. Woodbridge rejects personal immortality. Man is a natural creature with a wholly natural destiny.[32] The nature of man is not explained at all, but instead it is asserted that he is "natural" and "within" nature. Naturalism gives to man his animal rights. His intelligence is only an instrument of his animal life. He is no more important in nature than anything else, indeed, not so important as the atoms. Nature is no more tolerant of man than of any other thing.[33]

4. God. Woodbridge's nature, is the ultimate existence for him. Nature is, and no further explanation is possible. This assertion is similar to that of theists who assert that God is but just what he is or why he is calls for no further elaboration. Nature is Woodbridge's ultimate in the same way that God is for theists, but for him, God and nature are one and the same.[34] Woodbridge does not object to the use of the term "God" should one feel the need of it. But he rejects the view of a personal God, because such an hypothesis is unscientific and cannot be verified.[35]

5. History. History is purposeless if, by purpose, is meant "some future event towards which the whole creation moves;"

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[30] Supra, 72-73, 108-110.
[31] Supra, 72.
[32] Supra, 51.
[33] Supra, 110-111.
[34] Supra, 53, 71.
[35] Supra, 70.

but history is purposeful "if we mean that the past is utilized as material for progressive realization...of spiritual ends."[36] All that Woodbridge is really saying is that history is teleological, if you will allow me to define teleology in my own way. There is no single purpose in history, for history is pluralistic. There are many histories in nature and no one of them has preference over the others, not even man's. Human history appears purposeful but this is appearance only. It is due to a biased point of view. The cosmos is impartial to its many histories.[37]

6. Teleology and Mechanism. Woodbridge holds to a view of "natural teleology" for the whole of nature. Nature "suggests" plot or design, for purposes are conceived and executed, or so it seems to us. But all the happenings of nature are instances of this same thing, yet it is not really purpose but progression. The appearance of consciousness is an example of this teleology. Yet, Woodbridge does not object to one's thinking of one "Artist" for the whole of nature should one's religious nature demand it.[38] In his article on "Natural Teleology" he is trying to show that (1) there is no relevant connection between the fact of teleology and the operations of chance or design, and (2) that intelligence may not be regarded as the source of the distinction between means and ends, because it cannot be credited with creating the distinctions it discovers and because it is itself an instance of

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[36] Supra, 58-62.
[37] Supra, 59-60.
[38] Supra, 63-64.

teleology.[39] But this argument does not consider the possibility of an infinite intelligence as the ultimate cause of teleology. In the last analysis "natural teleology" is not teleology at all, but simply natural progression.

Woodbridge rejects the older mechanistic view of nature, which was based on Newtonian physics. It is not a machine controlled by unchangeable mechanical laws. While it is true that nature is partly mechanical, it is also true that she is continually producing "ideal products." It is always producing novelties, achieving results or purposes which show that she is not rigidly mechanical.[40] His view is summarized as follows: (1) Behavioristic distinctions are made, not in terms of structure, but in terms of ends accomplished by behavior; (2) behavior is consequently a teleological matter implying a natural teleology; (3) the admission of natural teleology does not necessarily involve either the doctrine that ends operate or the doctrine that structures contain resident powers by virtue of what they do; (4) the relativity of ends is confirmation of teleology and not its undoing; (5) natural teleology constitutes the intelligibility of nature; and (6) mind may be construed as an instance of teleology rather than the cause of it.[41] Mind is a development within nature, and hence wholly within space and time.

7. Metaphysics. The problem for metaphysics is not to explain or explain away existence, but to see what existence

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[39] Supra, 67.
[40] Supra, 73-76.
[41] Supra, 105-106.

implies. The great mistake of past metaphysics, he holds, has been the attempt to show that the implications of existence are its causes or prior to it. What he means is that, since mind is an existence discovered, it ought not to be considered the cause of existence.[42] Metaphysics means, or ought to mean, taking things as they are, in all their plurality, without trying to reach one ultimate cause for things, such as God. Yet, again Woodbridge does not object to the use of "God" "if our view of things compels us to seek" such a cause.[43] Metaphysics, for him, means admitting the existence of nature as a whole without attempting to account for its what and why. Nature needs no explanation and no justification of it is possible.

8. Mind. Woodbridge's theory of mind will now be reviewed. Mind is first of all a realm of discourse. It is a part of the natural world from which no one has ever succeeded in separating it. There is no separate world of ideas apart from the world of objects.[44] Mind is not a determinate form of being but a universe of discourse. It is not a "thing" which dwells in bodies but is a name for the fact that object and idea are inseparably united. There is but one realm of discourse and that is the realm of nature.[45] If psychologists in the past have suggested that mind is something which inhabits bodies, they have seriously erred. Mind is something wholly present in nature, not a separate entity. It is simply the assertion that animal bodies see, think, remember, etc., as well as breath, digest and

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[42] Supra, 67.
[43] Supra, 70.
[44] Supra, 85-87.
[45] Supra, 85-86.

walk.

Analysis shows us that man is nothing but a body. No such thing as a "mind" can be found. The space-time realm is the only one there is. To admit this is to find the real nature of mind, that is, within this realm. Animal bodies engage in different kinds of activity, some physical, some mental, but both take place with space and time.[46] It is simply the things man does that divide him into body and mind, but the distinction is artificial, for man is one undivided.[47]

The phrase "many minds" simply means that there are many men or many bodies in nature.[48] Mind as such may be developed. Man's development has been his intellectual growth--the growth of mind as an instrument. All of man's actions, whether labeled physical or mental are forms of behavior. Behavior is more than musculature; it is teleological also.[49]

This natural realm has logical structure. It is unified and coherent, systematized. It is the logical structure that identifies this realm also as the realm of mind. Mind is a collective name for all the empirical objects of thinking, for the realm of experience is the realm of mind.[50]

Thinking gives us knowledge of the physical world, but it does not construct it. Woodbridge criticizes Berkeleian or subjective idealism here, but his criticism does not affect modern personalism. No personalist says that the mind (human)

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[46] Supra, 89-91.
[47] Supra, 91-92.
[48] Supra, 102-103.
[49] Supra, 103-106.
[50] Supra, 97; ROM, 40-41.

constructs the objective world: that is the product of the infinite mind. Woodbridge does not deal with this point at all. He holds that the brain is an instrument of thinking and operates, much as a phonograph, in the production of ideas. Both are forms of mechanism. Here he is decidedly behavioristic. Thinking is the process of communication used by the organism. His view is summed up as follows: (1) The difference between acts of thinking and acts of walking is that we call one mental and the other physical; (2) Given ourselves as thinkers, we find nothing besides our bodies which does the thinking. The agent is always our bodily selves; (3) Thinking is co-extensive with the subject matter.[51]

Objective mind means simply that the universe is constructed rationally. This logical structure is discoverable, or, that is, the universe is rational.[52] Being is logically constructed and constitutes the realm of intelligibility irrespective of our efforts to comprehend it. This rationality suggests a rational purpose behind things. "Man believes in God because it seems impossible that our fate here has no significance beyond ourselves and no part in a wider plan."[53] But the existence of such a being cannot be established. The basic categories of nature are "space, time, and species" which together with thought, make up the intelligible world. God does not enter into this picture.[54]

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[51] Supra, 97-98, 113.
[52] Supra, 99-100.
[53] Supra, 99-100; ROM, 51.
[54] Supra, 100.

Language is not necessarily words, but simply a means of communication. His view is summarized as follows: (1) Language, which everybody says conveys ideas, is a material exchange and as such is on a par, metaphysically, with every other material exchange and they with it. (2) Ideas, although they are conveyed by something material, are not the material which conveys them but an effect wrought in the exchange and so are not material at all. (3) Ideas, because they are acquired and clarified by experience, that is, by the contacts of our bodies with the rest of the world, and because they are conveyed from one person to another, are in spite of their immateriality, not some peculiar idiosyncrasy in ourselves, but genuine discoveries and constituents of the system of things.[55] This is one of the hardest passages in Woodbridge to understand. The "system of things" is certainly in space and time. But ideas are not material so not in space and time, the only realm there is. Just what "ideas" are then seems impossible to say.

Consciousness is likewise a bodily action. It must be defined as the same general type of existence as space, time, or species. Its nature is akin to theirs.[56] It is a system of things or events in space and time, a "continuum of objects."[57] Objects are in consciousness because things are in one space. Through consciousness the world is not changed but a new relation with nature is discovered.

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[55] Supra, 101-102.
[56] Supra, 106.
[57] Supra, 107.

In the fifth chapter a survey of Dewey's philosophical system was made. The main purpose of his philosophy, he says, is to reintegrate human knowledge and activity within the general framework of reality and natural processes. The great task of philosophy is to develop an instrument or method for dealing with the problems of men. It must be a tool for freeing men from bias and prejudice and a way of clarifying their thinking especially along social and moral lines. In order to develop this kind of an instrument, philosophy must become self-critical, a criticism of criticism.[58] A difficulty in dealing with Dewey's thought is the fact that it is all of one piece. It is hard to separate and treat under independent headings, but must be looked upon as a whole. This is in part due to the early Hegelian influence.

A consideration of Dewey's psychology showed that in his early psychological writings, he supported the older soul-psychology. But he abandoned this view during the 1890's in favor of the newer functional psychology of such men as Angell and James. Dewey soon saw the individual and his actions as one. He rejected the ego behind states of action in the organism. Allport says "There is no longer any self for Dewey separate from musculature.[59] After his rejection of the self, Dewey searched about for something to take its place. It was many years later that he was to find the unifying agent in "habit."[60]

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[58] Supra, 122-124.
[59] Supra, 127.
[60] Supra, 128.

Dewey views "thinking" as an organic activity, as something which the organism performs at specific need. Thought arises in response to its own occasion. It is an activity as natural as any other activity of ordinary experience. It is the changing of physical things by physical means.[61] Mind or thinking is an instrument of biological adaption developed by the organism in the course of evolution.[62]

However, Dewey's theory of mind is not always consistent. Besides this functional view, there is also a strong suggestion of behaviorism at times. He himself says that his psychology antedated the use of this term as a psychological system. Knowledge, he says also, lies in the muscles, not in consciousness.[63] Meaning is primarily a property of behavior and secondarily a property of objects. But he does not go quite all the way. Speech is, he adds, very markedly distinguished from the signaling acts of animals. Unlike John Watson, Dewey does not reduce thinking to "silent exercise of the organs of vocalization."[64]

Then there are passages where Dewey retains some of his early self-psychology, contrary to his rejection of the ego. He speaks of being "aware of awareness." This sounds like a self that knows itself as itself. The self is also a "reflective agent." Dewey's psychology is not wholly consistent.[65]

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[61] Supra, 130.
[62] Supra, 131-133.
[63] Supra, 132.
[64] Supra, 133.
[65] Supra, 134-135.

He rejects any suggestion of an epiphenomenal view of mind in its relation to the body. These terms simply express "different characters of natural events."[66] The only difference between a bodily event and a mental event is a matter of complexity. The mental represents a higher organization of natural events. This organization Dewey outlines on four main levels as follows: (1) The psycho-physical organism which represents the organization of energies upon lines of need-demand-satisfaction. (2) The level of sensitivity, discriminatory response--the animal level as compared with the plant level of the first. (3) The level of feeling, marked by response to distant stimuli as characteristic of the higher animals. (4) Mind, whose distinguishing characteristics are communication, language, and response to meanings. Consciousness is present on all levels but only on the fourth is there actualized apprehensions of meanings.[67] Mind, Dewey says, is a genuine character of natural events on the level of their most complex interaction. The characteristics of this "complex interaction" he defines as consciousness, unity, awareness, manipulation of meanings, space and time transcendence, and striving for known ends.[68]

In his logic Dewey seeks to develop a "new" instrument of inquiry. He rejects traditional logical theories as unsatisfactory because they are incapable of application to existence. His aim is the development of a logic which will apply to the

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[66] Supra, 135-136.

[67] Supra, 136.

[68] Supra, 137.

whole realm of experience.[69] It is a logic of "natural events" which are functioning on the meaning level.[70] Since thinking is a natural event, logic must be naturalistic. Logic is the science of thinking or inquiry conceived on naturalistic terms. Inquiry is the process of transformation of the elements of a troubled situation into a coherent whole (untroubled situation).[71] Logic is the science of the natural instrument the human organism evokes in order to get itself out of a troubled or doubtful situation. This problem is not solved by the manipulation of personal states of mind, but by operations which modify existing conditions.[72] Terms such as thinking, reflection and judgment denote inquiries or the result of inquiries. Inquiry occupies an intermediate and mediating position in the development of an experience.[73] Experience is not to be taken as consciousness but as inclusive of all natural events which may at any time affect an organism. Consciousness is a "very small and shifting portion of experience.[74]

Dewey outlines the main theses of logical theory as follows: (1) Logic is a progressive discipline; (2) The subject matter of logic is determined operationally; (3) Logical forms are postulational; (4) Logic is a naturalistic theory; (5) Logic is a social discipline; (6) Logic is autonomous.[75]

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[69] Supra, 138-139.
[70] Supra, 139.
[71] Supra, 141; LOG, 104-105.
[72] Supra, 141.
[73] Supra, 143.
[74] Supra, 143; EEL, 6.
[75] Supra, 144-146.

The thesis that logic is naturalistic is developed in the light of inquiry. Inquiry or thinking is assumed to be a natural event. If this assumption is admitted, then it follows that logic is naturalistic. Dewey here assumed the continuity of all existences as natural events. Continuity is, he says, a primary postulate of experimental logic.[76] He rejects thinking as belonging to a mental realm, a thesis which has made an impassible gulf between thinking and natural existence. By means of logic conceived within the one matrix of inquiry, animal activities are transformed into intelligent behavior.[77]

All logical forms are developed within the operations of inquiry itself and are not given or imposed from without. Logical forms accrue to subject matter during the course of controlled inquiry. This is another fundamental thesis of his logic. Even the laws of identity, excluded middle, and contradiction are included in this process of inquiry.[78]

The ultimate purpose of inquiry is to produce warranted assertions. A warranted assertion is reached by means of the scientific method of investigation. Dewey does not give a consistent explanation of what he means by this method, for he speaks of science in the "narrower" sense, implying at the same time a "broader" sense.[79] Randall says that Dewey's method is not primarily based upon the method of the laboratory,[80] while Ratner

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[76] Supra, 148-149.
[77] Supra, 150.
[78] Supra, 151-153.
[79] Supra, 153-154.
[80] Supra, 155-156.

interprets the method in the narrower sense of experimentation.[81] There is evidence for both views in Dewey's writings so that the method may be interpreted either as (1) the laboratory method, or (2) in the broader sense, comparable to coherence, in the production of probable knowledge or warranted assertions.[82] The second is by far the more common usage.

Dewey's theory of knowledge is based upon the thesis that knowing is a kind of doing, a bodily activity. Mind must be defined in terms of doing and its results.[83] Knowing is a mode of practical action. It is something which happens to an object in the natural course of events. It is the representation of one thing by another thing. The instrument of knowing, inquiry, is natural, not brought in from another realm.[84] It is the process by which a troubled or doubtful situation becomes no longer doubtful or troubled. When doubt ceases the problem is solved and warranted assertibility has been reached.

Verification is the following out of a plan of action which brings about the successful or unsuccessful termination of inquiry. Consequences are always the means of determining the truth of the plan of action followed.[85]

An indeterminate situation is the state of affairs before inquiry begins. A doubtful situation does not require, according to Dewey, a personal doubter to be doubtful.[86]

Dewey defines metaphysics as a statement about the generic

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81. Supra, 156.
82. Supra, 156-158.
83. Supra, 159-160.
84. Supra, 160-161.
85. Supra, 162-163.
86. Supra, 164-165.

traits of existences without dividing them into physical and mental. All knowledge about existences is obtained by his scientific method.[87] The most important metaphysical problem is the relation of immediate qualities (consciousness) to objects of science (situations believed-in). The relations of subject and object, an epistemological question, is then the greatest metaphysical problem. There is passage within nature of objects with one set of qualities to objects with another set of qualities. This is a fact to be accepted, not necessarily to be explained. When a quality is known as a "sensation" it has been placed in a specially selected connection, that of being related to an organism or self.

Pragmatism recognizes the necessity of going beyond epistemology to develop an adequate metaphysics. Some theories have collapsed because they have been anti-metaphysical. Dewey's main protest in all his writings is against the "splitting" of reality of nature in two. To divide experience into mental and physical with no bridge between the two is fatal. His solution is to say that both the mental and the physical are natural, belonging to the only world there is--nature. This however, is only a verbal solution of the problem since it fails to define the terms clearly enough.[88]

Mind is a state of things, he says, in which qualitatively different feelings are significant of objective differences. The world of inner experience is dependent, to a large extent

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[87] Supra, 165-166.
[88] Supra, 167-169.

upon the extension of language. Language is a symbol. It was a physical thing before it became symbolic. It was developed through social intercourse. Language is the release and amplification of energies by a conferring on them of meaning as an additional quality.[89] But just how the mental is produced or how it functions, Dewey is not quite sure. Dewey is vague and finally says that he does not understand the exact physiological apparatus involved in thinking.[90]

Dewey distinguishes between mind and consciousness. Consciousness is present on all four levels of complexity mentioned above. Mind is the fourth or highest level. A contrast of the two on this level will show the difference.[91]

Mind	Consciousness
1. The whole realm of meaning.	Perception of single instances of meaning.
2. All-inclusive.	Single instance of mind.
3. Contextual and persistent.	Focal and transitive.
4. Structural and substantial.	Fleeting.
5. Constant luminosity.	Intermittent luminosity.
6. All mental events.	Selective from mental events.

Mind or the mental is an instrument as has been said. Hook outlines the functions of the instrument as follows: (1) An instrument is such in reference to some thought or intuition responsible for its construction as a tool. (2) An instrument for some aggregate of entities or domain of relations in which

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89. Supra, 172.
90. Supra, 172.
91. Supra, 172-173.

it is to be applied. (3) As an instrument in respect to and because of its form, arrangement, or structure.[92] Such an instrument is thinking. It cannot be used as a means of creating the world since it is an instrument by which the world is discovered. Thinking is no different an instrument from hammers and saws, or other such instruments.[93] Hook concludes that thinking is: (1) Of the same generic order as the object to which it is applied; (2) An incomplete system of relationships among things; (3) Not final but must forego all such claims and accept the status of an instrument striving for greater effectiveness.[94]

Dewey calls his system "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism." He begins with a rejection of anything "supernatural." The supernatural is, for him, comparable to the realm of the imagination.[95] The supernatural lies "beyond experience," which can be taken to mean beyond nature.[96] Nature itself is a totality which includes all events, physical, psychophysical, and mental, as well as all values.[97]

Nature is an all-inclusive term for both Woodbridge and Dewey. Like Aristotle they conceive of nature as achieving ends.[98] This dynamic view of nature pervades modern naturalism. Both Woodbridge and Dewey reject the rigid mechanism of Spinoza and Hobbes.[99] For Woodbridge, nature is a synonym for God, as in

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[92] Supra, 173-174.
[93] Supra, 175-178.
[94] Supra, 180.
[95] Supra, 181-182.
[96] Supra, 182-183.
[97] Supra, 183-184.
[98] Supra, 62f, 119f, 183-184, 217-218.
[99] Supra, 35-39, 73-74, 185.

the thought of Spinoza.[100] For Dewey, nature is also all-that-there-is, but he reserves the term "God" for the impersonal object of religious devotion.[101] Neither of these definitions of nature wholly agrees with any of those held to by other naturalists mentioned.[102] Modern naturalists are not too interested in exact first principles, except that they deny the existence of a personal God.[103] If an exact definition of nature were adopted, probably the most satisfactory one would be that of Kant. Nature is the universe as organized in sense experience.[104] This agrees with Webster's Dictionary where one of the possible definitions is "the totality of physical reality, exclusive of minds and the mental." This leaves all mental states, morals, and values outside the world of nature. Dewey and Woodbridge would reject this definition because they root everything within nature, although Woodbridge does come close to it when he says that nature is "pre-eminently the visible world."[105] But "pre-eminently" is not completely.

In the sixth chapter the application of Dewey's system to the field of values was considered. The modern problem of values stems from the bifurcation of experience and the elimination of teleology from natural science. Values were wrongly associated with human activities only.[106] All values arise out of nature. Logic, as the theory of inquiry, is the instrument to

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[100] Supra, 76-79.
[101] Supra, 203.
[102] Supra, 2-3.
[103] Supra, 185.
[104] Supra, 37-39, 185.
[105] Supra, 185, 46f.
[106] Supra, 194.

be used in the formulation of value judgments. Past theories of value failed because they held that the domain of values is wholly apart from the application of scientific methods. Dewey holds that no real development of value theory is possible unless the scientific method is used.[107]

His criterion of value seems to be twofold. The whole situation must be considered as well as the sort of consequences which result.[108] Values cannot be organized into a final system since a value must be determined in the concrete situation in which it arises. Means and consequences cannot be separated but are both parts of the whole situation, and they bear an organic relation to each other.[109] Every value is both an end and a means. No value is merely instrumental, but all values are also intrinsic.[110] Desire arises out of some lack in an existing situation--some conflict of tensions to be resolved.[111] Values cannot be reduced to feelings, for they have an existential status.[112]

All values are continuous with natural events. They are possibilities of existences or natural events. The "ideal" is the "possible" in contrast with the "actual" in a given situation. The eternal Essences of other systems of thought are the result of the hypostatization of the ideal, the making of it into a thing or person. For example, the ideal of the good has been made over into God.

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[107] Supra, 195-196.
[108] Supra, 197.
[109] Supra, 197-198.
[110] Supra, 198.
[111] Supra, 198-199.
[112] Supra, 199.

Values are not objective in the sense of existing in a realm of being other than nature. But they are objective in the sense that they are more than personal likings, are social, and are natural.[113] The only way to determine values is by the application of the scientific method to the whole of experience.[114]

The religious object, for Dewey, is the active relationship between the actual and the ideal. This relation he calls "God." God is the unity of all ideal ends arousing us to desire and action.[115] But at times the object of faith and devotion becomes the whole of nature or the universe. But God never means a person for him, since he has publically stated that he does not hold to a personal God.[116] He also rejects any doctrine of personal salvation, as well as immortality. Real salvation is to be achieved through science. Dependance upon the supernatural is trying to escape from existence.[117] He does not admit the problem of evil since it suggests a personal guidance of good and evil. The way to overcome evil is by the application of science to the problems of life.

The supernatural is rejected by Dewey for several reasons. The first is that it is built upon a false theory of knowledge. The supernatural is first set up and then proved. It is antecedent verification whereas science admits only of consequent verification.[118] The premisis upon which the doctrine is based

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[113] Supra, 201.
[114] Supra, 202.
[115] Supra, 203.
[116] Supra, 204.
[117] Supra, 204-206.
[118] Supra, 206-208.

is out of harmony with science.

Secondly, the idea of the supernatural is an abstraction and rests on the fallacy of hypostatization of "selective emphasis." The supernatural is the result of human desire for eternal Essences upon which to stand. Dewey finds in nature an all-sufficient ground for permanence and change, the one and the many, universals and particulars.[119]

Thirdly, the idea of the supernatural has obstructed progress and is an encumbrance to religion. It has ever been a detrimental factor in scientific and social advancement. Supernatural religion has caused a split in the very nature of things. Furthermore, an appeal to the supernatural never solves a problem; science alone shows us the way out of our difficulties.[120] Dewey rejects the supernatural in any form, as well as a personal God.

B. Summary of Criticisms

The main criticisms which were raised against Woodbridge are as follows:

1. The mystical and intuitive element in his writings, especially in An Essay on Nature, is not consistent in making a good scientific or philosophical investigation. He personifies and worships nature throughout.[121]

2. At times his statements become somewhat idealistic. He speaks of nature as "personal experiences." While he rejects absolute idealism, he, at times, might well be interpreted as

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[119] Supra, 208-209.
[120] Supra, 209-210.
[121] Supra, 82-83.

a pluralistic personalist.[122]

3. He is impatient in dealing with some problems. For example he dismisses "solipsism" as "unprofitable" without an adequate examination.[123]

4. He states that making the visible world problematic destroys intellectual clarity.[124] It produces a reign of confusion. If he means that questions are not to be raised, this attitude really stalemates speculative inquiry. What he means is not clearly stated.

5. His theory of knowledge is the scientific method taken in the narrow sense of the laboratory experiment. Truth must be discovered by experimental verification. He thus rejects probability knowledge.[125]

6. He holds that mind in the transcendental sense can have no genesis.[126] What he means is not well explained. Is mind eternal? If so, it is not a product of emergent evolution. Furthermore, if mind is eternal in the universe, this would be idealism, not naturalism. His position is by no means clear.

7. It is very hard to see what he means by ideas. The only realm of being is nature--the space-time realm. But ideas are not material things, hence, they cannot be in space-time. They are not "idiosyncrasies" of ourselves, but they are "objects" in their logical connection. If they are not material how can they be? His statements are very difficult to understand.[127]

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[122] Supra, 83.
[123] Supra, 83; EON, 32-33.
[124] Supra, 83.
[125] Supra, 84.
[126] Supra, 114.
[127] Supra, 115.

8. He is troubled by the facts of mental behavior.[128] Behavior is teleological and this fact cannot be explained by "structure." He holds to purpose in nature but rejects a directing agency although he knows such a position is "beset with difficulties." He says that an eternal personality could explain the facts, but this solution he rejects because God is not scientifically verifiable.

9. His view of consciousness is somewhat neorealistic.[129] This view has little or no psychological or philosophical standing today. Critics have pointed out that his view of mind is not consistent.[130]

10. Woodbridge offers several criticisms of idealism, criticisms which at times show a misunderstanding of idealism. The following differences between Woodbridge's naturalism and personal idealism are seen: (a) Woodbridge holds that nature is ultimate, while personal idealists hold that nature is part of the experience of the mind of God; (b) Woodbridge sees purposes and values arising from unconscious matter, personal idealism roots purpose and values in God.[131] No personal idealist holds that mind which emerges is the cause of the process, as Woodbridge suggests. The cause of the process is the eternal mind of God. Both finite minds and nature exist because of the eternal mind of God.[132] No personal idealist holds that mind

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[128] Supra, 115-116.
[129] Supra, 116.
[130] Supra, 116.
[131] Supra, 116-119.
[132] Supra, 117.

is something which comes in from the outside and lives in animal bodies. It is doubtful whether anyone holds such a view as he suggests.[133] No personalist holds that reality is divided into two worlds, physical and mental. Idealism is a protest against such a view.

11. Nature, for Woodbridge, is all-that-there-is. It includes both physical and mental events. To include all things under the term "nature" does not explain them. The term so used is too broad to be of much value. Nature, for him, is a synonym for God, as for Spinoza.[134]

The main criticisms of Dewey are as follows:

1. Nature is all-that-there-is for Dewey also. It includes all events, physical and mental, and all values as well. To include all within nature, gives only a verbal explanation of things. It does not explain their real nature at all.[135]

2. Dewey's psychology is somewhat confused. Mind may be thought of as (a) behavioristic, (b) functional, and (c) as a self. The functional or instrumental view, is most prominent. Many of the characteristics of mind are then not in keeping with functional psychology. He speaks of mind being conscious, united, aware of awareness, manipulating meanings, transcending space and time, and striving for known ends. This suggests self-psychology.[136]

3. Thinking arises, he says, only in response to the

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[133] Supra, 117.
[134] Supra, 76-79.
[135] Supra, 189.
[136] Supra, 136, 189-190.

doubtful, or in a troubled situation. This seems to be contrary to fact, as many have demonstrated that reflective thought may be spontaneous. Johnson points out that reason is not a separate faculty standing aloof until called to meet a crisis.[137]

4. The best that can be said for his solution of the mind-body problem is that it is verbal. To place both body and mind with nature does not explain facts. It is simply a stretching of the term to include the physical, mental, and psycho-physical. It assumes that all these fall within nature, as indeed they must, if nature is all-inclusive. Actually the mind-body problem still exists in the same way as before this arbitrary inclusion. Hocking's criticism of this view was noted.[138]

5. Dewey does not clearly explain or define his scientific method. It may be taken either in the narrower sense of the laboratory method, or in a broader sense, which is the more common, comparable to the coherence criticism of Edgar S. Brightman.[139]

6. Like nature, Dewey uses "experience" in a broad and inclusive way. At times it is synonymous with nature.

7. He is never quite clear on the status of mental states. What they are and what is their function is not clear. At times he practically denies their existence.[140]

8. Dewey, Woodbridge, and other naturalists reject personal immortality and agree on the ultimate doom of humanity. They see in man no eternal worth or value.[141]

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[137] Supra, 192.
[138] Supra, 191.
[139] Supra, 192.
[140] Supra, 141.
[141] Supra, 51, 205-206.

9. Dewey's thesis of the ideal is not satisfactory. There is more to an ideal than a possibility of existence. It is something that ought to be realized. There is a distinction between existence and obligation which he seems to ignore. To call both existences and values "natural events" does not explain their status at all. Actually there does not seem to be any reason in the theory of naturalism for devotion to values at all. Whether he admits it or not, a naturalist derives his ideals from some other source than nature.[142]

10. Dewey emphasizes continuity as an important principle in his thought. All events, physical objects, mental states, man and values, are bound together by this principle. This is the fallacy of hypostatization again, for "continuity" does not bind anything together. It is simply a term used to express the fact that continuity exists.[143]

11. When Dewey gives up the self his unifying agent becomes the muscle of the organism.[144] Just how the muscles unify is hard to understand. Thinking, willing, etc., are acts of consciousness, not of the muscles. The personality lives in the activity of self-consciousness, not in the muscles.

12. It is a question whether nature, as such, is a sufficient unifying factor for the multiplicity of the world. Bowne and others find the unity of multiplicity possible only in personality. Nature and values are also rooted, by idealists, in the personality of God.[145]

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[142] Supra, 200.
[143] Supra, 214.
[144] Supra, 127, 132, 190.
[145] Supra, 215.

13. Dewey's method of discovery is based on two assumptions. He assumes that his method is the only one for arriving at truth and further, that the existence of the supernatural cannot be established by it. When Dewey deals with the supernatural he is inclined to use his method in the narrower sense. Others would say that the existence of God is a warranted assertion.[146]

14. Dewey, like Woodbridge, holds that purposes arise out of unconscious matter. All values are rooted in nature also, since man is one of its products. Unconscious natural events are the source of all values. The truth of this stands or falls upon the assumption that nature is ultimate. Many hold that values cannot arise in this way.[147]

C. Comparison of the Views of Woodbridge and Dewey

The general views of these two thinkers may be compared as follows:

1. Definitions of Nature and Naturalism

	Woodbridge	Dewey
a.	Nature, existing in space-time, is all-that-there-is; the term "nature" is synonymous with "God."	Nature, existing in space-time, is all-that-there-is; but the term "nature" is not synonymous with "God." (See below.)
b.	Naturalism as a metaphysics is an investigation of what existences are and what they imply without seeking one ultimate purpose to explain them (other than nature itself which exists in space-time).	Naturalism as a metaphysics is an account of the generic traits of existences without distinguishing them as "physical" and "mental;" or the relation of natural events as immediate qualities (consciousness) to natural events as objects of science (situations-believed-in).

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[146] Supra, 216.
[147] Supra, 213, 215.

2. Points of General Agreement

a. Both reject a personal God or the "supernatural" in any form.

b. Man is wholly a product of nature.

c. Mind emerges from unconscious matter in the processes of biological evolution and is an example of nature's teleology.

d. Psychology: both have a functional or instrumental view of mind; its is an instrument developed by the human organism.

e. Epistemology: both hold that knowing is a kind of action performed by the organism.

f. Both reject personal immortality.

g. Teleology is natural--nature realizes ends or purposes. Both follow Aristotle in interpreting nature dynamically.

h. Both reject Spinoza's theory that nature is what it is by absolute necessity.

i. Both reject the mechanistic materialism which followed the rise of Newtonian science, a view well illustrated in the philosophy of Hobbes.

j. Both accept the Darwinian theory of biological evolution.

3. Main Differences

	Woodbridge	Dewey
a.	Attitude of investigation is mystical and intuitive.	Attitude of investigation is logical, scientific, and humanitarian.
b.	Method of discovery is that of the scientific laboratory.	Method of discovery is sometimes that of the scientific laboratory but more often "coherence."
c.	Verification if by laboratory experiment and acceptance of what can be scientifically shown to be true.	Verification is by following a plan of action, and truth is warranted assertibility as shown by satisfactory consequences.
d.	Mind is defined as a realm of discourse, or the assertion that bodies think.	Mind is defined as the most complex organization of natural events so that they are functioning on the meaning level.

e.	Consciousness is defined as a relation among natural objects.	Consciousness is defined as an awareness existing on all four levels of organic events, but only achieving meaning on the level of mind.
f.	God is used as a synonym for nature.	God is the active relation between the ideal and the actual or the totality of ideals arousing man to action.
g.	The "supernatural" is rejected because it cannot be scientifically verified.	The "supernatural" is rejected because (1) it is based upon a questionable epistemology, (2) it is an abstraction and an hypostatization of selective emphasis, (3) it obstructs progress and stalemates human effort.
h.	Values are natural but he has no clear or developed discussion.	Values are possibilities of existences, ideals that may become actual existences; they are not feelings or mere mental states.

D. Conclusions

The main conclusions of this study are as follows:

1. Influences on Woodbridge and Dewey. Dewey links his own practical view of philosophy with the social outlook of Plato. Both Woodbridge and Dewey accepted and developed Aristotle's dynamic view of nature; this is seen in their natural teleology. Both accepted Spinoza's view of nature as all-that-there-is, but they reject his idea of absolute necessity. Dewey openly, and Woodbridge more by implication, protest against Kant's bifurcation of experience into the phenomenal and noumenal orders. Dewey's emphasis upon continuity, coherence, and wholes is due to his early Hegelianism. Both accept the modern theories of physical science and reject the

mechanistic materialism which followed the rise of Newtonian physics, a view well illustrated in the thought of Hobbes. Both accept Darwin's theory of biological evolution. Both are influenced by the functional psychology of Angell and James, but Dewey to a greater extent than Woodbridge. Dewey's pragmatism was developed mainly under the influence of Peirce.

2. Nature for both Woodbridge and Dewey is all-that-there-is; for Woodbridge the term nature is synonymous with God as used by Spinoza; but, for Dewey, the term God is used to mean the active relation between the ideal and the actual, as well as the unity of all ideals arousing man to action.

3. Both Woodbridge and Dewey stress method; for Woodbridge the method is that of the scientific laboratory; for Dewey, the method may be that of the laboratory but more often is used in a broader sense, comparable to coherence.

4. Verification for Woodbridge means to accept the results of scientific experiment; for Dewey, verification is in general by consequences, although in the case of value judgments, the whole concrete situation must be considered. Truth, for Woodbridge, is what can be scientifically verified; for Dewey, it is warranted assertibility.

5. Both Woodbridge and Dewey reject teleology, in the sense of a purposer guiding events to a definite goal or end; but both accept a "natural teleology" by which nature's many events progress toward many natural ends; purpose is rooted ultimately in unconscious matter.

6. Both Woodbridge and Dewey reject a personal God, or the "supernatural" in any form; Woodbridge holds that such an existent is unverifiable and unknowable; Dewey rejects the supernatural because (a) the idea is based upon an unscientific epistemology, (b) it is an abstraction and an hypostatization of ideals by selective emphasis, and (c) it is impractical, obstructs progress, is useless for solving practical problems, and stalemates human effort.

7. The central metaphysical problem for both is that of the nature of mind and its relation to the body. Both hold that mind is a "natural" event, an instrument of the human organism; for Woodbridge, it is evidence for the fact that there are thinking bodies; for Dewey, it is the most complex organization of natural events so that they are functioning on a meaning level.

8. Consciousness, for Woodbridge, is a relation of object, his view is somewhat neorealistic; for Dewey, consciousness is an "awareness" among natural events organized on the organic level, from the psycho-physical to mind, but only on the level of mind is there awareness of meaning.

9. Woodbridge roots values in nature but does not discuss the problem at any length; for Dewey, values are possibilities of existences; they are not feelings or mere mental states, but have an existential status for they always belong to a concrete situation; he stresses values as possibilities of existences, more than matters of obligation.

10. There is much need for clear and standardized definition of philosophiac terminology. Ther term nature is used in different senses by these two thinkers, although there is much similarity in their general views. It was pointed out that other naturalists use "nature" in other senses as well, as was seen in the Krikorian volume. Naturalists do not wholly agree as to what nature is. Probably the most satisfactory definition of nature is that given by Kant who held that nature is the world of categorized sense experience. There seems to be little likelihood of any general agreement in the near future.

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ABSTRACT

The central problem of this dissertation is the attempt to define and criticize the use of the terms "nature" and "naturalism" in the thought of Frederick J. E. Woodbridge and John Dewey. The general plan of study is as follows: (1) a consideration of the main influences upon these philosophers including an historical survey of naturalism; (2) an exposition of the respective systems of these two philosophers; (3) a comparison of their views; and (4) general conclusions of the investigation.

In Chapter I a brief biography of each thinker is given. This is followed by a discussion of the main influences upon each. Woodbridge was most influenced by Aristotle and Spinoza. Dewey was influenced by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel who left, he says, a permanent deposit on his thinking. Both were influenced by the psychology of Angell and James, while Dewey's pragmatism came from Peirce. The literature in the field was then surveyed.

In Chapter II an historical survey is made of the development of naturalism in philosophy. Ambiguity in the use of the terms "nature" and "naturalism" is noted. Nature, philosophically, is used in at least five ways: (1) The world regarded as ordered process. This is the view of most of the ancient Greeks. The system of Democritus is the outstanding example of naturalistic thought here. (2) Nature, as the created order, distinguished from God. This view is well illustrated by the

orthodox church philosophers, Augustine and Aquinas. (3) Nature as all-that-there-is. Spinoza's deus siva natura is the classic example. (4) Nature as the phenomenal order, organized and categorized sense experience (Kant). (5) Nature as the world the sciences are investigating.

The influence of Darwin's theory of biological evolution upon naturalism is noted, and the history of naturalism in America reviewed. Men like Woodbridge, Dewey, Santayana, and Sellars have done most of the work here.

In Chapter III Woodbridge's concept of "nature" is considered. Nature is "the familiar setting of human history," or "public experience." Nature is pre-eminently, but not inclusively, the visible world. It is heaven and earth and sea, and all that in them is, which includes the invisible. Nature is the universe existing in space and time. All knowledge of nature is obtained by scientific experiment. The "supernatural" is rejected as unscientific and hence unknowable. All knowledge is gained through our "conscious bodies." Man is part and parcel of nature; he is no more exceptional an event than other animals, plants, or atoms. Nature is no more tolerant of him than of any other event, for he is a natural being with a natural destiny. Nature for Woodbridge is what Spinoza means by nature or God. Nature is historical, a history of histories, but all histories are purposeless, for they aim at no one ultimate goal. Teleology is wholly natural for there is no guiding and unifying intelligence behind world events. The true value of metaphysics is to see the implications of the

many existences without reducing them to one ultimate cause.

In Chapter IV Woodbridge's view of mind is taken up. It may be summed up as: (1) The difference between acts of thinking and acts of walking is that one is called mental and the other physical; (2) given ourselves as thinkers, nothing is ever discovered besides our bodies which do the thinking; (3) thinking is co-extensive with its subject matter. But the nature and function of ideas is left rather vague and confused. Consciousness is spoken of as a "continuum of objects."

In Chapter V Dewey's philosophical system is taken up. The purpose of philosophy, he says, is to reintegrate human knowledge and activity with the general framework of reality and natural processes. Dewey started out as a self-psychologist but soon moved to a functional view of mind. The shift is extremely important for it is the key to his whole later psychological and philosophical development. Thinking is a kind of activity, a function which the organism performs at specific need. The mental represents a "different character of natural events." Natural events may be organized on four levels of complexity: (1) The psycho-physical organism which is the organization of energies on the basis of need-demand-satisfaction (plant life); (2) sensitivity, discriminatory response (lower animal); (3) feeling, marked by response to distant stimuli (higher animal); (4) mind, the distinguishing characteristics of which are communication, language, and response to meaning. Consciousness is found on all levels but only on the fourth is there actualized apprehensions of

meanings. Mind is thus the most complex organization of natural events, so that they function on the meaning level. Its main characteristics are consciousness, unity, awareness, manipulation of meanings, space and time transcendence, and striving for known ends.

Dewey bases his logic on the assumption of unbroken continuity between lower and higher forms or events. Continuity is the basic category of experimental or naturalistic logic. By means of such a logic, animal activities are transformed into intelligent behavior. Knowing, for Dewey, is a kind of bodily action. This follows his instrumental view of thinking. The great problem of metaphysics is to determine the relation of immediate qualities (consciousness) to objects of science (situations-believed-in). In Dewey's terminology, this is the relation of the small and shifting portion of experience to the whole of experience. Metaphysics is an investigation of the generic traits of existences without dividing them into physical and mental. Dewey's system is a protest against the "splitting" of reality into two worlds, the mental and the physical.

In Chapter VI the application of Dewey's system to the field of values is considered. Values arise out of nature, for nature is the one and only realm of being. Value judgments are formulated and tested by the scientific method of inquiry. In every case of possible value the whole situation must be taken into account, not the consequences alone. A value is not a feeling or a mere mental state, but a possibility of an existence. The ideal is the possible in contrast with the

actual. The religious object or God is the active relation between the ideal and the actual and the unity of all ideals arousing man to action. It is never personal.

The main defects in the thought of Woodbridge are: (1) his mystical and intuitive attitude; (2) his impatience with some problems; (3) his assumption that the space-time order is all that there is; (4) his narrow view of knowledge and verification; (5) his unsatisfactory treatment of ideas; (6) his unsatisfactory concept of teleology; (7) his too inclusive definition of nature.

The main defects in the thought of Dewey are: (1) his psychology, confused with suggestions of behaviorism, functionalism, and self-psychology; (2) his view that thinking occurs only in a doubtful situation; (3) his verbal solution of the mind-body problem by stretching "nature" to include both physical and mental events; (4) the ambiguity of his scientific method; (5) his naturalistic theory of values, especially his failure to relate existence and obligation; (6) his hypostatization of "continuity"; (7) his unclear consideration of the status of mental states; (8) his too inclusive definition of nature.

The main conclusions of the study are as follows:

1. Woodbridge was influenced mainly by Aristotle's dynamic view of nature, Spinoza's pantheism, the biological evolution of Darwin, the discoveries of modern physical science, and the functional psychology of Angell and James. Dewey was also influenced by these, and in addition by Plato, Kant, and especially Hegel who left, he says, a permanent deposit on his thinking. His pragmatism came mainly from Peirce.

2. Nature for both Woodbridge and Dewey, is all-that-there-is; for Woodbridge the term nature is synonymous with God (Spinoza); for Dewey, the term God means (a) the active relation between the ideal and the actual; (b) the unity of ideals arousing man to action.

3. Both Woodbridge and Dewey stress method; for Woodbridge it is the laboratory method; for Dewey, it is (a) the laboratory method, or more often (b) coherence.

4. Verification, for Woodbridge, means laboratory demonstration; for Dewey, verification is by consequences, but, in value propositions, the whole concrete situation enters in. Truth, for the former, is what is scientifically verified; for the latter, it is warranted assertibility.

5. Both Woodbridge and Dewey reject teleology in the sense of any unified purpose in nature but accept "natural teleology," the progression of many events to many ends.

6. Both reject the "supernatural" in any form; Woodbridge, because it is unverifiable; Dewey, because (a) it is based on an unscientific epistemology; (b) it is an abstraction and hypostatization of ideals; (c) it is impractical, obstructs progress, does not solve problems, and stalemates human effort.

7. The central metaphysical problem is that of the relation of mind and body. Both have an instrumental view of mind. Woodbridge speaks of "thinking bodies;" for Dewey, mind is the most complex organization of natural events so that they function on the meaning level.

8. Consciousness, for Woodbridge, is a continuum of objects; for Dewey, consciousness is an "awareness" of natural events on the organic level, but only on the level of mind is there apprehensions of meaning.

9. Woodbridge neglects the problem of values; Dewey holds that values are possibilities of existences; he stresses value as such rather than matters of obligation.

10. There is much need for standardized philosophical terminology. Nature is used in different senses by these thinkers, although there is much similarity. They differ from other naturalists, for there is no general agreement as to what nature is. Probably the most satisfactory definition of nature is Kant's organized and categorized sense experience, but there is not likely to be any general agreement in the near future.

AUTOBIOGRAPHY

The author of this dissertation was born in Kingsboro, Prince Edward Island, Canada, December 25, 1913. His early education was obtained in the local public schools. In 1930 he entered Prince of Wales College, Charlottetown, P. E. I., where he studied for two years. The next few years were spent teaching in the public schools.

In 1939 he entered Gordon College of Theology and Missions, Boston, Massachusetts, in order to prepare himself for the Christian ministry. From this college he received the degree of A. B. in Th. in 1942 and was elected to the honor society of Phi Alpha Chi. The following year was spent in further theological study in Gordon Divinity School.

In the summer of 1943 he began work in Boston University Graduate School, majoring in philosophy. He was granted the M. A. degree from this University in 1944, writing a thesis on "God, the World, and the Soul in the Writings of Philo Judaeus." He then continued his studies, working for the Ph. D. degree, for which this dissertation is written.

While he was studying at Boston University, he served as an assistant in the Department of Philosophy for two years and as Chief Seminar Assistant, 1944-1945. He was elected to the Borden Parker Bowne Fellowship for 1945-1946. This same year he was elected president of the Boston University Philosophical Club. His presidential address, "The Logos Doctrine of Philo Judaeus," was published in The Philosophical Forum, 1946. In 1945-1946 he taught the course, "Philosophy and Religion," in the American Civilization Program of Boston University.

While he was completing his graduate studies, he was also actively engaged in Christian work. In 1943 he was called to become pastor of the First Baptist Churches of Sutton and Manchaug, Massachusetts, and in March, 1944, he was ordained to the Christian ministry. He resigned his pastorate in September, 1946, to accept a teaching position in the Department of Theology and Philosophy in Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, Chicago, Illinois.

He was married in June, 1943, his wife being the former Alda H. Jones of South Weymouth, Massachusetts. He has one daughter, Judith Ann, born February 21, 1946.

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